Gravitation and Cosmology with York Time by Roser, Philipp
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Dissertations Dissertations
12-2016
Gravitation and Cosmology with York Time
Philipp Roser
Clemson University, roser.philipp@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roser, Philipp, "Gravitation and Cosmology with York Time" (2016). All Dissertations. 1821.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1821
GRAVITATION AND COSMOLOGY WITH YORK TIME
A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Physics
by
Philipp Roser
December 2016
Accepted by:
Dr. Antony Valentini, Committee Chair
Dr. Murray Daw
Dr. Dieter Hartmann
Dr. Bradley Meyer
ABSTRACT
Despite decades of inquiry an adequate theory of ‘quantum gravity’ has remained elu-
sive, in part due to the absence of data that would guide the search and in part due to
technical difficulties, prominently among them the ‘problem of time’. The problem is a
result of the attempt to quantise a classical theory with temporal reparameterisation and
refoliation invariance such as general relativity.
One way forward is therefore the breaking of this invariance via the identification
of a preferred foliation of spacetime into parameterised spatial slices. In this thesis we
argue that a foliation into slices of constant extrinsic curvature, parameterised by ‘York
time’, is a viable contender. We argue that the role of York time in the initial-value
problem of general relativity as well as a number of the parameter’s other properties
make it the most promising candidate for a physically preferred notion of time.
A Hamiltonian theory describing gravity in the York-time picture may be derived
from general relativity by ‘Hamiltonian reduction’, a procedure that eliminates certain
degrees of freedom — specifically the local scale and its rate of change — in favour
of an explicit time parameter and a functional expression for the associated Hamilto-
nian. In full generality this procedure is impossible to carry out since the equation that
determines the Hamiltonian cannot be solved using known methods.
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However, it is possible to derive explicit Hamiltonian functions for cosmological
scenarios (where matter and geometry is treated as spatially homogeneous). Using a
perturbative expansion of the unsolvable equation enables us to derive a quantisable
Hamiltonian for cosmological perturbations on such a homogeneous background. We
analyse the (classical) theories derived in this manner and look at the York-time de-
scription of a number of cosmological processes.
We then proceed to apply the canonical quantisation procedure to these systems and
analyse the resulting quantum theories. We discuss a number of conceptual and techni-
cal points, such as the notion of volume eigenfunctions and the absence of a momentum
representation as a result of the non-canonical commutator structure. While not prob-
lematic in a technical sense, the conceptual problems with canonical quantisation are
particularly apparent when the procedure is applied in cosmological contexts.
In the final part of this thesis we develop a new quantisation method based on
configuration-space trajectories and a dynamical configuration-space Weyl geometry.
There is no wavefunction in this type of quantum theory and so many of the conceptual
issues do not arise. We outline the application of this quantisation procedure to gravity
and discuss some technical points. The actual technical developments are however left
for future work.
We conclude by reviewing how the York-time Hamiltonian-reduced theory deals
with the problem of time. We place it in the wider context of a search for a theory of
quantum gravity and briefly discuss the future of physics if and when such a theory is
found.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Quantum theory and gravity
Cosmology, the study of the history of universe, has a unique role in the investigation
of physical reality. Unlike, for example, particle physics or condensed-matter theory
it cannot be tested experimentally in the laboratory. All evidence must come from
observation of the one and only universe to which we have access. To make matters
worse, all our observations are made roughly from a single point in space and time.
Yet despite these limitations, cosmology — in particular the study of the very early
moments in the history of the universe — is not only fascinating in itself but also ex-
ceptionally useful in that it allows us to explore physics at extremely high energies and
on very small scales, where both gravitational and quantum effects are expected to play
a crucial role. That is, through observations of remnants of this very early period in the
history of the cosmos, we can hope to probe physics that is irreproducible in the lab to
any degree of practicality, if not in principle.1
1Since it is impossible to have the entire universe inside a piece of apparatus that is itself part of the
universe.
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The observational investigation of the early universe is uniquely challenging, but
also uniquely rewarding.
Aside from technical difficulties (to which we come shortly) it is this lack of ex-
perimental access that has led to the elusiveness of a complete and testable theory of
quantum gravity, a theory that is to describe physics under the conditions that existed
in the immediate aftermaths of the big bang,2 and that is to reduce to the testable limits
of classical general relativity and quantum field theory in the appropriate regimes. The
elusive theory of quantum gravity therefore has a unique historical status: Advances in
electromagnetism during the nineteenth century were propelled forwards by observing
phenomena such as static electricity and the action of magnetic forces, thermodynamics
by observing the behaviour of gases and other fluids. During the early twentieth century
the mystery of spectral lines and other atomic phenomena led, ultimately, to quantum
mechanics. Even general relativity, undoubtedly one of the most elegant theoretical de-
velopments in the history of physics, was not primarily a quest for mathematical beauty
but one to explain the advancing perihelion of mercury, for example.3 And while quan-
tum field theory was developed with the idea in mind of making quantum mechanics
compatible with the Lorentz-invariance of special relativity, experimental progress kept
up with theoretical predictions.4 On the other hand, the search for quantum gravity is
2Throughout this thesis I will use the term ‘big bang’ to refer to the initial singularity with which the
universe is thought to have started (unless quantum gravity were to tell us otherwise). A particle physicist
on the other hand would probably place the ‘big bang’ at a point when the universe had a size of roughly
the Planck scale (where classical general relativity is sure to break down), while some cosmologists
would use the term to describe a point in time as far forward as the end of inflation (since everything
before that is highly speculative).
3In fact, later in life Einstein revised his own history, stating that mathematical beauty had been the
driving force behind his development of general relativity. The documentation of the period 1910-1916
tells, however, a different story [123]. Einstein’s motivation was almost entirely experimental.
4Perhaps a notable exception is the Higgs boson, which was only observed some forty years after
having been predicted theoretically.
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driven not by experimental facts in need of explanation but by a desire for a unified
description of phenomena, each of which is already well described by an appropriate
theory such as general relativity or quantum field theory.
The fact that the quest for quantum gravity is driven by theory rather than experi-
ment is exactly the reason why experimentally corroborating any particular quantum-
gravity contender is difficult; if appropriate experiments were available in the lab we
would likely already have performed them, observed new phenomena and would have
had empirical evidence to guide our search.
That no accepted theory of quantum gravity exists is not due to a lack of contenders.
Proposals are numerous, albeit few are sufficiently developed theoretically to justifiably
claim the status of a self-consistent theory with concrete predictions. The proposed
theories differ radically even in the answers they give to most fundamental questions:
Is spacetime fundamental or is there a true differentiation between space and time? Are
space and time infinitely divisible? Is there a physically fundamental measure of time?
Is time even physical at all, and if so, what does that mean? Is everything dynamical or is
there a fixed ‘background’ structure that serves as the arena of the universe’s dynamics?
The reason for this plethora of theoretical frameworks is the failure of the ‘standard’
procedure when applied to gravity: the canonical quantisation of the classical gravita-
tional field of general relativity. In the present work we will spend some time gaining
an understanding of why this method fails. Suffice to say at this stage, both the suc-
cess of canonical quantisation with anything but the gravitational field, as well as the
procedure’s failure with it are in their own way remarkable.
A priori the idea of canonical quantisation appears ludicrous: Begin with a ‘clas-
3
sical’ theory describing entities such point particles, or fields, or rigid objects, where
the chosen classical theory is experimentally adequate on sufficiently large scales and
sufficiently low energies. Now perform a series of ad-hoc mathematical steps to arrive
at a new theory whose ontology (that is, the physical entities that purport to make up
the world) is radically different from that of the classical theory (if at all well-defined).
Finally establish a link with what is measurable by introducing highly questionable
postulates concerning the outcomes of ‘experiments’.
This new ‘quantum’ theory is now supposed to be understood as being more funda-
mental than the classical theory from which it originated, the latter being considered a
limit of the former under appropriate conditions. It appears that the reasoning is back-
ward, with the fundamental being derived from the approximation. Yet the phenomenal
experimental success of this ‘recipe’ in all areas of physics except gravity is truly re-
markable. When applied to the most fundamental classical theory known, the fields
comprising the standard model of particle physics, the resultant quantum theory has
been corroborated experimentally to an extremely high degree of accuracy.
However, when the same procedure is applied to the metric field gµν , a (0, 2)-tensor
classically used to represent the gravitational field (or, more accurately, to the spatial
metric gab on a suitably chosen space-like ‘slice’ taken from a foliation of the space-
time), it fails spectacularly. In particular, the resultant theory implies that the universe
is frozen, that no dynamical processes are possible at all. This is one facet of what has
been dubbed the ‘problem(s) of time’, which we will be discussing in some detail in
chapter 2.
At the heart of the problem lies the general covariance of the classical theory, that
4
is, the fact that the dynamical equations of general relativity are covariant under arbi-
trary coordinate transformations on spacetime. General covariance is not a physically
meaningful property of a theory. Any (classical) theory can be expressed in a generally
covariant form, a criticism going back almost a century [69]. However, applying the
quantisation recipe to distinct forms of the same classical theory does not necessarily
yield physically equivalent quantum theories. This fact is central to the line of inquiry
pursued in this thesis and will be discussed further in future chapters.
In general relativity one can consider four independent generators of coordinate
transformations at each point in spacetime, three in space and one in time. These are the
gauge freedoms of the theory at any one point in spacetime. Each of these gauge free-
doms leads to a constraint equation, totalling three so-called ‘momentum constraints’
and one ‘Hamiltonian constraint’5 stemming from the three spatial and one temporal
gauge freedom respectively. The problem of time is associated with the latter.
Understanding how the ‘frozen’ dynamics follow from the temporal gauge free-
dom is possible without reference to the full theory of general relativity. In fact, a
simple particle model suffices, provided its laws (that is, its action) is given in a time-
reparameterisation invariant form. This time-reparameterisation invariance serves as a
toy model for the temporal gauge freedom of general relativity. It is however impor-
tant to emphasise that in general relativity there are other facets to the problem of time
which do not appear in the case of a particle model, primarily due to the fact that while
in the toy model there is a single gauge degree of freedom determining the temporal
5Gauge constraints usually generate (non-physical) gauge transformations (‘generate’ referring to
motion in the configuration space determined by the Poisson bracket of the constraint and the config-
uration variable). However, it has been argued that the Hamiltonian constraint described real physical
change [11]. We briefly survey the argument at the end of section 2.2.
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parameterisation, there is one such degree per spacetime point in general relativity. As
a consequence in general relativity it is not only that the sequence of spatial slices con-
stituting the history of the universe may be freely relabelled, but it is not even clear how
the slicing should be done in the first place.
Short of more radical proposals, two ‘fixes’ come to mind. First, one may con-
sider partially gauge-fixing general relativity. Here one specifies the temporal gauge,
thereby choosing a unique slicing and a unique labelling of those slices. This elimi-
nates the Hamiltonian constraint and hence the frozen dynamics. A second approach
is to construct an entirely new theory which does not possess the slicing ambiguity in
the first place and has a fixed temporal parameterisation, provided the phenomenology
of general relativity can be recovered sufficiently closely in order not to contradict past
observations.6 One such contender is Shape Dynamics, a theory whose dynamical vari-
ables are those describing a conformal three-geometry (rather than the non-conformal
four-geometry of general relativity). Shape dynamics matches the phenomenology of
general relativity for spacetimes that can be foliated into globally hyperbolic slices (for
example, a spatially flat Friedmann universe) but differs in its prediction for what to
expect on the other side of a black-hole event horizon, for example. It turns out that in
the presence of such a hyperbolic slicing Shape Dynamics and general relativity have
a gauge overlap. That is, there is an appropriate gauge fixing (a choice of coordinate
description) for each such that the resultant two gauge-fixed theories are identical.
From the perspective of general relativity this gauge fixing consists of splitting
6It is not strictly necessary that all predictions of general relativity are recovered by such a theory,
but only those that have actually been tested. Discrepancies would allow for the ability to distinguish
between the two theories in future experiments.
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spacetime into slices of constant mean extrinsic curvature (CMC), a concept we will
introduce in some detail later. The slices are labelled by ‘York time’, named after James
York in whose work on the initial-value problem of general relativity in the early 1970s
this parameter had special significance [143, 28]. In a cosmological setting York time
is proportional to the negative of the Hubble parameter. This choice has a number of
convenient properties which we will describe in chapter 4. The choice corresponds to
the gauge overlap between Shape Dynamics and general relativity.
In the light of the problem of time, performing such a gauge fixing is an obvious
strategy. However, it is nonetheless radical in that it constitutes an explicit abandon-
ment of general spacetime covariance in favour of a more limited spatial covariance.
Physically speaking, it assumes the existence of a fundamental slicing of spacetime
into space and time, at least if this gauge choice is meant to be more than a convenient
coordinate choice for general relativity. Since we intend to construct a quantum theory
from this choice, and since different gauge fixings of the same theory may well lead
to phenomenologically distinct quantum theories after application of the quantisation
recipe (see chapter 3), the choice is indeed more than one of coordinates.
Abandoning spacetime in favour of space and time might appear to run in the face
of the last one hundred years of developments in physics, not least quantum field theory
whose development was in part motivated by the desire to construct a Lorentz-covariant
theory of particles. However, at closer inspection it is not, in fact, as far-fetched as it
might appear. One reason is that in quantum theory the notion of ‘time’ takes on a
fundamentally different role. Consider the quantisation of field theories. The quanti-
sation must be performed with a specific choice of temporal parameter. It is only after
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the quantisation is complete that one can show that the chosen splitting of space and
time (here in a Lorentzian setting with flat spacetime rather than the curved spacetime
of general relativity) is, in fact, undetectable and that no superluminal ‘signalling’ is
possible. That is, spacetime covariance is recovered at the phenomenological rather
than fundamental level. Further, covariant quantisation of the electro-magnetic field
(or equally fields of the strong and electro-weak sector of the standard model) leads to
‘ghosts’, unphysical modes in the field which are nonetheless essential to the mathe-
matical structure of such a formulation. Once again these do not appear at the level of
the phenomenology, but their status is somewhat of an open question on the ontological
level if the quantum field theory is treated with any degree of physical realism (which
it rarely is in practice). A fundamental choice of space and time would alleviate this
concern.
A very different reason to suspect the existence of a fundamental distinction be-
tween space and time is found in cosmology. It is well established that the observable
universe is highly homogeneous and isotropic at sufficiently large scales. Over distances
of hundreds of megaparsecs matter and radiation are very evenly distributed throughout
the universe. However, this homogeneity is not generally invariant but only holds in
one particular foliation of spacetime (up to small perturbations with scales smaller than
the scale on which the homogeneity holds).
Quantum theory demands an unambiguous notion of simultaneity. This is because
time is treated very differently from any other variable in standard quantum theory.
The departure from a fundamentally ‘relativistic’ physics is radical, but not unrea-
sonable. In fact, even at the classical level one can very naturally arrive at a field theory
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in which the universal light-cone, that is, the constancy of the speed of light and the fact
that this ‘speed limit’ appears to apply to all fields of matter equally, is a result rather
than a postulate of the theory. Starting from the desire to implement a truly ‘relational’
viewpoint of dynamics this has been achieved as part of the Shape Dynamics program.
However, for the emergence of the classical light cone a slightly simpler theory suffices,
dubbed ‘Relativity without relativity’ by its creators [12].
In order to arrive at a theory describing the evolution of CMC slices we will perform
a procedure called Hamiltonian reduction. It provides a method to arrive at a physi-
cal (that is, non-vanishing) Hamiltonian for the foliation-fixed theory starting from the
gauge-general Hamiltonian of general relativity in its Arnowitt-Deser-Misner (ADM)
formulation [4]. The ADM Hamiltonian vanishes in virtue of being the sum of four
constraints. In general, the Hamiltonian reduction cannot be completed analytically
since it involves solving a highly non-trivial (and non-linear) differential equation [28].
However, at sufficiently large scales on which the universe is spatially homogeneous the
procedure is relatively straightforward. For example, for a cosmological model with a
set of scalar fields the equation reduces to a cubic, which can be readily solved (see
chapter 5). At the level of perturbations it is more intricate and a perturbative solution
to the problem and the discussion of the resulting perturbation theory will constitute
chapters 7 and 8.
The reduced-Hamiltonian theory, unlike the original constraint system of general
relativity, can be quantised without (too much) difficulty, although we will encounter
some subtleties in the process. How then is the quantisation to be carried out?
It is important to remember that no quantisation method is intrinsically superior to
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another. Ultimately empirical data corroborates the contenders for the correct quantum-
gravitational theory and eliminates incorrect ones. If two theories, constructed from
the same classical theory using different methods of quantisation, are identical in their
prediction, one may be preferable for its conceptual clarity. However, realists must
proceed with care. The inference of facts about the world’s underlying ontology neces-
sarily involves a certain degree of ‘philosophy’ and one must be careful when choosing
between two empirically equivalent but ontologically distinct theories. This is not to
say that such reasoning is irrational, although many physicists throughout the twentieth
century and beyond have taken this attitude.7 In fact, here we wish to argue that any
fundamental physical theory must make statements about what the basic ontological
entities are with which the theory is concerned. Lacking such information a theory is
more akin to a prescription for predicting experimental outcomes, without or with only
very little explanatory value.
Yet it is no hyperbole to say that the last century has been dominated by confu-
sion with regards to the correct ‘interpretation’ of quantum mechanics, even in the
context of, say, quantised non-relativistic particle models.8 We chose to use quota-
tion marks around the term since it is rather inaccurate. What is generally counted
7More accurately, there are two distinct points here. First, there are schools of thought that claim
or at least imply that any form of reasoning about the underlying reality of a theory is meaningless.
Historically the best known such group were the logical positivists, most prominently represented by the
famous Vienna Circle. In a similar vein, arguably, falls the rising popularity of attempting to formulate
quantum mechanics in terms of partial knowledge and information with an ‘epistemic’ wavefunction
(concerning knowledge rather than physical facts), an approach appearing attractive to some at least in
part due to the progress in quantum computing and quantum information theory. The other point we are
referring to here is the unfortunate tendency of many physicists to look down on any form of philosophical
reasoning, in some cases using the word in an almost (and sometimes outright) derogatory manner.
8It would be an apt if slightly too general observation to criticise much of the work that has been
done in the foundations of quantum mechanics for being too focussed on non-relativistic models. While
mathematically and conceptually easier to handle, it is by no means clear that any insight gained in this
realm generalises. On the contrary, as we will argue, insight into the correct ‘interpretation’ might be
gained from insights in quantum gravity.
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among such interpretations includes theories with potential experimental discrepancies
(such as dynamical-collapse theories and non-equilibrium pilot-wave theory), as well
as ‘interpretations’ that are in fact no such thing but an explicit lack thereof (so-called
operational pictures).
Given the extent to which the quantum field theory of the standard model of parti-
cle physics has been tested it is highly doubtful that discrepancies in the predictions of
laboratory measurement outcomes by different formulations will be detected in appli-
cations relating to conventional (that is, non-gravitational) quantum field theory. On the
other hand, given the fundamental incompatibility of the standard quantum formalism
with general relativity, one or both of them must be revised. This might plausibly lead
to diverging phenomenologies in appropriate regimes, in particular in cosmological ob-
servations. One is therefore justified in the hope that cosmological observation may
help narrow down the set of viable proposals for theories of quantum gravity, which in
turn may contain indications for the correct formulation, or interpretation, of quantum
theory.
We already touched on how our theory of gravity may be modified in agreement
with astronomical observations, for example in the form of Shape Dynamics instead
of general relativity or by considering the existence of a physically fundamental notion
of time. We shortly turn towards a discussion of appropriate formulations of quantum
theory.
Before doing so however we must emphasise that there is no guarantee that any
choice of classical theory and quantisation method will succeed. Given the ludicrous-
ness of the quantisation method, it is entirely plausible to expect that the correct theory
11
of quantum gravity can only be attained ‘from scratch’, that is, by direct construction
from fundamental principles and not via quantisation at all. One example of such an ap-
proach is that of causal sets ([124]and references therein; for the original proposal, see
[19]) where the spacetime four-manifold is only considered a smooth approximation to
a discrete set of spacetime elements that are related via a partial ordering.9 However,
given the success of quantisation in other areas, the attempt to obtain an adequate theory
of quantum gravity in the ‘conventional’ manner is at least plausible.
It is not entirely clear what the ‘standard’ method of quantisation (that is, canonical
quantisation) is beyond the relationship between mathematical quantities, even leaving
aside the option of path-integral quantisation completely. Formally, canonical quan-
tisation is the construction of an operator algebra from a Poisson algebra of classical
functions by ‘promoting’ variables and functions of variables to operators [128]. This
operator algebra may then be represented as operators acting on complex functions on
a Hilbert space. Quantum mechanics is then itself about relationships between ‘observ-
ables’,10 a misleading term used to refer to the set of those operators that are self-adjoint
on the chosen Hilbert space. It is difficult to see how this formalism alone leads to the
physical reality of everyday objects or even that of particles or fields. At best, it de-
scribes some structural properties thereof.
In slightly less mathematics-focussed approaches ‘canonical quantisation’ is as-
sumed to also include the existence of a ‘quantum state’ or ‘wavefunction’, although
9Depending on the particulars of the approach, matter fields are either defined on those spacetime
elements or the elements are all there is and matter fields are emergent via a Kaluza-Klein formalism
[66, 67, 91]. One should also add that even the causal-set approach does not completely abandon the
notion of quantisation. It employs a ‘sum-over-histories’ method in its construction.
10Some authors [108, section 3.2.4] suggest that in a relativistic setting even classical mechanics is
about the relationship of observables.
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the latter term is often reserved to refer specifically to the quantum state when repre-
sented in the position basis of the Hilbert space. This wavefunction is then considered
to represent the physical state of the universe or at least the system under consideration
and the action of operators on this wavefunction is used to extract information about
the likelihood of measurement outcomes (hence the name ‘observables’), albeit with-
out being clear what exactly constitutes a ‘measurement’. The time evolution of the
wavefunction is determined by the action of a particular operator, the quantum Hamil-
tonian. If ‘measurement’ is understood as referring to a physical process (as it must or
its meaning is entirely obscure), then it is unclear why this process is supposed to have
a special status and is not itself encoded in the wavefunction and its evolution. This is
particularly problematic in the context of cosmology where the entirety of the universe,
including anything capable of performing a measurement, is supposed to be described
by the ‘universal wavefunction’. But even in non-cosmological application the concept
is problematic and a large literature has been dedicated to various facets of the ‘problem
of measurement’ (see [139] for a relatively recent review with many references).
In the minimalist sense canonical quantisation is a purely mathematical procedure
and does not constitute the construction of a physical theory. If the term is used in a
broader sense it is an incomplete if not inconsistent recipe to construct one. Either way,
by itself it is insufficient to arrive at an ontologically meaningful theory, although it may
describe certain mathematical structures underlying such a theory. In order to arrive at a
more satisfactory picture canonical quantisation must therefore be supplemented with a
set of physical principles that relate the operator algebra to physical reality. The abstract
notion of measurement does not suffice.
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One can separate proposals to overcome the overcome the measurement problem
into two groups, those that are purely interpretative of the quantum formalism and those
that add or change ontological and dynamical elements of the theory. Among the former
one counts the Everett ‘many-worlds’ interpretation ([42], though see [139, sec. 4] for a
review and discussion), and Quantum Bayesianism [48] and other ‘psi-epistemic’ (the
quantum state describes a state of information or knowledge) approaches. Among the
latter are dynamical collapse model such as those of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [49]
and de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory [34, 18, 59]. The list is by no means exhaustive
and this is not the place for detailed critiques of these ideas, which by themselves would
easily fill several doctoral theses.
To us, de Broglie-Bohm theory will be of particular interest. The reason is not that
it is a picture that is conceptually or otherwise more appealing than its contenders (al-
though it arguably is, as I have argued elsewhere [101]), but that it provides mathemati-
cal tools that are unavailable in other formulations. These tools are configuration-space
trajectories just like they exist in classical physics, although they are governed by non-
classical dynamics. Specifically, the trajectories may be used to provide a new way to
deal with quantum cosmological perturbations.11
Does the unique availability of mathematical methods imply that de Broglie-Bohm
theory deserves greater credence? In the process of constructing the quantum cosmo-
logical perturbation theory via the quantisation of a reduced-Hamiltonian system we
will see hints towards the plausibility of de Broglie-Bohm. Yet in the absence of a full,
non-perturbative theory of quantum gravity that explicitly relies on quantum trajectories
11There is no reason to think that the method we use here does not generalise to other applications,
although this will be the subject of future work.
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any definite conclusion of the sort would be rash.
However, it is possible to develop a quantum theory from a classical starting point
based entirely on the notion of such configuration-space trajectories and without refer-
ence to a wavefunction. The exploration of such a framework and its tentative applica-
tion to cosmology will form the final part of this thesis. A wavefunction-free formu-
lation of quantisation may be particularly suited to gravity and to the quantum theory
of the universe as a whole. Whatever its conceptual benefits, whether or not such an
approach can really lead to a fully satisfactory theory of quantum gravity remains to be
seen. In part IV we sketch the way forward.
1.2 Outline of this thesis
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the relevant background and
motivates the line of inquiry pursued in this thesis. In part II we develop the classi-
cal theory of York-time cosmology and in part III the corresponding quantum theory.
Chapters 2 and 4 for the most part review material (though hopefully introduce some
new perspectives), while chapters 3 (at least section 3.3), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12
contain primarily original work.
Most of the quantitative work has been published. The contents of chapters 5 and
9 (with the exception of section 5.4) has been published in ref. [106], that of chapter
6 in ref. [104], sections 7.2 and 10.1 in ref. [105], while sections 5.4, 4.4,7.3 and 7.4
correspond to the content of ref. [107]. The work on perturbation theory proper (chapter
8 and section 10.2) is contained in ref. [103], while that on trajectory-based quantisation
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methods (chapter 11) is presented in ref. [102].
We begin by setting the scene. Chapter 2 begins by considering the classical laws
governing a system of particles with the aim to express them in a time-parameterisation
invariant manner. That is, we wish to describe the dynamics in a way that is invariant
under the transformation t → T (t), the transformation from Newtonian time t to an
arbitrary (smooth monotonic) function T (t) thereof. Classically this turns out to be not
difficult. However, we find that it is a necessary condition of time-reparameterisation
invariance that the value of the Hamiltonian function vanishes, H = 0. This ‘Hamilto-
nian constraint’ leads to difficulties after quantisation however, where it seems to imply
that the quantum dynamics is frozen. This is a facet of the ‘problem of time’. We leave
the particle system behind and review relevant concepts in general relativity, in particu-
lar the ‘3 + 1’ formalism of Arnowitt, Deser and Misner. The formalism has properties
resembling those of the parameterised particle model and once again leads to frozen
dynamics after quantisation. However, there are other facets of the problem of time,
related to the spatio-temporal symmetries of general relativity.
In chapter 3 we review the idea of Hamiltonian reduction, a method to ‘pick’ a par-
ticular time parameter as physically fundamental and derive an associated non-vanishing
Hamiltonian, eliminating the problem of time. We argue that while in the classical the-
ory the choice of time is purely aesthetic, without consequences for observation, quan-
tisation with distinct choices of time may lead to diverging phenomenologies, implying
that if indeed there is a physical time, the list of contenders can be narrowed down
empirically. We illustrate this using a particle model.
Finally we introduce York time in chapter 4, a particular choice of time parameter
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in general relativity which is a plausible candidate for an underlying physically fun-
damental time. We discuss its role in the initial-value problem of general relativity,
perhaps the strongest motivation for taking York time seriously, before looking at some
of its formal and physical properties, specifically the Poisson structure of the reduced
variables, the behaviour of the York-time foliation around singularities and how various
aspects of the problem of time are resolved.
Hamiltonian reduction cannot be performed explicitly in the case of full general
relativity without additional symmetry assumptions since in this case the Hamiltonian
constraint cannot be solved explicitly. In part II we perform the procedure for various
physically relevant scenarios in which solving the Hamiltonian constraint is possible
due to the presence of symmetries or at least approximate symmetries.
In chapter 5 we consider the simplest possible cosmological scenario, a homoge-
neous and isotropic (‘Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre’) universe. This simplification leaves only
one geometric degree of freedom: scale. This one degree of freedom is ‘absorbed’ into
the notion of time through the Hamiltonian reduction, so that only matter degrees of
freedom remain, for which we consider one or more scalar fields. The model, though
simple, is nonetheless of relevance. First, it serves to illustrate some of the features
of the reduced-Hamiltonian method in practice. Second, the model will describe the
dynamics of the homogeneous background on which cosmological perturbation the-
ory is defined. Furthermore, aside from the simplified matter content used here, the
Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe does, in fact, provide a good approximation to our actual
universe. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of cosmological inflation in terms
of the York-time description.
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In chapter 6 we discuss an important, if unexpected implication of considering York
time the physically fundamental time parameter: the history of the universe should
(depending on the global geometry of space, that is, whether the universe is closed, flat
or open) be extended beyond what is normally regarded as temporal infinity t = ∞.
This point corresponds to a finite value of T and a priori there is no reason for T to
‘end’ here. However, there are also concrete physical reasons why the quantum theory
based on York time requires this extension for consistency. We consider the conditions
on various scalar-field potentials, with particular emphasis on potentials favoured as
candidates for inflation, for a smooth transition from ‘our’ side of cosmological history
to the extension.
Chapter 7 begins the development of the theory of cosmological perturbations in
York time. First we consider a simple model (a homogeneous but anisotropic model
classically equivalent to the ‘Kasner’ models) that explores the unconventional Poisson
structure, that is, the fact that the geometric reduced variables are only ‘almost’ canoni-
cal. We then examine phenomena that are well understood in conventional perturbation
theory, such as the freezing of modes as their physical wavelengths grow to scales larger
than the Hubble radius, in the context of York time cosmology.
Finally, drawing on the preliminary insights gained in the last chapter, in chapter
8 we develop the formalism for cosmological perturbation theory based on York-time
Hamiltonian reduction, discuss a variety of related conceptual points and aim to obtain
a physical understanding of the theory.
Chapter 9 begins part III the development of York-time quantum cosmology. We
consider the quantum theory of the cosmological ‘background’ by canonical quantisa-
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tion of the theory developed in chapter 5, explore the dynamics and draw some con-
clusions for different scalar-field potentials. We also discuss some of the more subtle
technical points of the quantisation procedure.
In the next chapter, chapter 10, we undertake the project of canonically quantising
cosmological perturbation theory as developed in chapter 7. First, we consider the quan-
tised anisotropic minisuperspace model explored earlier. This quantum theory can be
solved exactly, that is, we are able to find the Hamiltonian eigenvalues and eigenfunc-
tions, for example. Following quantisation the non-canonicity of the Poisson brackets
has some curious consequences relating to the nature of momenta. In particular, (1)
the theory does not have a momentum representation and (2) the momenta are not ob-
servables (are not Hermitian). We discuss the implication thereof. We then move on
to the quantisation of perturbation theory proper and discuss a number of its features.
Because of its complexity, no explicit solutions can be found and explicit connection
with observation will likely require numerical work.
Chapter 11 considers an alternative to canonical quantisation. After all, the problem
of time is the result of the application of the canonical quantisation recipe to general
relativity. In the rest of the thesis we only modified general relativity by selecting a
physically preferred choice of foliation. In this chapter on the other hand we consider a
modification of the quantisation recipe by ‘quantising’ via the mutual interaction of an
infinite set of configuration-space trajectories. The particular approach proposed here,
we argue, is preferable over similar quantisation methods developed in recent years for
certain technical reasons that we explain in detail.
The approach of chapter 11 is understood for simple finite-dimensional particle
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models. Its application to gravity remains an open question. In chapter 12 we discuss
the application of the quantisation scheme developed in the last chapter to gravitational
field theories and consider some cosmological examples. The mathematical develop-
ment here remains mostly schematic. Given that this line of inquiry is still in its infancy,
these last two chapters are to be understood as a speculative guide and the beginning of
a new direction of research rather than a presentation of established results.
Finally, in chapter 13 we summarise what has been accomplished in this work and
discuss its implications and open questions, as well as future directions of research.
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PART I:
SETTING THE SCENE
21
CHAPTER 2
THE PROBLEM OF TIME
In this chapter we explore the problems that arise when attempting to quantise a time-
reparameterisation and refoliation invariant theory such as general relativity. These
‘problems of time’ are perhaps the most pressing difficulty when formulating a theory
of quantum gravity.
2.1 Time-reparameterisation invariance
Much of modern physics describes the physical world through the use of variables.
These are mathematical quantities — often real or complex numbers, or entities rep-
resentable as ordered sets thereof (such as vectors, matrices and so on), or occasion-
ally more complicated objects with different mathematical behaviours (such Grassmann
numbers) — which are understood to have some physical interpretation, are subject to
certain laws expressible in the form of equations limiting the values the variables can
take and establishing relations between values at different (often infinitesimally sep-
arated) points in time. We leave a more careful characterisation of the relationship
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between the mathematical entities and physical reality to philosophical discourse.
The variables and equations that provide the best known description of our actual
world, the quantum state vector on the space of field variables of the standard model
of particle physics and, somewhat speculatively, of some appropriate theory of grav-
ity along the lines of general relativity, are so complicated that explicit calculations are
only possible for highly symmetric situations (such as Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre cosmology)
or through perturbative approaches (such as particle scattering theory or cosmological
perturbation theory). It is therefore often beneficial to look at non-realistic, simple,
finite-dimensional models in order to understand individual physical features of the
more complicated realistic theory. The implications of time-reparameterisation invari-
ance, that is, roughly, the irrelevance of the choice of temporal parameter to the form of
the equations, is no exception.
While the notion of a ‘variable’ is fairly clear, at least from a practical perspective,
the notion of ‘time’ is not. Greater questions aside, one can ask: Should time t itself be a
variable? Suppose we have a classical system of n particles of identical mass m, mov-
ing in three-dimensional space, whose instantaneous configuration may therefore be
described by a 3n-dimensional vector in configuration space. The set of all points that
describe the particle configuration at some time forms a trajectory in this configuration
space. This trajectory may well cross itself any (finite or infinite) number of times. Sup-
pose instead we consider the extended configuration space, that is, the 3n-dimensional
configuration space together with an extra dimension, time. Time t is treated as a fur-
ther variable. The trajectory in this 3n+ 1-dimensional space never crosses itself (since
every instant of time only occurs once). Furthermore, with time t explicitly included in
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the information given by the vector in the extended configuration space, the trajectory
may be parameterised by any choice of parameter τ , not necessarily the value of t.
The natural question raised by this picture is whether or not the physical laws (equa-
tions) that govern which trajectories are dynamically allowed (that is, are solutions to
the equations of motion) can be expressed in terms of the arbitrarily chosen parameter
τ . For simplicity, suppose the system is conservative (or scleronomic in Boltzmann’s
language), that is, its dynamics has no explicit time dependence. Consider the form of
the action when parameterised by τ rather than t:1
Action =
∫ t2
t1
dt L
(
q1, . . . , q3n; q˙1, . . . , q˙3n
)
=
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ t′ L
(
q1, . . . , q3n;
q′1
t′
, . . . ,
q′3n
t′
)
, (2.1)
where q˙i = dqi/dt, q′ = dqi/dτ and t′ = dt/dτ . We limit our considerations to
Lagrangians without second or higher-order time-derivatives. This still encompasses
the majority of physically relevant Lagrangians and indeed all those relevant for the
present work. Note that the variable t appears only in the form t′. It is kinosthenic,
or cyclic in Helmholtz’s terminology. It is then a basic theorem of classical mechanics
that its conjugate momentum, pt is a constant of motion. Bearing in mind that the
1In this and the next few paragraphs we follow roughly the presentation in Lanczos beautiful book
[72] on the variational principles of classical mechanics, chapter V, section 6.
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Lagrangian in the action in τ -form is t′L rather than merely L, this momentum is
pt =
∂(t′L)
∂t′
= L−
(
3n∑
i=1
∂L
∂q˙i
q′i
t′2
)
t′ = L−
3n∑
i=1
piq˙i
= −
(
3n∑
i=1
piq˙i − L
)
. (2.2)
The momentum pt conjugate to time is just the negative of the Hamiltonian of the sys-
tem. This insight will form the basis of the ‘reduced Hamiltonian formalism’ we will
employ below. At present, we note that the fact that pt is a constant of motion therefore
implies that the total energy of the system is, too. This constitutes a proof that the en-
ergy in conservative systems is conserved, although this was not our primary objective
here.
Another consequence of pt being a constant of motion is that t may be eliminated
entirely from the variational problem defined by this Lagrangian. This effectively con-
stitutes a partial integration (hence a partial solution) of the Lagrangian equations of
motion. In our case this eliminates any reference to the original notion of Newton’s
absolute time t. The general procedure to eliminate kinosthenic variables can be found
in most textbooks on classical mechanics (or e.g. ref. [72, ch. 5, sec. 4]). In brief, the
procedure is as follows.
Suppose variable qk only appears as ‘q˙k’ in the Lagrangian. In this case the Euler-
Lagrange equation for qk is simply the statement that the conjugate momentum pk ≡
∂L/∂q˙k is constant, pk = ck. One introduces a modified Lagrangian,
L¯ ≡ L− ckq˙k. (2.3)
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Now solve the original Euler-Lagrange equation of qk, ∂L/∂q˙k = ck for q˙k and substi-
tute the result into L¯ to arrive at a variational problem leading to dynamics equivalent
to the original but without dependence on the kinosthenic variable.
Let us apply this procedure to the variable t in order to eliminate any reference to it.
The momentum conjugate to t is a constant,
pt = −E. (2.4)
The modified action is
A¯ =
∫
L¯ =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
(
Lt′ − ptt′
)
=
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ (L− pt)t′ =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
3n∑
i=1
piq˙it
′, (2.5)
in which we must eliminate t′ via equation 2.4. Assuming that the Lagrangian has the
usual form L = K.E. − V , note that the integrand on the right-hand side of eq. 2.5 is
just twice the kinetic energy,
K.E. = 1
2
3n∑
i=1
piq˙it
′ = 1
2
3n∑
i=1
mq˙2i t
′ = 1
2
3n∑
i=1
m
(
q′i
t′
)2
t′ =
1
2t′
3n∑
i=1
mq′2i . (2.6)
Having chosen to focus on Lagrangians of the usual form, eq. 2.2 combined with eq.
2.4 now gives the familiar relation
E = K.E.+ V (~q), (2.7)
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where the argument (~q) is shorthand for (q1, . . . , q3n), so that eq. 2.6 implies
t′ =
√∑3n
i=1 mq
′2
i
2(E − V ) (2.8)
and the resulting action is (after another use of eq. 2.7),
A¯ =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
√√√√(E − V ) · 3n∑
i=1
1
2
mq′2i . (2.9)
This action is of geodesic form: it may be written as
A¯ =
∫ √√√√ 3n,3n∑
i=1,j=1
Gij(~q)dqidqj, Gij(~q) =
1
2
(
E − V (~q))δij, (2.10)
where δij is the Kronecker delta function. That is, the configuration space may be
considered to be equipped with a metric Gij(~q) and the variational problem is one of
minimising the path length in configuration space with respect to that metric. We will
meet actions of this form throughout this thesis.
The action principle 2.9 has been used by Barbour [9, 10] as a starting point for
time-reparameterisation invariant mechanics. He justifies this by arguing that the ‘ki-
netic metric’ Gij is the natural choice of metric on the configuration space. We chose
an alternative route for its derivation by promoting Newtonian time t to a variable and
parameterising the configuration-space trajectory by an arbitrary monotonic parame-
ter, identifying t as kinosthenic and hence being able to eliminate it, resulting in the
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geodesic action 2.9. The Euler-Lagrange equations for this action are
d
dτ
(√
E − V (~q)∑
k
1
2
m
(
dqk
dτ
)2 mdqidτ
)
= −
√∑
k
1
2
m
(
dqk
dτ
)2
E − V (~q)
∂V
∂qi
. (2.11)
These equations are dramatically simplified if we choose τ such that
∑
k
1
2
m(dqk
dτ
)2 =
E − V (~q). This is, of course, the case when τ = t, where one recovers the familiar
Newtonian equations of motion. The Newtonian time parameter is special: when the
dynamical laws are expressed with respect to t they take their simplest form. However,
we are not forced to make that choice or ascribe any fundamental meaning to t. But
given that t has this simplifying property it is no surprise that Newton and his followers
believed in the existence of an ‘absolute’ time.2
2.2 Vanishing Hamiltonians and frozen dynamics
It is an obvious next step to try to understand time-reparameterisation invariance in the
Hamiltonian picture. However, promoting Newtonian time t to a variable and parame-
terising the configuration-space trajectory instead via an arbitrary parameter τ leads to
a difficulty: The Hamiltonian vanishes. The Hamiltonian3 is defined as
Hτ = ptt
′ +
3n∑
i=1
∂(Lt′)
∂q′i
q′i − Lt′ (2.12)
2Newton’s reasoning was, of course, considerably more subtle and relied on philosophical and theo-
logical considerations as well [89, 73]. Furthermore, the Lagrangian formalism had not yet been invented,
although it is interesting to speculate what he might have thought of the above line of argument.
3We use a subscript τ to identify the Hamiltonian as the one defined with respect to the arbitrary
parameter and not, say, the Hamiltonian Ht defined with respect to Newtonian time t, which is given by
Ht = −pt.
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since the Lagrangian is Lt′ and the set of configuration variables is (t, qi, . . . , q3n). But
from eq. 2.2 and q˙i = q′i/t
′ it follows immediately that the right-hand side vanishes,
Hτ = 0. (2.13)
This result may be understood heuristically, although as with all heuristic explanations
care must be taken not to take this for being more rigorous than it is.4 The heuris-
tic picture is as follows. A Hamiltonian function generates (via the Poisson brackets)
motion of the system in phase space that corresponds to the physical evolution of the
system in time. But Hτ is to generate motion for all possible choices of τ . For exam-
ple, if Hτ generates the motion for one choice τ = τ1, exactly the same Hamiltonian
Hτ is to generate the motion for another choice, τ = τ2 given by τ2 = 2τ1, that is, a
choice where the parameter-time ‘passes’ twice as fast. But this is inconsistent unless
the Hamiltonian vanishes.
Eq. 2.2 followed from the parameterised form of the action 2.1. The vanishing of
the Hamiltonian is a direct result of the definition of the momenta (specifically pt) for
an action of this form and hence is a primary constraint in the language of Dirac [36].
It is the so-called Hamiltonian constraint. As an aside, note that the other momenta
p1, . . . , p3n conjugate to the original variables q1, . . . , q3n are independent of the choice
4It is not an uncommon occurrence for heuristic explanations to become the canon that is repeated
and propagated without question. A prime example is undoubtedly Hawking radiation, whose supposed
heuristic explanation by spontaneous pair production near a black-hole horizon has very little to do with
the rigorous derivation via the inequivalence of inertial frames at the horizon and at infinity. The heuristic
version goes back to a paragraph in Hawking’s original paper [58], though it is doubtful that the author
intended this idea to be popularised in the way it did.
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of time since
p
(t)
i ≡
∂L
∂q˙i
=
∂L
∂q′i
t′ =
∂(Lt′)
∂q′i
≡ p(τ)i . (2.14)
The result that the Hamiltonian vanishes remains unchanged if one eliminates the
cyclic variable t first. Starting with the the Lagrangian given by expression 2.9 (the
Lagrangian of Barbour and Bertotti [10]) instead, the momenta are
pBBi =
∂
∂q′i
√√√√(E − V ) 3n∑
k=1
1
2
mq′2k =
1
2
√
E − V∑3n
k=1
1
2
mq′2k
·mq′i, (2.15)
in virtue of which the associated Hamiltonian vanishes,
HBBτ =
3n∑
i=1
pBBi q
′
i −
√√√√(E − V ) 3n∑
i=1
1
2
mq′2i = 0. (2.16)
The Hamiltonian constraint does not pose any problem for the dynamics, at least
classically. For example in a conventional particle system with L = K.E. − V and
Ht = E = K.E. + V = −pt it merely says that the total energy E is zero. Since the
dynamics does not depend on the value of V but only its gradient (is invariant under a
shift in the potential V → V+const.), whether or not E = 0 is not detectable and the
choice of potential and resulting dynamics is effectively unrestricted.
The Hamiltonian constraint does however pose a problem for quantisation. During
canonical quantisation the canonical variables are ‘promoted’ to operators, which act
on ‘states’, that is, complex functions ψ over the configuration space of the system. The
constraint equations become equations of operators, which may either be identically
satisfied at the operator level or, if not, select a subspace of states that are considered
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‘physical’ in virtue of satisfying this quantum constraint equation, rather than mere
mathematical artifacts. We will encounter both cases in this thesis. This is not the place
to review the systematic treatment of constraints in the classical and quantum theory,
which is due to Dirac [36]. A comprehensive discussion of constraint systems can be
found in ref. [126].
Accordingly, physical states in time-reparameterisation invariant systems, that is,
systems with a Hamiltonian constraint Hτ = 0, must satisfy
Hˆτ ψphys = 0, (2.17)
where Hˆτ is the Hamiltonian operator obtained in the usual manner by replacing qi and
pi by operators qˆi and pˆi respectively in the functional expression for Hτ . In the context
of general relativity the analogue equation is known as the Wheeler-deWitt equation,
which we will encounter in section 2.3. The implication of equation 2.17 is that the
Schro¨dinger equation for physical states is then
i~
∂ψphys
∂τ
= Hˆτψphys = 0. (2.18)
The state vector does not evolve and the quantum dynamics is ‘frozen’. This static
result is known as the ‘problem of time’, although in the context of general relativity
there are other, related issues summarised under this label (see section 2.4).
The above treatment of canonical quantisation does, of course, not constitute a rig-
orous discussion. As we discussed in chapter 1, a more rigorous approach would be for-
mulated in terms of an operator algebra whose commutator structure is inherited from
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the Poisson algebra of the classical theory. For a thorough treatment, see ref. [128].
Suffice to say, the problem of time is unaffected.
The Hamiltonians Hτ and HBBτ were derived by extending the set of configuration
variables to include Newtonian time t. One might consider this counterintuitive to the
stated goal that is the elimination of an external time parameter. Is this the cause of the
problem?
Not so. Return instead to the parameterised action 2.1. Suppose we wish to elim-
inate any dependence on t, which only appears in the form of its derivative t′. If t is
to be meaningless in the desired dynamics then t′ merely denotes some arbitrary non-
negative5 function, which we will call N(τ). Its counterpart in general relativity, which
we will meet in section 2.3, is referred to as the ‘lapse’ function and we also adopt this
nomenclature here. Our proposed action is then
Action =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ N L
(
q1, . . . , q3n;
q′1
N
, . . . ,
q′3n
N
)
. (2.19)
Having ‘forgotten’ the origin of N(τ), this is now an arbitrary function that encodes the
freedom of choice with regards to the temporal parameter.
In many texts the argument proceeds by treating N like another dynamical variable.
One then introduces its conjugate momentum pN , which must vanish since dN/dτ does
not occur in the action. Such variables do not introduce dynamical equations of motion
but so-called primary constraints. The easiest way to see this is to write the action in
5What about dtdτ = 0? This would suggest that an extended interval of τ would correspond to a single
point on the t-timeline. A physical interpretation of this is not immediately apparent. However, later on
we will discover examples with such a relationship between two choices of time parameter, for example,
York time with de Sitter space.
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canonical form, that is, introduce conjugate momenta and perform a Legendre transfor-
mation of the integrand,
Canonical action =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
[
3n∑
i=1
piq
′
i −H(q, p)
]
, (2.20)
whereH(q, p) is a function such that the expression matches the original Lagrangian up
to total derivatives and is, of course, the Hamiltonian of the system. The new variable
N does not contribute to the sum since pN vanishes. Note that the canonical action
presents a new variational problem with 6n variables {~q, ~p} and its Euler-Lagrange
equations are just Hamilton’s equation. The Hamiltonian formalism can therefore be
understood as a special case of the Lagrangian formalism, namely limited to problems
in which the Lagrangian takes the form of a sum made up of pairs of variables one of
which (the ‘q’) appears as a time derivative while the other one (the ‘p’) does not, minus
a function of the variables only (without time derivatives). This result is independent of
any notion of reparameterisation invariance and the nature of the temporal parameter.
It applies just the same to mechanics in terms of standard Newtonian time [72]. In the
case of the action 2.19, the canonical action is
Canonical action =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
[
3n∑
i=1
piq
′
i −NH (~q, ~p)
]
, (2.21)
that is, the Hamiltonian is
H(N, ~q, ~p) = N ·H (~q, ~p) = N ·
(
3n∑
i=1
1
2m
p2i − V (~q)
)
. (2.22)
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The Euler-Lagrange equation for N then implies that
H (~q, ~p) = 0, (2.23)
which is exactly the Hamiltonian constraint obtained above.
The reasoning of the last paragraph — that is, the reasoning of most texts review-
ing the subject — is, on the whole, correct. The one step that may be objectionable is
the very first: Why should N be treated as a dynamical variable? It is a function of τ
but has no obvious physical meaning. The point we wish to make here is that it is, in
fact, not necessary to adopt N as a dynamical variable. First note that the form of the
canonical action is independent of this step. The system is expected to follow the ‘path
of least action’ for any choice of N (since our dynamics is to be independent of that
choice), which is akin to demanding that it be extremised with respect toN . That is, the
variational principle for N is justified on physical grounds, not because the function is
adopted to the pool of variables that are subject to the well-known Lagrangian machin-
ery. The formal consequence, namely the appearance of the Hamiltonian constraint, is
the same as in the standard argument. Here we merely took issue with its justification.
The derivation of the Hamiltonian constraint (and the resulting frozen dynamics fol-
lowing canonical quantisation) via the lapse function N is, in fact, the way the problem
is usually understood in the context of general relativity. There treating N as a variable
may more justified depending on one’s perspective: The lapse is effectively the infor-
mation contained in the time-time entry of the spacetime metric (4)gµν (i.e. µ = ν = 0)
and so from a spacetime point of view is indeed one of the variables. On the other
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hand, if a ‘3+1’ formalism is considered fundamental (that is, a slice of space evolving
in time), then N should not be considered a physical variable. We will discuss these
perspectives and the contrast between them in greater detail below.
Below we will also show that the problem of time may be addressed by supposing
the existence of a physically meaningful time parameter. Formally this is done via
a so-called ‘reduced Hamiltonian formalism’, where the choice of physical time T is
extracted from the physical variables and a corresponding (non-vanishing) Hamiltonian
function is derived. At this stage however it is important to acknowledge that this is by
no means the only possibility. In particular, the procedure of canonical quantisation—
itself questionable as we argued in chapter 1—may be abandoned in favour of perhaps
some other method to arrive at a quantum theory with the appropriate classical limit
(corresponding to the classical system with which we started) but without the suffering
from the problem of time. This more ambitious endeavour is began in chapter 11.
The relational particle dynamics of Barbour et al.
The elimination of a theory dependent on t in favour of a reparameterisation-invariant de-
scription was in part motivated by the fact that t had no physical role (although it did lead
to the simplest equations of motion). Yet t is not the only variable that has that property.
Any gauge degree of freedom should similarly be eliminated. In the context of Newto-
nian particle theories, for example, concepts such as absolute position and orientation are
physically meaningless unless reference to a notion of ‘absolute space’ is made. But since
absolute space plays no role in the physics, its introduction is unwarranted. For a system
of N particles in three dimensions the real number of degrees of freedom is therefore not
3N but 3N−6, the coordinates of all the particles minus the centre-of-mass position (three
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degrees of freedom) and the overall orientation in three-dimensional space (three further
degrees of freedom, for example in the form of Euler angles).
Eliminating unphysical degrees of freedom of this kind motivated Barbour and various
collaborators to develop the ‘shape dynamics’a of particles and fields [e.g. 9, 10, 8, 2, 12].
They include not only the six degrees of freedom mentioned but also the overall scale (only
ratios of distances are considered physical), so that a total of seven degrees of freedom
are eliminated. Why this leaves the dynamics of ‘shape’ is best illustrated by an example:
Consider three particles, effectively forming the three vertices of a triangle, naı¨vely having
nine degrees of freedom. However, the orientation of the plane of the triangle in space is
physically irrelevant (using up three degrees of freedom), as is the position of the centre of
mass on the plane (two more degrees of freedom) and its orientation in the plane (one degree
of freedom). Finally, the overall size of the triangle is presumed physically irrelevant (so
that geometrically similar triangles are considered just representations of a single physical
triangle), eliminating a seventh degree of freedom. The remaining two degrees of freedom
determine only the ratios of the three sides to one another — in other words the shape of
the triangle.
Formulating the dynamics explicitly in terms of physical quantities only is difficult. In-
stead these ideas are implemented via a procedure called ‘best matching’. The idea is this:
two system configurations differing only by the value of variables considered unphysical
are consequently themselves physically equivalent. At each instant one can therefore freely
‘slide’ the configuration-space point representing the system up and down these gauge or-
bits. Now choose at each instant the gauge variables such that the resulting system (the
triangle, for example) matches that of the previous instant most closely. This minimisation
procedure (one is minimising the difference in Newtonian representation between tempo-
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rally adjacent system configurations (triangles)) implies that certain boundary terms in the
action are forced to vanish, resulting in constraints.b In particular, the constraints are that
the momenta conjugate to the unphysical degrees of freedom vanish, namely
~P ≡
n∑
I=1
mI ~˙xI = 0 (Total linear momenta)
~L ≡
n∑
I=1
MI~xI × ~˙xI = 0 (Total angular momenta)
D ≡ 2
n∑
I=1
MI~xI · ~˙xI = 0 (‘Dilational’ momentum).
In addition, the elimination of an specific time parameter introduces the Hamiltonian con-
straint. Applied to a universe made up of particles, the consequences are that this universe
has zero total energy (due to the Hamiltonian constraint), zero total linear momentum, zero
angular momentum and zero dilational momentum. The value of energy is not detectable
anyway since shifting the potential by a constant has no dynamical effect. The value of the
total linear momentum is also undetectable unless Galilean relativity were violated. The
total value of angular momentum is however detectable, at least in principle (a rotating ref-
erence frame can be dynamically distinguished from a non-rotating one from within, and
a similar result holds for the dilational momentum. Hence this theory would be falsifiable
via measurement of the universe’s total angular or dilational momentum if indeed we lived
in a universe whose fundamental building blocks are point particles in three-dimensional
space.
A question here is however whether specifying initial data independent of the gauge vari-
ables is sufficient to uniquely determine the future evolution of the physical variables. If it
is, this would arguably constitute an implementation of Mach’s Principle, a concept that has
received ample philosophical discussion over the last one hundred years but disagreement
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persists over what exactly the principle is.
One can apply analogous ideas to gravitational field theories, which led to a series of
papers on ideas such as conformal geometrodynamics [e.g. 12, 2] and ultimately Shape
Dynamics (see footnote a).
Finally, the question arises whether the Hamiltonian constraint itself can be the genera-
tor of physical transformations, since all the other constraints relating to the total momenta
do not, and according to Dirac’s classification scheme [36] the constraint is primary and
first-class, normally associated with physically irrelevant motion. Barbour and Foster [11]
have however pointed out that the argument relies on a absolute time being the indepen-
dent variable. This assumptions is explicitly violated in time-reparameterisation invariant
systems. The Hamiltonian constraint may therefore be a generator of physical change, not
just movement along a gauge orbit.
a Without capitalisation we use this term to refer to any theory, which aims to eliminate unphys-
ical degrees of freedom as described. When capitalised, ‘Shape Dynamics’ refers to a particular
theory of gravity based on three-dimensional conformal geometries evolving in time, developed
in the last six years or so [e.g. 54, 53, 13, 84]. The terminology (shape dynamics versus Shape
Dynamics) is my choice. In the literature context and author usually determines which is meant.
bWe will use a very similar construction in the development of a new wavefunction-free quanti-
sation procedure in chapter 11.
2.3 The problem of time in general relativity
2.3.1 General relativity
General relativity is a classical theory that describes gravity. General relativity postu-
lates a space-time, represented by a four-dimensional (pseudo-)Riemannian manifold.
The fundamental physical variables are encoded in the spacetime metric (4)gµν(x), that
is, ten real numbers for each point of spacetime in the form of a four-by-four symmetric
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matrix.6 The metric encodes the geometry, that is, the notion of length and angles by
defining the scalar product between two four-vectors A,B at a spacetime point x,
(A ·B)(x) = (4)gµν(x)Aµ(x)Bν(x). (2.24)
The length of a vector is then given by |A| = √A · A. The equations governing the
behaviour of the metric are the ten independent Einstein Field Equations (EFEs),
(4)Rµν − 12 (4)R (4)gµν =
8piG
c4
(4)Tµν , (2.25)
where (4)R and (4)Rµν are, respectively, the scalar and Ricci curvature derived from
(4)gµν , and (4)Tµν is the stress-energy tensor of the appropriate matter fields, G being the
gravitational constant. For a full introduction to general relativity we refer the reader to
[86] or another book of their choice. In what follows we will assume the use of units
such that the speed of light c is unity.
The number of geometric degrees of freedom is however less than ten. This is
because the entries in the matrix (4)gµν are coordinate dependent. In other words, a sin-
gle geometry corresponds to an infinity of possible coordinate representations of that
geometry. The EFEs take the same form in all coordinate systems. That is, they are gen-
erally covariant, whence the name ‘general relativity’. Furthermore, every measurable
quantity must be independent of the choice of coordinate system.
6Throughout this thesis we will use the raised prefix ‘ (4)’ to denote quantities relating to four-
dimensional space-time (e.g. (4)gµν , (4)R, ,,,), while quantities concerning three-dimensional space
are written without a prefix (e.g. gab, R, ...). Greek indices assume values 0, 1, 2, 3 with 0 representing
the temporal direction, while Latin indices take values 1, 2, 3, ranging over spatial directions only. Ex-
cept where otherwise indicated (e.g. section 7.2) we follow the usual Einstein summation convention,
assuming a sum over repeated indices.
39
The precise physical meaning of general covariance and its relation to notions such
as ‘background independence’ (the absence of non-dynamical structures) and diffeo-
morphism invariance (roughly, that the theory possesses a certain number of continuous
symmetries) is, oddly, still somewhat contentious. See ref. [99] for a recent contribution
and references therein. In brief: Coordinates have no physical content. They are labels
of points in space and time, that is, methods of describing physical entities. Whether or
not the description of the physics (that is, equations and their formal solutions) is un-
changed when the labelling of points is changed is a question concerned entirely with
our description of the physics, not the physics itself. General covariance is a property of
our description, not physical reality. Indeed any theory can be cast into a fully covari-
ant form.7 This, in effect, was a point raised as early as 1917 by Kretschmann [69] as
a response to the undue importance some researchers — including, arguably, Einstein
himself — attached to general relativity being general covariant.
The Einstein Field Equations follow from an action principle that is simply the
extremisation of the scalar four-curvature, the so-called Einstein-Hilbert action,
EH action = 1
2
M2Pl
∫
d4x
(√
| (4)g| (4)R + Lmatter
)
, (2.26)
where Lmatter is the four-covariant Lagrangian density (with respect to the coordinate
volume and therefore including a factor of
√
| (4)g|) of the matter content and may
7For example, to obtain standard Klein-Gordon scalar-field theory in Minkowski spacetime, promote
spacetime derivatives ∂µ in the Klein-Gordon equation to covariant derivatives ∇µ and introduce an
additional equation to determine the spacetime properties,
Rµνρσ = 0.
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include a cosmological constant Λ.8
In equation 2.26 MPl denotes the reduced Planck mass. Its relationship to the cos-
mological constant G is
MPl =
√
~c
8piG
(2.27)
but throughout the rest of this thesis we choose units such that ~ = 1 and c = 1. We
refrain from setting MPl = 1 (or equivalently 8piG = 1) since it can at times be in-
sightful to see the dependence of the dynamics on these constants explicitly. We have
to choose if we wish to make reference to MPl or G in our derivations. While this is ul-
timately only an aesthetic choice, the two options do suggest slightly different physical
insights: how quantities and dynamics depend on the Planck scale MPl, which presum-
ably encodes where our classical theories break down entirely, versus how they depend
on the ‘strength of gravity’ G. Since ultimately we are interested in the construction of
a theory of quantum gravity, we choose to make reference to MPl in this thesis.
2.3.2 The Arnowitt-Deser-Misner formalism
The spacetime description of general relativity given above is widely accepted as the
correct way to interpret general relativity. Some particular solution of the Einstein Field
Equations is a description of a block universe, the geometry (and value of matter fields)
at all points in spacetime. It is not a sequence of configurations labelled by a time pa-
rameter. This makes a Hamiltonian formulation of the theory impossible since a Hamil-
tonian is to be understood as a generator of time translations, and this in turn means that
8Whether or not this is conceptually appropriate depends on the proposed origin of Λ [see e.g. 17].
Either way, mathematically it is unproblematic.
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the system cannot be canonically quantised. Early attempts to construct a Hamiltonian
formulation of general relativity culminated in a series of papers by Arnowitt, Deser
and Misner in the late fifties and early sixties, in particular [4]. Their approach became
known as the Arnowitt-Deser-Misner (or ADM) formalism and forms the basis of much
of the subsequent work on canonical quantum gravity. Other terminology used is the
‘3+1’ or ‘Cauchy’ formulation of general relativity.
For a naı¨ve approach to a Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity one might
propose the following: Choose some coordinate system that covers the region of space-
time for which we wish to arrive at a Hamiltonian description. Slices of constant t
automatically provide a foliation of the spacetime into spatial slices. Two points in
space on slices labelled by t1 and t2 respectively are considered the same point if and
only if they have the same spatial coordinate. Now construct a Hamiltonian density
(by some appropriate method) that adequately describes the evolution of all field values
(matter field and the spatial geometry induced on the slice) at all spatial points from
slice t to t+ ∆t.
Such an approach, or a variant thereof, would be, however, deeply problematic.
First, whether or not this can be carried out depends crucially on the original choice of
coordinate system. For example, the spatial coordinates must cover the same ranges on
each temporal slice, which is by no means guaranteed. Second, even if the procedure
can be carried out, the Hamiltonian theory has lost a crucial feature of general relativity:
its general covariance.
Part of the feat of ADM was to come up with a formulation that retains the full
general covariance at the Hamiltonian level. That is, the formulation has to be general
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enough to allow for any choice of foliation, and any choice of coordinates on each
slice, after the Hamiltonian has been derived, but no such choice must be made prior to
it. In what follows we will not reproduce the full derivation, which can be found in any
textbook or set of lecture notes on the subject (e.g. [86]) but merely highlight critical
points.
The first step is the decomposition of the spacetime metric (4)gµν into a spatial
metric gab that represents the geometry on a given spatial slice and four functions, which
establish the spatio-temporal relationships between one slice and infinitesimally nearby
ones and points thereon. The decomposition is as follows:
(4)g00 = −(N2 −NiN i), (4)g0a = Na, (4)gab = gab. (2.28)
The function N is the lapse function and will be shown to indeed correspond to a close
analogy to the notion of lapse explored in section 2.2. The three functions Na are the
‘shift’, which relate the coordinate values of points of one slice with those of infinitesi-
mally close ones. For reference, we also note the expressions for the inverse metric,
(4)g00 = −N−2, (4)g0a = N
a
N2
, (4)gab = gab − N
aN b
N2
, (2.29)
and for the spacetime volume element,
√
|det( (4)gµν)| = N
√
det(gij) = N
√
g, (2.30)
where the last equality is purely notational, g ≡ det(gij).
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The lapseN receives its name from the fact that it denotes how much proper time dτ
lapses per interval of coordinate time dt in the direction in spacetime that is orthogonal
to the embedded spatial slice. This interpretation relies on the existence of the entire
spacetime, in which spatial slices have geometrical relations to one another. This is a
natural assumption if we consider the four-dimensional spacetime picture to be funda-
mental and our ‘3+1’ formalism to be merely a re-description. On the other hand, if we
consider a picture in which the geometric properties of a spatial slice evolve in time (in
conjunction with matter fields defined on the slice), then this interpretation is nonsensi-
cal as there is no notion of orthogonality to a slice since there is no embedding. In this
caseN (andNa) must be considered free functions without geometric content, although
it is the appearance of these functions in the formalism that ultimately allows the recon-
struction of a spacetime picture by ‘welding’ spatial slices together in an appropriate
manner. The situation is mostly analogous to that in section 2.2, where N may be un-
derstood to encode a relationship of the arbitrary time parameter and Newtonian time
if and only if Newtonian time is considered to have a meaning in the first place, that
is, if and only if the parameterisation-invariant formalism is not considered the original
starting point. The situation is not entirely analogous however because not being able
to ascribe N with an obvious interpretation is due to slightly different reasons: In the
particle formalism it was due to the ‘non-existence’ of Newtonian time, while here it
is due to the absence of the notion of orthogonality. In the ADM formalism N relates
the arbitrary coordinate time to proper time rather than some ‘background’ time a` la
Newton. We will discuss the notion of proper time in section 4.2.
Whether the ADM formalism is considered to describe the relation between spatial
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slices and geometric variables thereon or rather the evolution of a single slice also de-
termines whether N and Na should be considered dynamical variables. In the former
case they describe geometric properties between slices and the identification of points
from slice to slice, and can therefore be considered geometric variables, namely just
a transformation on the time-time and time-space components of (4)gµν . In the latter
case N and Na are simply arbitrary function without dynamical meaning and therefore
should not be treated as variables. However, just like in the case of parameterised par-
ticle mechanics there is no distinction between the resulting equations and dynamics,
merely between the lines of reasoning used to arrive at them.
I am not aware that this point concerning the ambiguous nature of N has been made
explicitly in the literature, although at least some authors are clearly aware of it. For
example, Unruh and Wald [132] introduceN andNa as arbitrary functions on the spatial
slice “which have the interpretation of lapse function and shift vector in the spacetime
constructed from the time evolution.”
In the space-time picture the shift Na relates the identification of points by spatial
coordinates on neighbouring spatial slices. In particular, they denote how the point
identified by a particular spatial coordinate value x is shifted from the point that lies
orthogonally to the future of the point identified by x on the infinitesimally previous
slice. This implies that unlike the lapse N the shift Na depends on the purely spatial
coordinates chosen on the slice. As a consequence, the choice of how to split spacetime
into space and time fixesN , butNa is only determined once a coordinate system is cho-
sen on the slice. If one therefore makes some choice of physical time, such as the ‘York
time’ we will choose later in this work, the shift remains undetermined. In other words,
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because the way spacetime is separated into space and time is more physically mean-
ingful than the choice of spatial coordinates (in particular with regards to subsequent
quantisation), the lapse and shift are not exactly analogous to one another.
In order to establish the dynamics of the ADM picture, we must rewrite the Einstein-
Hilbert action 2.26 in terms of the new variables. This is not fundamentally difficult,
although the decomposition of the scalar 4-curvature (4)R into a scalar 3-curvature R
and other terms is somewhat involved algebraically. Helpful here are the Gauss-Codazzi
relations (see ref. [86]). The final result is the ADM action,
ADM Action =
∫
dt d3x N
√
g
(
R + gacgbdKabKcd −K2
)
+ matter terms. (2.31)
All terms in the Lagrangian density are understood to be functions of time and space.
The term Kab denotes the extrinsic curvature and K ≡ gabKab its trace. We will ex-
plain their meaning momentarily. We first wish to remark however on the form of this
Lagrangian density, which matches the usual ‘kinetic-minus-potential’ form where the
terms involving Kab constitute the kinetic term (which is furthermore a squared first-
order time derivative, as will become clear) and the term −R, which depends only on
the geometric variables gab and not their time derivatives, takes the role of the potential.
The extrinsic curvatureKab describes how the spatial slice is embedded in the space-
time manifold in relation to other, temporally infinitesimally separated slices. An iso-
lated slice cannot be said to have an extrinsic curvature, so at least at this stage we must
still assume that the spacetime picture is the fundamental one and the ‘3+1’ formal-
ism only a re-description. Formally the extrinsic curvature may be defined as the Lie
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derivative of the spatial metric along the normalised vector nˆ orthogonal to the spatial
slice,
Kab ≡ −12Lnˆgab = −12Lnˆ (4)gab = −12
(
nˆµ∂µ
(4)gab +
(4)gaµ∂bnˆ
µ − (4)gµb∂anˆµ
)
.
(2.32)
Another possible expression is in terms of a covariant derivative, Kab = −∇bnˆa. In
more useful and intuitive terms, the extrinsic curvature denotes the fractional rate of
deformation of a volume element—or equivalently, the rate of change of gab—with
respect to proper time τ , orthogonal to the spatial slice,
Kab = −1
2
(
∂gab
∂τ
− ∇aNb
N
− ∇bNa
N
)
, (2.33)
or in terms of an arbitrary coordinate time t,
Kab = − 1
2N
(
∂gab
∂t
−∇aNb −∇bNa
)
. (2.34)
The terms involving the shift Na ensure orthogonality since the time derivative alone
would measure the rate of change of the metric along the line connecting points of
equal spatial-coordinate value, which may be shifted relative to the point orthogonally
‘above’ the starting point. In many scenarios one is able to set the shift to zero, which
constitutes a partial gauge fixing of the spatial coordinates (a partial coordinate choice)
and indeed we will do so below since it significantly simplifies the algebra without
significant loss of insight.
The scalar extrinsic curvature K = gabKab is the rate of fractional shrinkage of
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volume with respect to proper time. In a homogeneous and isotropic cosmology like
the one we will consider below this implies that K is nothing but the Hubble parameter
up to a negative constant.
It is important to emphasise the importance of an embedding spacetime for the
meaningfulness of Kab. At the same time, however, it is not essential for Kab to have
this geometric interpretation. Instead it is possible to view Kab merely as a convenient
way to express the kinetic term of the ADM action.
The other point of note is that the ADM action 2.31 is already in parameterised
form, analogous to the particle action 2.19 we obtained in section 2.2. There we had
to ‘manually’ introduce an arbitrary time parameter and treat Newtonian time as one
of the dynamical variables. Here this step is unnecessary. The reason is that in general
relativity the time parameter is already dynamical, or at least its rate of change (given by
the lapse N or equivalently the temporal components of the 4-metric) is. In the particle
model there was no notion of shift since it was not a field theory and the variables had
discrete labels, but otherwise the situation is exactly analogous. Consequently, as we
will see shortly, the ADM formalism also suffers from the problem of time.
In order to make this apparent, first introduce the geometric momenta,
piab =
∂L
∂g˙ab
=
√
g
(
Kgab −Kab) , (2.35)
where the Lagrangian density L denotes the integrand of the action 2.31 and g˙ab =
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dgab/dt. The action can then be written in canonical form,
Canon. ADM action =
∫
dt d3x
[
piabg˙ab + ‘φpφ’−NH −NaH a
]
, (2.36)
where ‘φpφ’ stands for the canonical kinetic term of the matter content (the q˙ · p terms
that characterise the canonical action integral) and
H = −1
2
√
gM2PlR +
2
M2Pl
√
g
(
gacgbd − 12gabgcd
)
piabpicd +Hmatter, (2.37)
H a = −2∇bpiab +H amatter, (2.38)
with Hmatter and H amatter being place-holders for the terms appearing as a result of
the matter fields, which we are leaving general for now. It is common terminology
to call H and Ha the Hamiltonian constraint and momentum constraint respectively,
although this is somewhat confusing since the literal ‘constraints’ are the demand that
these expressions vanish,
H = 0 (2.39)
H a = 0, (2.40)
not the name for the expressions themselves.
The reason that they do vanish is analogous to the situation in the particle model
of sections 2.1, 2.2. Either one takes the spacetime view, in which case N and Na
are dynamical variables and then the Hamiltonian and momentum constraints follow
from their respective variation, or, in the space-in-time picture, they are just arbitrary
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functions but the action is required to be extremised for any choice of N and Na, in
which case the constraints also follow.
Note that each constraint describes the vanishing of a density and therefore con-
stitutes four constraint at each spatial point. An equivalent set of constraint could be
imposed,
∫
d3x ξ0H = 0 (2.41)∫
d3x ξaHa = 0 (2.42)
for any choice of the four functions ξ0(x), ξa(x). The expression on the left-hand
side have another role: The momentum constraint expressions 2.42 generate canonical
transformations that result from spatial diffeomorphisms on the slice, that is, infinites-
imal changes in the spatial coordinates. Expression 2.41 is the generator of canonical
transformations corresponding to diffeomorphisms of the spacetime metric (constructed
from gab, piab, N and Na if spacetime is not presupposed), although there are subtleties
with this interpretation since the correspondence only holds if the field equations are
satisfied [132]. On the phase-space hypersurface on which all constraints are satisfied
however, the set of expressions 2.42, 2.41 suffice to generate all the spacetime diffeo-
morphisms of general relativity.
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2.3.3 The problem of time in the ADM formalism
From equation 2.36 we can read off the ADM Hamiltonian,
H =
∫
d3x
(
NaH
a +NH
)
, (2.43)
which vanishes in virtue of eqs. 2.39, 2.40 or eqs. 2.41, 2.42 (simply set ξa = Na,
ξ0 = N ). According to the canonical quantisation procedure one now ‘promotes’ the
canonical variables to operators, which are acting on ‘states’, as we discussed in the
introduction (chapter 1). The quantum Hamiltonian given by expression 2.43 with gab
and piab replaced by gˆab and pˆiab respectively (and similar replacements are made for the
matter variables) determines the time evolution of those states. Operator-expressions
derived from the constraints now select which states are considered physically possible.
The Hamiltonian and momentum constraints 2.41, 2.42 therefore lead to the conditions
[∫
d3x ξ0Hˆ
]
Ψphys = 0 (2.44)[∫
d3x ξaHˆa
]
Ψphys = 0. (2.45)
These constraints ensure that Ψ is invariant under the same set of spacetime diffeomor-
phisms as the classical theory. In particular, 2.45 ensures that Ψ only depends on the
spatial three-geometry and not its metric representation. This means Ψ is a function on
superspace, the space of three-geometries of the manifold, each of which is an equiva-
lence class of metrics related via spatial diffeomorphisms. An analogous interpretation
of 2.44 is not possible since its meaning concerns the relationship between quantum
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states at different times. In conjunction with 2.45 the effect is that acting with a space-
time diffeomorphism in the spacetime constructed from the spatial slice at different
times on the argument of the state Ψ does not change it.
Equation 2.44 is known as the Wheeler-deWitt equation. It is the equation central to
the problem of time, more so than eq. 2.45. The reason is that in the Hamiltonian 2.43
and equivalently in its quantum operator form
Hˆ =
∫
d3x
(
NaHˆ
a +NHˆ
)
(2.46)
one can set Na = 0 by an appropriate choice of coordinates but not N , since N = 0
would lead to singular evolution — no proper time would pass during a finite coordinate-
time interval. That is, the contribution of the momentum constraint to the Hamilto-
nian essentially reduces to a matter of coordinates, the Hamiltonian constraint does not.
Equivalently the Wheeler-deWitt equation may be written as one constraint per space-
time point,
Hˆ Ψphys = 0, (2.47)
in analogy with the classical case.
In virtue of the Wheeler-deWitt equation 2.44 and of 2.45, the Hamiltonian annihi-
lates physical states,
HˆΨphys = 0, (2.48)
and this once again makes the Schro¨dinger equation imply a frozen dynamics,
i~
∂
∂t
Ψphys = 0. (2.49)
52
If Ψ is presumed to describe the physical state of the universe, which is the case in
quantum theory, then no evolution is possible. This is not only a formal problem but it
appears to outright contradict the fact that the state of the universe is evidently chang-
ing. This constitutes the problem of time in quantum geometrodynamics, the quantum
theory of the dynamics of spatial geometry as derived from the ADM formalism, or at
least one aspect of it. There are other issues arising from the spacetime-diffeomorphism
invariance (that is, the ability to choose one’s foliation freely and parameterise the slices
at will), which we will discuss in the next section.
2.4 Other problems of time
The problem of frozen dynamics is only one of a number of difficulties and questions
that arises when quantising (or even just preparing to quantise) a classical theory that
is refoliation invariant. A number of these issues are essentially related to the fact that
two theories that are classically equivalent — or indeed two methods of expressing the
same theory (for example, once in a four-covariant and once in a ‘gauge-fixed’ form) —
do not necessarily lead to equivalent quantum theories when the rules of quantisation
are applied. Many of these problems do not have counterparts in a finite-dimensional
models such as the particle model studied above.
The classification of the following list is primarily due to Isham [64], Kucharˇ [70]
and Anderson [1]. However, a number of issues are linked and cannot strictly be sep-
arated, and in some cases a solution to one issue would also constitute a solution to
another. Anderson fittingly calls them ‘facets’ of the problem of time.
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The global problem of time. It is not in general guaranteed that a system allows
for a time parameter that can be defined consistently everywhere. In particular, there
are scenarios where no function of the physical variables is always monotonic. It is
therefore not guaranteed that a global notion of time can be constructed.
The (thin) sandwich problem. Suppose data of the intrinsic spatial metric (such that
it satisfies the momentum and Hamiltonian constraints) is given on two (possibly in-
finitesimally) separated hypersurfaces, each of which is considered to be ‘space at a
given time’. It is unclear whether (or to what degree) this specification of the boundary
data uniquely determines the spacetime geometry. The reconstruction of a spacetime
from a series of spatial slices requires knowledge of the lapse and shift functions in
addition to the intrinsic variables on each slice. The problem is already a classical one.
Spacetime reconstruction problem. In the quantum version of the sandwich prob-
lem (presumably one would have to give a wave functional over spatial geometries as
data for the initial and final time) it is not even clear if and in what manner a space-
time geometry (or functional over spacetime geometries) can be constructed at all. This
touches on the much bigger question on the role of spacetime in quantum gravity.
Independence of evolution on the foliation. The (more or less) converse of the sand-
wich problem is: Suppose an initial and final spatial surface is chosen and the initial data
is fixed. If one then evolves the data via two different intermediate foliations, does one
arrive at the same final data? Classically it can be shown that this is guaranteed by the
first-class nature of the constraints (they Poisson commute with the Hamiltonian) [71]
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Figure 2.1: Different ways of foliating the spacetime into spatial slices while keeping the ini-
tial and final slice (the ‘bread’ of the sandwich) fixed. The sandwich problem and spacetime-
reconstruction problem concern determination of the foliation from data at the end points, while
the functional-evolution problem asks whether a quantum state (over geometries) on the initial
slice uniquely determines the quantum state on the final slice irrespective of the intermediate
foliation. At least the classical analogue, the question of the independence of the classical
evolution on the foliation, can be answered affirmatively.
(and so there is not actually a problem). But for a quantum theory this is not clear:
The functional-evolution problem. In particular, evolving an initial state Ψinit[g]
via two different intermediate foliations to a final state Ψfin[g], it is not guaranteed
that the two final states obtained in this manner are the same. In other words, are
the quantum Hamiltonian and momentum constraints all that is needed to determine
consistent evolution of a state?
Multiple-choice problem. This is essentially the issue that forces us to carefully con-
sider how to identify a physical time parameter. Different choices, while associated with
classically equivalent theories, lead to non-equivalent quantum theories.
These problems are mostly concerned with the relationship between space (or spa-
tial geometry) evolving through time and spacetime, in particular in a quantum theory.
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Therefore, if we are willing to abandon the idea that spacetime is in some some funda-
mental, or that it must play some role in the quantum theory, these problems are really
no problems at all. In fact, these problems arguably hint at the fact that the notion of
spacetime ought to be abandoned in the quantum theory. A spacetime picture can be
constructed in the classical theory in virtue of the constraints. The construction is rather
compelling — so much so that one may be forgiven to consider it more fundamental
than the theory of spatial geometry evolving through time. However, ultimately the
problems of time hint at the fact that this may be a mistake.
That said, in the absence of a fundamental notion of spacetime it would be desirable
to have a better understanding of why the constraints ‘conspire’ in such a way that a
spacetime construction is possible at the classical level. More accurately, why is the
(quantum) theory that describes our universe such that its classical limit has a structure
(namely, the necessary symmetries) that allows for the construction of spacetime? Of
course, any question in physics beginning with ‘Why?’ is notoriously difficult to answer
and at best an answer consists of a reduction of the problem to more basic and simpler
statements (for example, in the form of a simple physical principle). Nonetheless some
reduction of the sort would be highly desirable in order to do away with the crutch of
spacetime in explaining why the laws of gravity are what they are. I am not at this stage
aware of any work on the subject, either by physicists or philosophers.
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CHAPTER 3
PHYSICAL TIME
In this chapter we explain how the existence of a physically fundamental notion of
time would alleviate the problem of time. We explain how to derive via ‘Hamiltonian
reduction’ a theory with a fundamental notion of time from a classically equivalent
theory with time-reparameterisation invariance. We provide an example of how two
classically equivalent theories with distinct choices of time may lead to distinguishable
quantum theories.
3.1 Choosing a physical time: Hamiltonian reduction
There are numerous ways to overcome or avoid the problem of time. Very broadly
speaking, these may be divided into two categories: approaches that modify the quanti-
sation formalism such that the vanishing classical Hamiltonian does not lead to frozen
dynamics in the quantum theory, and approaches that modify the classical theory in
order to avoid the vanishing Hamiltonian, although some ideas may fall into both cat-
egories. The former require for the most part a radical departure from what is usually
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understood to constitute the framework of quantum theory. In chapters 11 and 12 we
explore a new method of quantisation, although also in conjunction with a preferred
spacetime foliation.
Among the latter type of approaches is what is perhaps the simplest idea of them
all, the choice of a fundamental time parameter. In the case of relativity, this includes
two separate steps: (1) the choice of foliation, that is, how to split spacetime into space
and time, and (2) the choice of parameterisation of slices. In the case of the time-
reparameterisation invariant particle model of sections 2.1 and 2.2 only the second step
is necessary.
Two claims constitute such a proposal, which a proponent will have to justify. First,
there is a claim of existence. The proponent claims that there is a physically preferred
foliation and time parameter. Second, the proponent identifies a particular choice of
foliation and time parameter and must explain why this is a plausible choice from the
infinite number of options. Of course, it is a perfectly viable position to make the first
claim and be agnostic with regards to the second. In fact, as conscientious scientists
we do not, of course, subscribe to any such proposal in particular. Rather, we consider
this solution to the problem of time plausible (it is no theoretical impossibility) and
therefore worth of investigation, but we do not believe that any particular choice of
time parameter is correct until we have empirical or other1 evidence to support such a
claim. However, in order to guide our search for plausible choices of time parameter we
1It is highly questionable what other form of evidence there could be. Clearly a theory has to pass
basic tests of mathematical and physical consistency. However, any claims beyond this must be viewed
very critically. In fact, the tendency by a few physicists (specifically, some string theorists [33]) to argue
for non-empirical selection criteria for theories has prompted a critique by Ellis and Silk [41], which in
turn has led to a fair degree of argument within the high-energy theoretical-physics community over the
last year or two. For a very recent and insightful clarification on the subject, see ref. [109].
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must invoke some theoretical ideas and since scientific inquiry is carried out by fallible
human beings our respective evaluation of particular proposals may vary.2 We will
discuss a particular choice of time parameter, York time, in the next chapter (chapter 4).
The basic idea is then as follows. Choose a time parameter that serves as the physical
time, derive a (non-vanishing) Hamiltonian that describes the dynamics with respect to
this parameter and quantise based on this new Hamiltonian. In this section we will
aim to understand the procedure that allows us to derive the non-vanishing, physical
Hamiltonian based on a choice of physical time parameter. The procedure to do so is
called Hamiltonian reduction and the resulting theory with the choice of York time is
the central topic of investigation in this thesis.
Of course, a crucial question is whether or not the choice of time has any measurable
consequence. That is, is the claim that some particular choice is the correct physical
time parameter falsifiable? Fortunately, the answer appears to be affirmative at least in
principle. In section 3.3 we will illustrate this using a simple two-particle model.
The central idea of Hamiltonian reduction is that the Hamiltonian is the generator
of transformations in time. In general, the quantity that generates transformations in
a variable qi is the momentum pi conjugate to that variable. Therefore, if the physical
time T is one of those variables (and this is what we mean by T being a ‘physical’ time),
then motion with respect to T is generated by the momentum PT that is conjugate to
T . The physical Hamiltonian is therefore HT ≡ −PT , where the minus sign is due to
convention. If T is not one of the ‘qi’, then one must first perform an appropriate change
2We are not only fallible with regards to our ability for analytical assessment of theoretical proposals
but also, for example, with regards to our biases towards familiar concepts (what we understand and built
our career on appears more plausible) and the biases of our funding agency (proposals more likely to
receive grant money suddenly become a lot more plausible).
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of variable to make it so. Depending on one’s choice of T , performing such a change of
variable may not always be possible—York time is a notable example of this—and one
must instead introduce T and PT as additional variables in conjunction with constraints.
Furthermore, the remaining reduced variables may then obey a non-standard Poisson
structure. We will see this explicitly in later sections.
The physical Hamiltonian, or equivalently the momentum PT , must be expressed
as a function of the other variables, so that equations of motion may be derived. Of
course, this assumes that PT is fully determined by the remaining variables. This it is
in virtue of the Hamiltonian constraint, which provides exactly the one condition (or
one condition per spacetime point in the case of field theories, in which one obtains the
Hamiltonian density via this method) that implies that having fixed all but one of the set
of canonical variables, that last one is determined. Hence one has to solve the Hamil-
tonian constraint for PT as a function of the other variables (including T ). This gives
the desired functional expression for HT . The existence of the Hamiltonian constraint
is guaranteed by the time-reparameterisation invariance of the original dynamical de-
scription, in other words, the parameterised form of the action. If the system is not
parameterised, it cannot be deparameterised.
It is by no means guaranteed that the Hamiltonian constraint is analytically solvable.
In fact, the full Hamiltonian constraint of general relativity is not. This is the reason why
we are restricted to minisuperspace models and perturbative solutions in later chapters.
The physical time T must be chosen in such a way that T is monotonic. Otherwise
PT may become singular and at best the reduced-Hamiltonian description is limited to
time intervals during which T is monotonic. In the case of York time problems arise if
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one attempts to describe a pure de Sitter space, in which T is constant over an extended
interval of conventional cosmological time t, for example.
Let us apply the Hamiltonian reduction procedure to the particle model of chapter
2. The simplest possibility is a return to Newtonian time. The vanishing Hamiltonian
Hτ has the form 2.12, which is just
Hτ = ptt
′ +
(
3n∑
i+1
pi
dqi
dt
− L
)
t′. (3.1)
The Hamiltonian constraint Hτ = 0 is then solved straightforwardly for Ht = −pt and
one obtains
Ht(q1, . . . , q3n, p1, . . . , p3n, t) =
3n∑
i+1
pi
dqi
dt
− L, (3.2)
that is, the conventional Hamiltonian of such a finite-dimensional model.
A less trivial example would be to pick one of the particles to function as a ‘clock’.
In other words, have some function of its position and momentum correspond to the
physical time T . We will explore this choice for a particular two-particle model in
section 3.3, where we use it to illustrate that two quantum theories, derived via canonical
quantisation from a pair of physically equivalent parameterised and deparameterised
classical theories respectively, are not themselves observationally equivalent.
Proof: Classically the parameterised and deparameterised theories are equivalent
So far we have merely asserted that the dynamics generated by the reduced Hamiltonian
HT are identical with those generated by the vanishing Hamiltonian Hτ of the parame-
terised description. We justified the reduction procedure by the fact that the ‘momentum’
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conjugate to ‘time’ is the Hamiltonian, but it is not necessarily clear that the functional
expression obtained by solving the Hamiltonian constraint for HT ≡ −PT should indeed
lead to a set of physically equivalent equations.
I am not aware of such a proof anywhere in the literature, although frequently it seems to
be tacitly assumed that the reduced and unreduced dynamics are identical. Nonetheless I do
not doubt that workers in the field (such as Arnowitt, Deser and Misner, or Choquet-Bruhat
and York) were aware of a proof such as the one below or similar and that for one reason
or another it was just never written down in their publications (to my knowledge).
For easier readability we consider the case of a finite-dimensional model such as the
particle model of chapter 2. We also assume that the proposed physical time is identifiable
with one of the variables, T = q3n+1. This can either be achieved by a suitable chosen
canonical transformation or by the introduction of an auxiliary variable together with an
additional constraint. (The latter would be required, for example, in the case of York time,
as we will see in the anisotropic minisuperspace model discussed in section 7.2.) This also
means that the Poisson brackets are the standard canonical ones after deparamterisation and
Hamilton’s equations take their usual form. As a result the short proof given here is not
fully general, although a generalisation is readily possible if rephrased in terms of Poisson
brackets.
Let us abbreviate functional dependence by writing f(~q) for f(q1, ..., q3n) and so on.
The parameterised system satisfies the Hamiltonian constraint,
Hτ (~q, ~p, T,−HT ) = 0
where T and−HT are just another canonically conjugate pair of variables and have not yet
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been given any special significance. The Hamiltonian constraint also generates motion in
the arbitrary time parameter τ ,
dqi
dτ
= {qi, Hτ} = ∂Hτ
∂pi
,
dT
dτ
= {T,Hτ} = ∂Hτ
∂(−HT ) ,
dpi
dτ
= {pi, Hτ} = −∂Hτ
∂qi
,
dHT
dτ
= {HT , Hτ} = ∂Hτ
∂T
.
The Hamiltonian-reduction procedure now requires us to solveHτ = 0 forHT as a function
of the other variables. Suppose we do so and obtainHT (~q, ~p, T ). Then define new function
G(~q, ~p, T ) as
G(~q, ~p, T ) ≡ Hτ
(
~q, ~p, T,−HT (~q, ~p, T )
)
,
that is, as the function Hτ with the functional expression of HT (~q, ~p, T ) substituted in for
the variable HT . By the nature of this construction,
G(~q, ~p, T ) ≡ 0
identically, that is, for all values of ~q, ~p and T , and so it is also the case that
∂G
∂qi
= 0,
∂G
∂pi
= 0 and
∂G
∂T
= 0.
One can now express dqidτ in terms of G(~q, ~p, T ),
dqi
dτ
=
∂Hτ
∂pi
=
∂G
∂pi
− ∂Hτ
∂HT
∂HT
∂pi
= − ∂Hτ
∂HT
∂HT
∂pi
=
dT
dτ
∂HT
∂pi
.
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But also, by the chain rule, since T is a suitably monotonic parameter by hypothesis,
dqi
dτ
=
dqi
dT
dT
dτ
,
so that Hamilton’s equation for the deparameterised dynamics in T follows,
dqi
dT
=
∂HT
∂pi
.
The derivation of the equations for dpidT is exactly analogous.
The steps can also be easily inverted to obtain a proof in the other direction, so that full
equivalence is established.
3.2 The meaning of the reduced Hamiltonian
A Hamiltonian is two things: First, it is a function of a set of variables representing
the physical degrees of freedom of a dynamical system, and possibly of time. Second,
the numerical value of the Hamiltonian has some physical interpretation, usually ‘en-
ergy’. That is, having arrived at solutions to Hamilton’s equations one can substitute
the values taken by the variables at some time back into the Hamiltonian function to
obtain a number. In many conventional cases the dynamics is independent of t, which
implies that the value of the Hamiltonian, the energy, is constant. It is doubtful that
the concept of energy would even be considered physically meaningful were it not usu-
ally conserved. That is, we can talk of a ‘flow of energy’ from one part of a system to
another exactly because overall it is conserved and can therefore be conceptualised as
something that is passed around. This interpretation is then applied to cases where the
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the numerical value of the Hamiltonian is not conserved and we speak of energy being
‘lost’ or ‘gained’, usually representing interactions with the world outside the system
under consideration. In other words, even here energy is taken to be conserved overall
but the appearance of energy gain or loss is due to our attempt to describe a system
interacting with the rest of the universe as if it were not. Yet the assumption is that if
we were to provide a complete description, then the Hamiltonian would once again be
time independent.3
This assumption is justified. The conventional variable t has no physical meaning
in itself. While to Newton it was an absolute ‘background’ time at the very foundation
of the structure of the physical world, today we may view t as the one choice of time
parameters that brings the physical laws into their simplest form (see our discussion in
chapter 2) and that can be ‘read off’ most easily from the time evolution of systems
such as pendula or the motion of the planets (ephemeris time). Having no physical
significance, the dynamics cannot be t-dependent except in cases where a t-dependent
term (usually the potential) is used to represent evolution outside the system under
investigation.
In a formalism with a physical time T however the situation is very different. The
interpretation of the numerical value of the Hamiltonian is not ‘energy’ but whatever
the physical meaning of −PT , the negative of the momentum conjugate to T , since this
is how the physical Hamiltonian was defined. Hence if the position of some particle
3In gravitational system the notion of energy is more complicated since here the energy density is
part of the dynamics itself, co-determining the stress-energy tensor and hence via the Einstein equations
the curvature of space-time. The two notions are can be roughly identified with each other physically if
we place a finite-dimensional particle system into a gravitational field. This description is not entirely
consistent though and the two notions of energy should really be kept separate, ideally using different
terminology.
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is taken for T , then the same particle’s momentum is identified with −HT . In general
reduced Hamiltonians are time dependent and their numerical values are not conserved
in time. In the case of York time, which we will explore in later chapters, the physical
meaning of the associated Hamiltonian density is the local spatial volume element and
the full Hamiltonian is the volume of the universe, both of which vary in time.
When quantising a reduced classical system, the eigenvalues and eigenfunctions of
the Hamiltonian are consequently not ‘energy eigenvalues’ and ‘energy eigenfunctions’
but also have physical interpretations depending on the meaning of the Hamiltonian,
such as ‘volume eigenvalues’ and so on in the case of York time.
3.3 Significance of the choice of time
If one takes a realist view of scientific inquiry — the idea that our theories not only
provide models useful for predictions but in some way are also a reflection of at least
some properties of the world itself, properties that are ‘really there’ — then theories
with different choices of physical time are manifestly distinct as their ontology is man-
ifestly distinct, even if their empirical predictions are identical. A physicist who rejects
a scientific realism on the other hand would disagree. To them an empirical distinction,
that is, a different prediction for observation, is required for two theories to be distinct.
However, even a realist should find a situation where there are two or more com-
peting theories with identical predictions troubling. It would imply that a fundamental
feature of reality, namely, in our case, what the true physical time parameter is, is un-
detectable in principle. The question of which theory is correct cannot be answered
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scientifically and becomes one of metaphysics rather than physics. In some cases one
of a set of empirically equivalent theories may be strongly preferable for other reasons,
such as mathematical or ontological simplicity. However, here one invokes a priori as-
sumptions about what reality is really like: that it is ontologically simple or is governed
by laws whose mathematical form is concise.
While such assumptions, whether explicit or implicit, have undoubtedly propelled
forward progress in physics at multiple occasions in history, to elevate them to onto-
logical tie-breakers for observationally equivalent theories is rash. Furthermore, the
occasions that spring to mind, such as the departure from geocentrism, the unification
of electricity and magnetism, special and general relativity, the electro-weak unification
and so on, all were at least in part observationally motivated and verified. Mathemat-
ical and ontological simplicity may have been ideas nudging the scientists’ minds in
the right direction but ultimately these theories made new predictions which could be
subsequently experimentally corroborated. By hypothesis, this would not be the case
for equivalent theories differing in their choices of fundamental time.
At the end of the last section we showed that classically the reduced-Hamiltonian
theory is equivalent to the parameterised theory of some particular system. This raises
the question whether or not quantum theories constructed via quantisation of these clas-
sical theories are themselves identical. In fact, that the choice of time does not matter
even when composing the quantum theory is a tacit assumption frequently made in
particular in the context of cosmological perturbation theory. Here one has to make
a ‘gauge choice’, meaning a choice of coordinates describing the small perturbations
on the homogeneous cosmological background. Changing the gauge leaves the back-
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ground description undisturbed (since the transformation is ‘small’) but transforms the
representation of the perturbations. A choice must be made (although ultimately mea-
surable quantities must turn out to be gauge invariant) because the four-diffeomorphism
invariance of general relativity implies that some of the degrees of freedom are merely
coordinate freedom, although there is no matter of fact of which ones these are. The
gauge choice not only concerns spatial coordinates on a slice but also small perturba-
tions of the slice itself (small ‘bumps’ in the foliation), so that it involves small defor-
mations in the time parameter. Classically this is known to be indeed only a choice
of description and not physical but it is then usually assumed without discussion that
the gauge choice is also irrelevant for the physical properties of the quantum theory
obtained through quantisation of the perturbations.
Such an assumption is problematic. For example, different choices of gauge will
lead to Hilbert spaces whose degrees of freedom have different physical interpretations
and it is entirely unclear that the quantum dynamics is physically equivalent when mov-
ing from one Hilbert space to another (the functional-evolution facet of the problem
of time in the context of cosmological perturbation theory). Different choices of time
lead to different reduced Hilbert spaces. A general argument against the equivalence has
been presented, for example, in ref. [79]. Here we will consider a concrete two-particle
model which illustrates that different choices of time can indeed lead to observationally
distinct theories.4 This saves the realist from having to rely on metaphysics, although
4There are, strictly speaking, a number of separate issues: (1) Can the canonical quantum theories
based on two distinct foliations be empirically separated? (2) Can quantum theories based on identical
foliations but distinct parameterisations be distinguished? (3) Can quantised reduced-Hamiltonian theo-
ries be distinguished from quantisations of the unreduced theories with gauge choices corresponding to
the same foliation but different parameterisation? This last question is the one we answer in this section.
A full exploration of all three of these and the specific conditions that lead to empirical distinguishability
is left for future work.
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there may remain classes of time parameters which lead to equivalent physics, so that
observation might only provide the possibility of a partial determination of the true
physical time.
Nonetheless it is encouraging to see that we might ultimately be able to detect what
this fundamental physical time is if indeed there is one. The observation would nec-
essarily be one of particular quantum phenomena. In particular, this model suggests
that differences may arise with regards to observations relating to the physical degree
of freedom that has been chosen as time. If there may be other differences not directly
related to the choice of time itself remains uncertain. Furthermore, a theory with a fun-
damental choice of time not only competes with other choices of time but also other,
radically different theories of quantum gravity. How far observations can disentangle all
such choices is an open question and will depend on the details of the various theories.
Consider then a system of two particles, each with mass m = 1, and suppose they
are constrained to a one-dimensional ‘box’ (or infinite well) but are otherwise free.
Denote the position of the particles by x and y respectively and let the box be of length
pi,
V (x, y) = −U if x ∈ [0, pi], y ∈ [0, pi], ∞ otherwise, (3.3)
where U > 0 is a constant. We consider two descriptions of this system. First, the
conventional ‘textbook’ description using Newtonian time t. Second, a deparameterised
description using one of the two particles as a clock. The parameterised action for this
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system is
S =
∫
dτ N
(
x˙2
2N2
+
y˙2
2N2
− V
)
=
∫
dτ (x˙px + y˙py −NHτ ) , (3.4)
where the second line is the canonical form. The momenta are
px =
1
N
dx
dτ
, py =
1
N
dy
dτ
(3.5)
and the function Hτ , whose vanishing constitutes the Hamiltonian constraint, is
Hτ =
1
2
p2x +
1
2
p2y + V = 0. (3.6)
As we discussed in chapter 2 the Hamiltonian constraint may be considered the equation
of motion for N . Note that the Hamiltonian constraint has no well-defined solution if
one particle is outside the box, since this would require
1
2
p2x +
1
2
p2y = −∞. (3.7)
Inside the box the Hamiltonian constraint implies that the total kinetic energy is fixed
to the constant U ,
1
2
p2x +
1
2
p2y = U. (3.8)
This equation illustrates why we chose to set the bottom of the well to a negative finite
constant rather than zero. Had we chosen the latter option, the particles would have
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been forced to be at rest.
We begin now with the classical analysis in terms of Newtonian time t. Here we
simply set N = 1 and relabel ‘τ ’ as ‘t’. This would be the textbook description of this
scenario, although we also retain the Hamiltonian constraint, which now constrains the
total energy to be equal to zero.5 The Newtonian Hamiltonian is
Ht =
1
2
p2x +
1
2
p2y − U (3.9)
while the two particles are inside the well, which is guaranteed by the Hamiltonian
constraint.6 Hamilton’s equations are just those of a free particle,
d
dt
px = 0,
d
dt
py = 0,
d
dt
x = px,
d
dt
y = py, (3.10)
excluding the instances when a particle hits a wall. For the purposes of this model
we are content not to treat collisions and instead limit the applicability of our analysis
to a time interval within which no collision occurs. If we wanted to treat collisions,
we would need to treat the well as the limit of a continuous potential, for example by
expressing V as a Fourier series terminated after n terms for the dynamical analysis
before taking the limit n → ∞. The solutions of the equations 3.10 are, of course,
trivial.
5Dropping the Hamiltonian constraint in order to have the system as it would actually appear in a
textbook indifferent to parameterisation invariance would not change the conclusions drawn from the
analysis of this section.
6It is a noteworthy if somewhat pedantic point that without the Hamiltonian constraint one must
additionally impose the requirement that the initial conditions are such that the particles are inside the
well, or equivalently that the total energy is finite. In that case, they can never leave the well. Otherwise
starting with a particle outside the well would constitute perfectly reasonable boundary conditions.
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Now consider that we instead choose a physical time by considering the particle
described by y a ‘clock’. Specifically, define T and its conjugate momentum PT as
T ≡ py
2y
, PT = −y2. (3.11)
This choice will not only illustrate the point that the two resulting quantum theories
are observationally distinct, but it also is a choice of time that is remarkably similar
mathematically to York time in minisuperspace models such as the ones explored in
chapters 5 and 9, and sections 7.2 and 10.1. The fact that T and PT do indeed form a
conjugate pair may be shown either by deriving their Poisson brackets (using the known
Poisson structure for y and py), or by considering the canonical kinetic term dTdτ PT and
showing that it is equal to dy
dτ
py up to a total derivative. We now perform the coordinate
transformation (x, px, y, py)→ (x, px, T, PT ), that is, we substitute T and PT for y and
py in Hτ ,
Hτ =
1
2
p2x +
1
2
· 4T 2(−PT ) + V, (3.12)
from which we can then solve the Hamiltonian constraint Hτ = 0 for PT in terms
of the other variables and derive the physical Hamiltonian according to the procedure
described in section 3.1,
HT (x, px, T ) ≡ −PT (x, px, T ) = − 1
4T 2
(p2x + 2V ). (3.13)
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This leads to the Hamilton’s equations
d
dT
x = − 1
2T 2
px,
d
dT
px = 0. (3.14)
The second of these might have been predicted since x and px have been untouched
by the introduction of T and PT and ddtpx = 0 above (something no change in time
parameter chan change–if it is constant, it is constant no matter how time is measured).
The equations of motion can be solved:
x =
p0x
2T
+ x0 =
p0x
p0y
y + x0 (3.15)
with p0x, p
0
y and x0 being constants determined by the initial conditions. We know that
the dynamics must be equivalent in virtue of the proof given in the previous section,
but one can also verify explicitly that the equations in t and T are indeed physically
equivalent.
Let us now canonically quantise the two descriptions. We are going to be agnostic
about the underlying quantum ontology and simply perform the standard procedure
of canonical quantisation of which we provided a discussion in chapter 1. In terms
of t the quantum system is well known from any introductory textbook on quantum
mechanics with the exception of inclusion of the Hamiltonian constraint. The quantum
Hamiltonian operator is
Hˆt =
1
2
pˆ2x +
1
2
pˆ2y + V (3.16)
where the momentum operators take their usual form in the position basis. In order to
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solve the Hamiltonian eigenequation, consider the ansatz ψ = ψx(x)ψy(y), which leads
to the equation7
− ~
2
2
∂2xψx = (Ex − Vx)ψx (3.17)
for x-eigenfunction ψx and x-eigenvalue Ex, and an analogous equation for ψy and
Ey, with Vx + Vy = V . The infinite-well potential manifests in boundary conditions
ψx(0) = ψx(pi) = 0, with which the equation gives solutions (labelled by k ∈ N)
ψkx =
√
2
pi
sin(kx). (3.18)
An anologous results holds forψy. For a Hamiltonian eigenstateψnm(x, y) = pinx(x)ψ
m
y (y)
the corresponding energy eigenvalue is
E =
~2
2
(n2 +m2)− U. (3.19)
This essentially completes the standard textbook analysis. We also consider the pres-
ence of the Hamiltonian constraint. Constraints in a classical system manifest in the
form of conditions on the physical wavefunction. The quantum Hamiltonian constraint
states that physical states satisfy Hˆtψphys = 0, or
− ~
2
2
(∂2x + ∂
2
y)ψphys = Uψphys, (3.20)
while states not satisfying this condition are considered mathematical artifacts without
7For the purposes of this section only, we include the constant ~ explicitly.
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physical relevance. Expressed in the Hamiltonian eigenbasis,
ψphys =
∑
n,m
cnmψ
n
xψ
m
y , (3.21)
this condition becomes ∑
n,m
cnm
~2
2
(n2 +m2) = U. (3.22)
This has the rather peculiar implication that there are physical Hamiltonian eigenstates
(corresponding to having only one non-vanishing coefficient cnm) only if U is equal to
one of a subset of integer multiples of ~2/2. The physical meaning of this is somewhat
of an open question but since the infinite square well is not a realistic model of our
universe this peculiarity may not concern us for our purposes. The quantum constraint
is effectively a Wheeler-deWitt-like equation and implies that the dynamics is frozen
We alluded earlier that phenomenological differences arise when considering mea-
surements relating to observables associated with the physical time T , that is, the y-
particle. To see this, consider the expectation value 〈y2〉. For a general physical state
3.21 this is
〈ψ | y2 |ψ 〉 =
∑
k
∑
m
|ckm|2 ·
(
pi2
3
− 1
2m2
)
+
∑
k
∑
l 6=m
c∗klckm(−1)l+m ·
8lm
(l2 −m2)2 .
(3.23)
The term inside the sum in the first part of this expression is what one has for Hamil-
tonian eigenstates, the second term corresponds to the cross-term contribution only
present in non-eigenstates. In general c∗klckm has a time-dependent overall phase factor,
so that the second sum itself is time-dependent, while the first is constant. However,
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suppose that U is such that there exist physical energy eigenstates, that is, U is an in-
teger multiple of ~/2. Then for such states the second sum vanishes and there exist
physically allowed states in which 〈y2〉 is time-independent.
Now quantise the classical theory with physical time T . We will show that there are
no states in this theory such that 〈y2〉 is constant in time, illustrating disagreement with
the quantised theory in t. Here the configuration space of the system is one-dimensional
since only x remains as a variable, while y and its momentum have been ‘absorbed’ into
the notion of time. Denoting the eigenvalue of the Hamiltonian by F , the Hamiltonian
eigenequation HˆTψx = Fψx is
− 1
2T 2
(
1
2
p2x + V
)
ψx = Fψx. (3.24)
This is exactly analogous to the equation in the quantisation of the t-description except
that there is an additional time-dependent pre-factor. Hence the eigenfunctions are the
same as ψx obtained above,
ψnx =
√
2
pi
sin(nx), n ∈ N, (3.25)
(and vanishing outside the wel) and the eigenvalues are
Fn = − 1
2T 2
(
~2n2
2
− U
)
. (3.26)
The Hamiltonian constraint has been eliminated as part of the Hamiltonian reduction
and as a result is identically satisfied as is easy to check.
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Above we calculated the expectation value 〈y2〉 and showed that at least for some
choices of U there are states in which it is constant in time. Here 〈y2〉 is, according
to our discussion in section 3.2, the Hamiltonian expectation value, since the physical
meaning of the Hamiltonian was defined as HT = −PT = y2. For a general state
ψ =
∑
n
cnψ
n
x (3.27)
we find (using the orthogonality of the eigenstates)
〈ψ | y2 |ψ 〉 = − 1
2T 2
(∑
n
|cn|2~
2n2
2
− U
)
, (3.28)
which is time dependent for all states since the part in parentheses is not. This is in
manifest disagreement with the range of possible expectation values resulting from the
quantisation of the t-description.
There remains a question of how this would be measurable in practice given the
above model. One might think it possible to simply wait a sufficiently long time such
that the expectation values are sufficiently different to be easily distinguishable with
good probability from a single measurement, although one is of course limited by the
limited applicability of the model to the time frame between classical bounces. Further-
more, a measurement process should be included dynamically, not considered external,
since it would have to be part of the Hamiltonian-reduction process. Furthermore, it is
arguably impossible to test the expectation value via repeated measurements of systems
prepared in the same state since in the reduced formalism there is only one time vari-
able, not one per copy of the system. Physical time is always extracted for the universe
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as a whole, not multiple times within a universe, and multiple copies of a system are
necessarily part of the same universe if one claims to be able to make any statistical
inference from them.
These considerations suggest that great care has to be taken on how to actually dis-
tinguish between the two quantum theories in practice, in particular in a more realistic
model. However, another way one might hope to establish the distinction experimen-
tally with a single measurement is by simply measuring y2 to high precision. For any
value of T other than a discrete set of values the possible outcomes of such a measure-
ment do not match the possible values of measurements obtained in the t formalism.
Hence one would be able to say with great probability whether or not the measured
outcome could possibly be one that is allowed in the t-formalism or not.
Despite these subtleties the above illustration is sufficient to show that one may
plausibly expect experimental differences in the respective quantum theories with dif-
ferent physical time parameters. One might be hopeful that such a time parameter might
therefore be detectable for our universe if indeed there is one. Considering York-time
quantum gravity is then not a purely formal exercise but may ultimately lead to con-
cretely different observable physics, at least in principle.
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CHAPTER 4
YORK TIME
In this chapter we introduce York time, arguably the most promising candidate for a
physically fundamental notion of time. We explain its role in the initial-value problem
of general relativity and discuss some of its other properties and how it would address
various questions about the nature of quantum gravity.
4.1 The initial-value problem of general relativity
In the last chapter we discovered that different choices of physical time may lead to
phenomenologically distinct theories following quantisation. In principle, therefore,
one can hope that observation will ultimately constrain the list of temporal candidates,
or rule out such an approach to quantum gravity all together. However, a priori there are
an infinite number of ways to carry out the time-space split. We must therefore apply
theoretical considerations in order to identify viable candidates. Roughly speaking one
may divide proposals into three categories:
1. Intrinsic time: the time parameter depends only on the configuration variables
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within a spatial slice, that is, the metric gab. Furthermore, the parameter ought to
be invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, so that the parameter depends really
only on the geometry, that is, an equivalence class of metrics. One simple exam-
ple in cosmology would be to use a monotonic function of the scale factor a as a
time parameter. For example, Misner [85] proposed the use of − ln a to describe
cosmological history.
2. Extrinsic time: the time parameter depends only on geometrical degrees of free-
dom but this includes the relationship between infinitesimally separated slices, so
that it may be a function of gab and the geometric momenta piab. Once again the
parameter ought to be invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, which may vary
from slice to slice. York time is an example of an extrinsic time parameter.
3. Matter time: the time parameter is extracted from the properties of matter. Whether
some particular matter field and if so which, or perhaps a combination of all mat-
ter should be used to formulate the parameter is entirely open. Some illustrative
proposals using dust have been made in refs. [26] and [63].
In principle one could define a time parameter also by mixing geometric and matter
degrees of freedom, although it is difficult to see what proposal of this sort would have
any theoretical basis. Nonetheless it cannot be ruled out.
With a plethora of choices available and a finite number of hours in a researcher’s
life, how should one select a candidate parameter for further investigation? The most
promising route is to look at the structure of the theory, general relativity, itself. The
first point to note is that the physical degrees of freedom of general relativity are not the
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variables themselves but only equivalence classes thereof. That is, general relativity is
generally covariant, meaning (roughly) the equations are identical for different choices
of coordinates. This coordinate freedom is not physical and our choice of time, as
already indicated above, should not depend on the chosen coordinates. It should not
depend, that is, on the metric representation of the geometry.
In addition to the dynamical equations that govern how the spatial geometry changes
over time the space of solutions is subject to four constraints, the three momentum
constraints 2.40 and the Hamiltonian constraint 2.39. One consequence of the existence
of such constraints is that the initial-value problem of general relativity is non-trivial.
The initial-value problem is the task to specify a full set of Cauchy data on a spatial slice
such that the evolution is uniquely determined at all times thereafter (and before). In
practice this means specifying values for gab(x) and the geometric momentum piab(x)
at every point x on a spatial slice. Doing so uniquely determines their values on all
other slices via the evolution equations. This holds true no matter how the spacetime is
foliated to the future of the initial slice since gab(x, t) and piab(x, t) being fixed for one
foliation means they are determined for any foliation as such a change corresponds to a
mere spacetime coordinate transformation.
For many other theories the initial-value problem is simple. For example, in a sys-
tem with n particles one simply specifies the momentum and position of each par-
ticle. If the total energy is constrained (to zero, for example, as the result of time-
reparameterisation invariance) then we can imagine placing n − 1 particles as we like
(depending on the form of the potential function there might be a maximum total en-
ergy for those n − 1 particles that we have to observe) and then the position and/or
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momentum of the nth particle is at least partially determined by the constraint. The
future evolution of the system is then fully determined and the initial-value problem is
solved.
In general relativity there is a catch, however. There is no obvious straightforward
way to specify initial data gab(x) and piab(x) such that all the constraints are satisfied.
General relativity is a field theory with an infinity of degrees of freedom and the con-
straints are sufficiently non-trivial1 that no simple mechanical construction is possible.
A beautiful solution to the initial-value problem was found by James York in the
early 1970s [142, 143, 144, 28]. Specifically he showed that only the conformal part of
the metric and conjugate momentum, meaning the ‘scale-free’ or ‘shape-only’ geomet-
ric degrees of freedom describing the anisotropy of space, may be specified, and only
on slices of constant extrinsic curvature. The local notion of scale and its rate of change
are then determined by the constraints. The details are as follows below. A reader not
interested in the technical details may choose to skip to the non-technical discussion at
the end of this section, taking note however of equation 4.12.
Recall that the Hamiltonian and momentum constraints are respectively the vanish-
ing of
H = −1
2
√
gM2PlR +
2
M2Pl
√
g
(
gacgbd − 12gabgcd
)
piabpicd +Hmatter, (2.37)
H a = −2∇bpiab +H amatter. (2.38)
1An (artificial) example of sufficiently trivial constraints would be constraints that are super-local,
meaning they do not involve spatial derivatives. In this case a finite set of data could be found at each
point individually and only continuity from point to point is required.
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Following [144], the first step in specifying a full set of data that satisfies the constraints
is to construct data satisfying the momentum constraints only. To do so, specify some
arbitrary functions for the metric and momentum, g¯ab(x) and p¯iab(x). From these one
can construct uniquely a set of data that satisfies the momentum constraints by decom-
posing it into pure-trace, longitudinal and transverse-traceless parts at each spatial point.
Consider for the sake of generality a tensor ψab and write
ψab = ψabTT + ψ
ab
L + ψ
ab
Tr. (4.1)
The trace contribution is determined by single degree of freedom ψ,
ψabTr =
1
3
ψgab, ψ = gcdψ
cd (4.2)
while the longitudinal contribution may be expressed in terms of a vector W a,
ψabL ≡ (LW )ab ≡ ∇aW b +∇bW a − 23gab∇cW c, (4.3)
where indices are raised and lowered with the spatial metric gab and its inverse gab as
usual, and ∇a denotes the spatial covariant derivative associated with the given met-
ric. The transverse-traceless part is defined as what is leftover to satisfy equation 4.1,
although the fact that ψabTT really is transverse and traceless is still to be shown. We
assume throughout that all tensor quantities are C∞.
It is easy to show that ψabTT is indeed traceless since Tr(ψ) = Tr(ψTr) from eq. 4.2
and Tr(ψL) ≡ 0 for any W a in virtue of its definition 4.3. The non-trivial part of the
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construction is to choose W a such that ψTT is indeed transverse,
∇bψabTT = 0. (4.4)
This effectively constitutes the requirement
∇b(LW )ab = −∇bψabTF , (4.5)
where ψabTF ≡ ψab − 13ψgab denotes the tracefree part of ψab. Introducing the operator
D defined by
(DW )a = −∇b(LW )ab (4.6)
one can show that D is linear, second-order, positive-definite and Hermitian. The first
two properties are easily seen by inspection, while the latter two may be shown by
integrating by parts a global scalar product over the manifold, giving
(W,DW ) ≡
∫
Wa(DW )
a = 1
2
∫
(LW )ab(LW )
ab ≡ 1
2
(LW,LW ) ≥ 0, (4.7)
and for any two vectors V a, W b one can show by integrating by parts twice that
(DV,W ) = (V,DW ) (4.8)
illustrating Hermiticity. The case LW = 0 is a special case, implying that eitherW = 0
or W is a conformal Killing vector field. In either case they do not affect the possible
solutions for W a (details are found in ref. [144]). These properties of D imply that
84
solutions exist and can be found by considering eigenfunctions of D. The solutions are,
formally,
W a =
(
D−1(−∇ · ψTF )
)a
, (4.9)
where the inverse D−1 of D exists in virtue of the same properties, although a solution
W a is unique only up to conformal Killing vector fields. Thus, strictly speaking, one
obtains an equivalence class of vectors W a for any one initially selected tensor ψab.
The tensor (LW )ab, which enters the definition of ψabTT is however unique for any one
such equivalence class. Having solved for W a, the transverse traceless part ψabTT now
has those properties provably by construction.
Applying this method to the initially chosen momentum data p¯iab helps one to find
the part piab of p¯iab that satisfies the momentum constraint with respect to the metric g¯ab,
as the momentum constraint is effectively a requirement of transverseness.
Suppose then we have a set of data (gab(x), piab(x)) satisfying the momentum con-
straints but not yet the Hamiltonian constraint. Consider a conformal transformation
gab → g˜ab = φ4gab, piab → p˜iab = φ−4piab, (4.10)
where φ(x) is an arbitrary smooth function on the slice. The momentum constraint is
invariant under such a transformation, that is, it is satisfied by the data (g˜ab, p˜iab) if it is
satisfied by (gab, piab), if the slice is maximal. A slice is maximal if and only if the trace
of the momentum vanishes everywhere, pi ≡ Tr(piab) ≡ gabpiab = 0.
Assume then that the data is indeed given for a maximal slice. The momentum con-
straints are assumed to be satisfied but the Hamiltonian constraint, in general, is not.
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The goal is to perform a conformal transformation 4.10 such that the transformed data
(g˜ab, p˜i
ab) does satisfy the Hamiltonian constraint. If this can be done, then the trans-
formed data would indeed satisfy all constraints and the initial-value problem would be
solved, at least for data on maximal slices. Substitute therefore the transformed data in
the form (φ4gab, φ−4piab) into the Hamiltonian constraint, which can now be understood
as an equation determining the correct choice of φ in terms of gab and piab, namely
8∇2φ+M−2Pl g−1piabpiabφ−7 −M2PlRφ = 0. (4.11)
This equation is known as the Lichnerowicz equation. Having solved this equation for
φ one has explicit data satisfying both the momentum and Hamiltonian constraints.
The method described in the last two paragraphs assumes that the data is given on a
maximal slice. This restriction may be weakened to slices of constant mean curvature
(constant scalar extrinsic curvature), that is, slices on which the parameter
T ≡ 2pi
3
√
g
(4.12)
is constant (pi here still denotes the trace of piab, not the constant relating geometric
properties of circles). This requires an extra step, the replacement of piab by its traceless
part
σab ≡ piab − 1
3
pigab. (4.13)
Since ∇agab = 0, one has that if piab satisfies the momentum constraint (∇apiab = 0),
then so does σab (∇aσab = 0). The crucial aspect of a slice of constant mean curvature is
86
that the decomposition 4.1 is invariant under conformal transformations.2 One proceeds
as for the case of maximal slicing by substituting the transformed data (g˜ab, σ˜ab) into
the Hamiltonian, which now yields the extended Lichnerowicz equation,
8∇2φ+M−2Pl g−1piabpiabφ−7 −M2PlRφ− 38M−2Pl T 2φ5 = 0. (4.14)
For T = 0 one recovers the (unextended) Lichnerowicz equation 4.11 as expected.
There are two key points that follow from this solution to the initial-value problem.
First, the degrees of freedom that may be freely specified are the conformal geometric
degrees of freedom, that is, the variables determining local ‘shape’ (or angles together
with anisotropy), and not the local absolute scale. Second, the initial data can only be
given on a a slice of constant scalar extrinsic curvature, or equivalently of constant T .
If we take the idea of a theory of gravity described by three-dimensional space
whose geometry evolves through time (rather than the four-covariant ‘spacetime’ pic-
ture) seriously, then the latter fact strongly suggests that slices of constant T are slices
of constant time, so that the foliation on which the initial-value problem can be solved
is indeed the foliation that corresponds to stacking of spaces at consecutive instances.
For if physical time corresponded to a different time variable, that is, if the reconstruc-
tion of spacetime from the space-through-time theory were not a reconstruction from a
constant-mean-curvature foliation, then as a consequence initial data could not be spec-
ified at a single instance in time. This would pose a major conundrum for the notion of
what determines the dynamics of a physical system.
2The distinction between maximal and constant-mean-curvature slices is essentially that in the former
case the trace part piabTr as defined in 4.1 vanishes, while in the latter case the part has to be subtracted
‘manually’ to arrive at the transverse traceless part.
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Accepting that the correct physical foliation is one of constant T , two question
remain. First, is T itself a viable notion of time? In other words, is it monotonic? And
is the constant-mean-curvature slicing unique?
We will consider the question of uniqueness in the next section. Regarding the first
of these, note first that there are solutions to the equations of general relativity that
do not permit a global constant-mean-curvature slicing. One example is any solution
with a closed timelike loop. Such solutions of general relativity would therefore not
constitute solutions to our theory of gravity described by space evolving through time.
This inequivalence is likely unproblematic since such solutions of general relativity do
not as far as we know correspond to our actual universe and the theories are therefore
phenomenologically equivalent given what we already know about our universe. For
solutions of general relativity that do allow a constant-mean-curvature slicing (such as
universes with closed or asymptotically flat cosmologies) one can indeed show as a
result of the field equations that T is non-decreasing.3
This leaves only the possibility that T is constant across multiple slices. One ex-
ample of such a scenario is de Sitter space, where homogeneous space expands at a
constant fractional rate. De Sitter space often serves as a first approximation for the be-
haviour of the universe during inflation, which we will treat in detail in section 5.4. For-
tunately there de Sitter is only an approximation and a higher-order calculation shows
that T is, in fact, increasing during this cosmological period, albeit slowly (with respect
to conventional ‘cosmological’ time). A true de Sitter space would pose issues for con-
sidering T as a time variable. However, once again we know that our universe is not
3This is in general true provided a sufficiently well-behaved matter content is assumed.
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described by a pure de Sitter space, so that the viability of the York parameter T is as a
time parameter is not threatened.
The second insight gained from the initial-value problem was that ‘scale’ (and its
conjugate momentum) are not freely specifiable but are determined by the Hamiltonian
constraint. This suggests that these variables do not have the same physical status as
the other, shape-determining variables. Indeed, the (fractional) rate of change of scale is
just the value of the York parameter on the slice, or the answer to the question ‘what time
is it?’ The scale itself (expressed as the local volume element
√
g) is the momentum
conjugate to the time T .
Considering T as our physical time parameter implies then that
√
g is equal to the
physical Hamiltonian density, as discussed in section 3.2. The status of volume is there-
fore analogous to that of ‘energy’ in conventional theories; not a physical variable (al-
though arguably not void of physical meaning) and given by the numerical value of the
Hamiltonian. Exploring this idea will constitute the majority of the remainder of this
thesis.
In our argument there is one caveat. While it is true that York’s solution to the initial-
value problem gives reasons to take the proposal of York time as physical time seriously,
it is unproven that the initial-value problem can indeed not be solved in another manner,
in particular with another foliation. It is the case that no other solutions are known4, but
at least the possibility of other solutions has not been ruled out.
York time and constant-mean-curvature slicing do however also have a number of
other properties that support the plausibility of their fundamental physical significance.
4although there were attempts along different lines preceding York, for example due to Baierlein,
Sharp and Wheeler [6]
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This will be the subject of the next section.
4.2 Properties of York time
The York parameter T plays a central role in the initial-value problem in that it is to our
knowledge only surfaces of constant T on which the problem can be solved. The notion
of local scale and its rate of change is ‘extracted’ from among the physical variables.
Taking the implication of this seriously, we argued, means to consider the York pa-
rameter as the true physical time and its conjugate momentum as the Hamilton density,
whose physical interpretation is that of local volume.
York time however does have other properties as the result of which it stands out
from among the candidates for physical time. Suppose we were unaware of York’s work
on the initial-value problem and we wished to identify a physical time based on a few
simple theoretical considerations. First, we wish to extract it from the geometric degrees
of freedom only (no matter-dependent definitions) and furthermore we believe that it
should only depend on the local degrees of freedom, that is, ‘what time is it?’ should
be answerable without reference to the properties of other, distant points in space. The
latter criterion enables subsequently the identification of a local Hamiltonian density.
So physical time and the Hamiltonian density at x are functions of gab(x) and piab(x)
only.
Further, it is reasonable to suppose that the time parameter be identified as an
isotropic quantity. There is nothing that leads us to believe that there is any sort of
fundamental anisotropy in the laws of the universe. This then implies that any of the
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‘shape’ degrees of freedom, which determine the notion of angles, are not to be used.
Only the overall scale and its rate of change (or conjugate momentum), that is, the
metric determinant g = det(gab) and the momentum trace pi = gabpiab, remain.
This still leaves various options. For example, one might consider the local scale
√
g to be time and its conjugate momentum to be the Hamilton, essentially a reversal
of the roles we propose. The issue here is however that in general
√
g does not change
monotonically according to the laws of general relativity. Disallowing such solutions
would be far more restricting than disallowing spacetimes that cannot be foliated in
the manner of constant mean curvature, although in cosmological contexts (assuming a
homogeneous universe) such a time parameter may be viable and has been considered
in the literature (by Misner, for example, [85]). The requirement of monotonicity rules
out the vast majority of possible functions of g and pi.
I cannot say with certainty that only constant mean curvature slicing guarantees
monotonicity, although I am unaware of any other, non-equivalent foliation of the sort.
However, the simplicity of the interpretation of the Hamiltonian is uniquely compelling.
So, even if there are other options, York time must be considered a favourite among
them based only on a few theoretical principles.
In the last section we also left unanswered the question whether the constant-mean-
curvature slicing of a spacetime that forms a solution of the field equations of general
relativity is unique. We already discussed that not all such spacetimes are, in fact,
constant-mean-curvature slicable and those that are not would not be solutions of our
theory of York-time geometrodynamics. However, if the spacetime is slicable by a
constant-mean-curvature foliation, can there be more than one such foliation?
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The last question has been answered in the negative by Marsden and Tipler [80].
They established that the constant-mean-curvature slicing of a spacetime, if indeed there
is one, is unique, at least for a subset of solutions of general relativity. Specifically, these
are the cases of closed universes, that is, those that, roughly speaking, experience a ‘big
crunch’ after some finite proper time. However, their argument also applies to universes
which are asymptotically flat, that is, where space in the infinite distance approaches a
Euclidean geometry.
Figure 4.1: Surfaces of finite constant
T wrap around singularities, which
are all part of a single final singular-
ity at T =∞. The image is taken from
ref. [100].
Another encouraging aspect of constant-mean-
curvature slicing is the shape such a foliation takes
in the presence of singularities. In the 1980s
Qadir and Wheeler [100] discovered that the scalar
extrinsic curvature K, or equivalently −T , ap-
proaches infinity as the singularity is approached.
This applies equally to a final singularity that is the
‘big crunch’ in universes that have such a singular-
ity and to local singularities such as black holes.
As a result slices of constant T ‘wrap around’ a
singularity and all black holes are part of the single, final singularity found at T =∞.5
Consequently there are no geometric singularities on any slice labelled by a finite T .6
This completely preempts a difficult conceptual issue that any theory of quantum
5As in all parts of this thesis, a slice is itself a three-dimensional object with non-zero volume, and
‘wrap around’ is to be understood as a three-dimensional (hyper)slice ‘wrapping’ in the fourth dimension.
6However: In a universe that expands forever (and T → 0 as t → ∞ in the homogeneous approx-
imation), what is the shape of the York foliation then? In the vicinity of a singularity the cosmological
properties are irrelevant and T → ∞ but in other parts of the universe T ends at zero. This apparent
contradiction motivates us to propose a cosmological extension for such universes. This we discuss in
detail in chapter 6.
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gravity has to address. The issue concerns the existence of singularities. The first
question is whether or not singularities, which are clearly solutions of the classical
theory, are also part of the quantum theory. If yes, then what is the quantum description
of such singularity? If not, then how do singularities arise as classical approximations?
I am not aware that any approach of quantum gravity has answered these questions fully
and with certainty.
The York slicing avoids classical singularities entirely since they are ‘banished’
to T = ±∞. Hence the quantum geometrodynamics, the quantum theory of spatial
geometries, can be defined on those slices without concern regarding the recovery of
classical singularities in any limit.
Proper time
The attentive reader will have noticed that the notion of constant extrinsic curvature and
York time was introduced with reference to another, more familiar notion: proper time. In
particular, the physical understanding of the scalar extrinsic curvature is the local fractional
rate of growth of volume, where ‘rate of growth’ refers to growth with respect to proper
time. Does this reliance on another notion of time, proper time, spell doom to our idea to
consider York time a physically fundamental time parameter? What about proper time as a
physically fundamental time parameter? And what is this proper time anyway?
Our endeavour is not doomed. Referring to proper time provided a physical intuition
for the York parameter but in its formal definition in terms of the geometric momenta piij
and the metric gij no such reference was made. The expression for the momenta, when
traced back to the original action principle, involved the lapse N , whose own physical
interpretation is the amount of proper time passing per coordinate time, but recall that
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mathematically N merely encodes the freedom to choose any monotonic time parameter.
Its physical meaning is not relevant for this, nor for the procedure of Hamiltonian reduction,
which will be used to derive the dynamical equations. The notion of York time does not, in
fact, rely on the idea of proper time at all.
In fact, if we take the view that our theory of gravity is fundamentally one of the time
evolution of a spatial geometry and not just a ‘3+1’ description of a spacetime geometry,
then the lapse N and proper time τ were never more than a crutch that allowed us to come
up with a theory that is phenomenologically equivalent with general relativity anyway.
Proper time itself does not constitute a viable fundamental time parameter. For one, it
does not actually define a single preferred foliation. At any point on a slice chosen in any
desirably way one can define the notion of proper time (of a comoving observer), but ‘what
proper time it is’ is not a notion that can be answered in an absolute manner. A ‘slice of
constant proper time’ is not a meaningful notion unless there already is another such slice
that is assumed to be such and relative to which absolute values of proper time can be
assigned. That is, a constant-proper-time foliation is determined by choosing a single slice,
but how to choose that first slice is not unique. Proper time further lacks a relation to what
constitutes, arguably, the physical variables given the initial-value problem.
Another issue proper time faces is the criticism made by Valentini [134] that we discussed
above.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny that the notion of proper time must have some direct
physical significance. After all, it is exactly the time parameter that is measured by a clock,
∆tclock =
∫
path
dτ =
∫
path
√
dt2 − gijdxidxj .
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A clock may be considered a ‘hodometer of spacetime’ [23], measuring the Lorentzian
length of the spacetime path taken akin to the mileage counter of an automobile. Clocks
are physical systems governed by dynamical equations depending on the exact constituents
of the clock. It is a remarkable conspiracy that all clocks — no matter whether consisting of
pendula, vibrating atoms or systems of orbiting bodies — ‘tick’ at the same rate. There are
two views one can take: either this conspiracy shows that there is an underlying spacetime
structure that the clocks ‘sense’; or it is exactly this conspiracy that allows a description in
terms of spacetime, but the conspiracy is purely a matter of matter dynamics.
The first view is the one commonly presented in the majority of textbooks on relativity,
although too often clocks (and rods) are simply considered as primitive entities that —
almost by definition — display the spacetime structure. Opening many a textbook one
finds diagrams of coordinate grids with clocks drawn at each intersection, or similar. This
apparently compelling view is called into question however when we try to understand the
details by which actual clocks sense this spacetime structure. We are forced to consider the
interaction between dynamics and spacetime, but this then is just a rephrasing of the second
view. The notion of spacetime can be invoked because the universality of the dynamics
allows for a geometric description but the clock conspiracy is ultimately a question of
dynamics.
This universality is essentially due to the way the gravitational field represented by the
spacetime metric (4)gµν is coupled to the matter fields via minimal coupling. (Co-)vectorial
quantities (such as spatial derivatives of fields) are summed, for example in the kinetic
terms of a scalar field, via contraction of the indices by the metric. The spatial derivatives
are furthermore modified to be covariant, giving them the right transformation properties
that the gravitational field may be given a geometric interpretation.
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The reliance on notions that ultimately require dynamical treatment, such as rods and
clocks, as primitive is as old as relativity itself. Early in Einstein’s celebrated 1905 paper
Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Ko¨rper [39] he writes,
“Like all electrodynamics, the theory to be developed here is based on the
kinematics of a rigid body, since the assertions of any such theory have to
do with the relations among rigid bodies (coordinate systems), clocks, and
electromagnetic processes.”
Few authorsa have encouraged a dynamical understanding of relativistic effects such as
clock dilation and length contraction without relying on spacetime geometry as a primi-
tive explanation. One notable exception is Bell, who provides a beautiful discussion of
the deformation of a moving atom in terms of electrodynamics in “How to teach special
relativity”, published as something of an oddity among his collection of papers on quantum
mechanics [15]. The most careful discussion of the principles and assumption of special
relativity of which I am aware is due to Brown [23], who criticises the operationalist view-
point of rods and clocks exemplified by the above passage. Here we cannot do the subject
justice. Our point is merely that proper time, which can be understood as a geometric notion
in the context of spacetime, cannot be separated from the dynamics of physical systems.
To consider spacetime conceptually prior to the dynamics of matter would, one may
argue, be putting the cart before the horse.b Proper time is intrinsically dynamical, not an
aspect of spatial or spatio-temporal structure, and is therefore not obviously a viable choice
of fundamental time parameter.
aMany years later Einstein himself however became uneasy with his approach to special relativ-
ity as is evident from his autobiographical notes, in which he calls the primitive treatment of rods
and clocks “inconsistent” [40].
bThis statement is intentionally a reference to a claim by Balashov and Janssen [7], who de-
fend exactly the opposite view, although in the context of Minkowski’s non-dynamical geometry.
The paper is heavily criticised by Brown, who argues that “[t]he appropriate structure [to define
96
a kinematics for mechanics] is Minkowksi geometry precisely because the laws of physics of the
non-gravitational interactions are Lorentz covariant” (original italics) [23, p. 133].
4.3 The reduced variables and their Poisson structure
Hamiltonian reduction is a mathematical procedure that reduces the number of config-
uration-space degrees of freedom by one and the number of phase-space degrees of
freedom by two (one ‘position’ and one ‘momentum’). If the variables extracted to
serve as time and as the Hamiltonian (or Hamiltonian density) are simply one pair of
canonical variables chosen from among the full set of canonical pairs, then the Poisson
structure of the set of remaining variables is unchanged. On the other hand, if the no-
tion of physical time and Hamiltonian are definable only in terms of multiple variables
and there is no canonical transformation that avoids this, then the number of reduced
variables is not smaller than the number of original degrees of freedom. Instead the
reduced variables must satisfy a new pair of constraints, so that the number of degrees
of freedom is nonetheless reduced. That these constraints remain satisfied with time
irrespective of the particular form of the Hamiltonian is however guaranteed by modi-
fied Poisson brackets. The new Poisson structure is obtained directly from the Poisson
structure of the original variables and some basic properties of Poisson brackets.
The content of the preceding paragraph, describing abstractly how a non-canonical
Poisson structure arises, may appear obscure. A simple example helps to clarify this
mathematical process.
Consider a system described by three pairs of canonical variablesQi, P i, i = 1, 2, 3.
These may describe the position and momentum of three particles confined to move in
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one dimension, for example. Let its (unreduced) Hamiltonian be the usual one (setting
the particle mass to m = 1),
Ht =
1
2
∑
i
P i2 + V (Q1, Q2, Q3), (4.15)
where the subscript t denotes the fact that this Hamiltonian describes evolution with
respect to t. We demand time-reparameterisation invariance (see chapter 2), so that the
system obeys a Hamiltonian constraint,
Ht = 0. (4.16)
Since the set of variables {Q1, Q2, Q3, , P 1, P 2, P 3} is by hypothesis canonical and
therefore obeys the usual Poisson structure,
{Qi, P j} = δji , (4.17)
with all other Poisson brackets vanishing.
Define for convenience the quantities
G ≡ Q1Q2Q3, Π =
∑
i
QiP
i, (4.18)
somewhat resembling the metric determinant g and the trace of the geometric momen-
tum, pi = gijpiij respectively. In fact, the model used here to illustrate the appearance of
non-canonical Poisson brackets describes a homogeneous but anisotropic spatially flat
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universe and will be developed in full in section 7.2. We choose a physical time with
respect to which to perform a Hamiltonian reduction, namely
T ≡ 2Π
3
√
G
, PT ≡ −
√
G. (4.19)
The choice is obviously analogous to York time and its conjugate momentum. However,
for our present purposes (to derive the Poisson structure of the reduced variables) the
exact form does not matter, only that they are functions of the ‘scale’ variables: T =
T (G,Π), PT = PT (G,Π).
There is no canonical transformation from the set of variables {Q1, Q2, Q3, P1, P2, P3}
to another set {G, Q˜1, Q˜2,Π, P˜1, P˜2} such that the latter includesG and Π. This implies
that the set of reduced variables is not just an unreduced set of canonical variables mi-
nus one canonical pair. Instead it is another set of six variables from which the ‘scale’
is extracted via constraints. The most obvious way to do this is to define the reduced
variables as
qi ≡ G− 13Qi, pi ≡ G 13 (P i − 13Π/Qi). (4.20)
The new variables configuration variables qi obey the constraint
q1q2q3 = 1 (4.21)
identically in virtue of their definition. However, if we ‘kick away the ladder’ and treat
the variables qi as fundamental, that is, if we ‘forget’ how we arrived at the reduced
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description, then the constraint is a genuine one. The variables also obey
∑
i
qip
i = 0, (4.22)
which ensures that the first constraint remains satisfied with time evolution irrespective
of the exact form of the Hamiltonian. The constraint also holds identically in virtue of
the definition of the momenta pi. In fact, the form of the momenta 4.20 is exactly such
that any motion generated by the momenta is tangent to the constraint surface defined
by eq. 4.21. Other definitions, such as p˜i ≡ G 13P i, would not have this property. We
will discuss this in more detail in section 7.2.
For now we are only interested in the derivation of the Poisson structure for the
set {q1, q2, q3, p1, p2, p3}. The procedure to find the new Poisson structure (such that
the reduced dynamics is physically equivalent with the unreduced dynamics) is as fol-
lows: First write the Poisson bracket to be determined in terms of the original variables.
Second, use the original Poisson structure together with general properties of Poisson
brackets to evaluate the selected bracket in terms of the old variables. Rewrite the result
in terms of the new reduced variables. This ensures consistency of the new Poisson
structure with the old.
For illustrative purposes we wish to determine {qi, pj}. Following the procedure
just described we write,
{qi, pj} =
{
(Q1Q2Q3)
− 1
3Qi , (Q1Q2Q3)
1
3
(
P j − 1
3
∑
kQkP
k
Qj
)}
. (4.23)
Now use the property of Poisson brackets that for a function F (Q1, Q2, Q3) it is true
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that
{F, P j} =
∑
k
∂F
∂Qk
{Qk, P j}. (4.24)
This follows from distributivity of the Poisson brackets and the for our purposes rea-
sonable assumption that F is sufficiently well behaved to have a series expansion. Eval-
uating the Poisson bracket in this manner gives (after rewriting the right-hand side in
terms of the new reduced variables):
{qi, pj} = δji −
qi
3qj
. (4.25)
Proceeding analogously with the other Poisson brackets, one finds
{qi, qj} = 0 (4.26)
{pi, pj} = p
i
3qj
− p
j
3qi
. (4.27)
The existence of the second term in the expression 4.25 and the non-vanishing of the
right-hand side of eq. 4.27 are the reason the new reduced variables are not canonical.
We will return to this model, which is a description of the geometrodynamics of a
homogeneous but anisotropic universe, in chapter 7 before proceeding to consider the
analogous Poisson brackets of the perturbation theory.
In contrast with this finite-dimensional model, the full theory of York-time ge-
ometrodynamics is a field theory. The theory is, however, local, so that Poisson brackets
vanish if compared between two distinct spatial points. Otherwise the Poisson brackets
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one obtains (proceeding in the same manner as we did above) are very similar:
{g˜ab(x), g˜cd(y)} = 0 (4.28)
{g˜ab(x), p˜icd(y)} =
(
δ(ca δ
d)
b − 13 g˜ab(x)g˜cd(x)
)
δ3(x− y) (4.29)
{p˜iab(x), p˜icd(y)} = 1
3
(
g˜cd(x)p˜iab(x)− g˜ab(x)p˜icd(x)
)
δ3(x− y). (4.30)
Here g˜ab and p˜iab denote the reduced variables and x and y denote points on the spatial
slice. The argument of g˜ab and p˜iab on the right-hand sides has been written as ‘x’,
although we might as well have written ‘y’ since the expressions are non-vanishing
only if the two selected spatial points are one and the same.
If we consider the universe to be homogeneous and additionally restrict the metric to
have a form such that off-diagonal elements vanish, the expressions 4.28 - 4.30 reduce
to expressions 4.25 - 4.27.
In section 7.2 we discuss the meaning and consequences of the non-canonical Pois-
son structure further, and its implication for quantisation in section 10.1.
4.4 Cosmological history with York time
A conventional description of cosmological history in terms of cosmological time tmay
be criticised for a variety of reasons: The universe began at some finite time t0 whose
value is essentially arbitrary. In other words, only intervals ∆t matter. However, at the
same time the universe might not end at a finite t, so that the cosmological timeline is
semi-infinite. Furthermore, different eras of interest vary hugely (by dozens of orders
of magnitude) in their duration. In particular, much of the early history of the cosmos
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took place within the first 10−33 (inflation) or even 10−43 (Planck era) of a second.7
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the description in t. One might, however,
consider it lacking in an aesthetic sense. Cosmological time t is a highly unnatural
choice of time parameter when discussing the very early universe.
In 1969 Misner proposed that the quantity − ln a — or (more or less equivalently)
the logarithm of the temperature in the homogeneous approximation — would provide
a time parameter with which to give an account of cosmic history that is more adequate
than the conventional cosmological time t [85]. The new parameter would avoid the
absurdly small numbers needed to describe early epochs. Misner wrote: ‘The universe
is meaningfully infinitely old, since infinitely many things have happened since the
beginning.’
In terms of York time it is the early history that takes up the longest period ∆T .
In fact, just as in the case of Misner’s parameter − ln a, the ‘beginning’ lies in the
infinite past and unlike in the conventional description in terms of t there is no notion
of ‘before the Big Bang’. The Planck era stretches from T = −∞ to just before the
onset of inflation. Recent data [96] leads to an upper bound on the Hubble parameter
during inflation of 3.6 × 10−5MPl, so that in reduced Planck units (where MPl = 1)
this number also gives a rough estimate of T .
Following inflation and reheating, the energy density then becomes dominated by
radiation until t ∼ 104 years. At this point matter becomes dominant and the Hubble pa-
rameter is of order 10−12s−1, or 10−53 in reduced Planck units, which is already within
the final moments of the universe when considered in terms of York time. Evidence
7Changing units to, say, Planck units leads to absurdly large numbers for later eras instead.
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Figure 4.2: The cosmological timeline with York time. The entire known cosmological history
takes place within 10−5 from the end of the universe. If there is a cosmological constant then
cosmological history ends just short of T = 0. The figure is taken from ref. [107] by the author.
suggests that today, at T ∼ H ∼ 10−61, we are nearing a possibly final era dominated
by a cosmological constant.
The York time description clearly does not do away with absurdly large order-of-
magnitude differences in the way Misner might have envisioned. Rather, periods of
large T -duration are of short t-duration and vice versa. The infinite ‘York age’ of the
universe might however be considered an aesthetic advantage.
One might speculate whether York time really ‘ends’ at T = 0 or whether cosmic
history continues and our description ought to be extended. Indeed, if T does have
fundamental physical significance, then it is unwarranted to conclude that the universe
would end then simply because the usual parameter t ceases to describe such speculative
future eras, although problems may arise if physical quantities are not well behaved
during the transition to T > 0. The existence of a cosmological constant also raises
questions. In such a case the conventionally considered timeline never reaches T =
0 but stops slightly short since H(t) → Λ (up to constants) as t → ∞ rather than
approaching zero. An analysis concerning the viability or indeed necessity of such an
extension will be performed in chapter 6.
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4.5 York time as a solution to the problem of time
In an important review on the subject of the problem of time and approaches to over-
come it, Isham [64] identifies the key questions that any theory of quantum gravity must
answer. The points raised are (verbatim):
1. the status of the concept of probability and the extent to which it is conserved;
2. the status of the associated concepts of causality and unitarity;
3. the time-honoured debate about whether quantum gravity should be approached
via a canonical, or a covariant, quantisation scheme;
4. the extent to which spacetime is a meaningful concept;
5. the extent to which classical geometrical concepts can, or should, be maintained
in the quantum theory;
6. the way in which our classical world emerged from some primordial quantum
event at the big-bang;
7. the whole question of the interpretation of quantum theory and, in particular, the
domain of applicability of the conventional Copenhagen view.
In this section we wish to briefly address what answer quantum geometrodynamics
based on York time and constant-mean-curvature slicing gives to each of these. Some
answers are not determined by this change of the classical starting point from four-
diffeomorphic general relativity to a space-through-time theory with spatial diffeomor-
phisms only, but will depend on one’s favoured formulation of quantum mechanics. At
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this stage we will remain agnostic about the latter question, although the reader will
undoubtedly become aware of our favoured approach.
York-time quantum geometrodynamics has a clear notion of time and simultaneity
across space, even if these simultaneity surfaces — the foliation — is not classically
detectable. Hence the quantum theory is not plagued by the question of how to define
quantum states and similar issues. A quantum state Ψ is a complex function over the
configuration space of the theory, which is just conformal superspace, the space of all
equivalence classes of spatial geometries where two geometries are in the same class if
they are related via a local conformal transformation gab(x)→ φ4(x)gab(x).
The notion of probability is therefore well defined and conserved as much as this
is the case in any theory. Rigorously defining probability densities here requires defin-
ing a measure on the configuration space, which has an uncountably infinite number
of dimensions. These complications are however inherent to all field theories and not
generally considered an issue. The main point here is that in York-time quantum ge-
ometrodynamics instants of time are clearly-defined concepts and no additional issue
arises.
Since the foliation is fixed, the quantum state of the universe evolves just like in
other more conventional systems as the state space is well defined. One quantum state
follows another, so if one understands causality in the sense of a temporal ordering
with one state being a necessary and/or sufficient condition for another state to arise at
a later stage, then the notion of causality makes sense. However, in general I do not
find the introduction of such a notion helpful. For example, since the evolution of the
quantum state is deterministic and linear (given by a functional Schro¨dinger equation)
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if the universe is described by a state Ψ1 at time T1, this is as much necessary and/or
sufficient for Ψ2 to be the state at a later time T2 as is the converse. So being necessary
and/or sufficient is surely not what the idea of ‘causality’ is trying to express. But then
without any temporal aspect to the notion of causality, how is one to understand the
question ‘is A a cause of B?’ The question is problematic independently of any notion of
space, time, spacetime or quantum theory and should be left to philosophers to discuss,8
although even there one may ask how far the exercise of defining the notion of causality
really is more than one of semantics. Unitarity on the other hand is as well defined as in
any field theory. One may have to impose certain boundary conditions at spatial infinity,
for example, for unitarity and well-defined probability but there is no additional issue
from the fact that the theory is considered ‘gravitational’ or ‘geometrical’.
The canonical-versus-covariant debate has clearly been answered since four-covariance
is explicitly broken and only the more trivial covariance under spatial diffeomorphisms
remains. The approach to quantisation here is canonical, although in chapters 11 and
12 we suggest an alternative approach, which is neither canonical nor covariant.
Is spacetime a meaningful concept in York-time quantum geometrodynamics? This
is a more difficult question to answer. In the classical theory spacetime may be con-
structed from a sequence of spatial slices, that is, from the classical state of the space
and its matter content at a continuous progression of instants. In other words, it may be
constructed from the trajectory of the system (the universe) in conformal superspace. In
standard quantum theory no such trajectories exist and such a construction is not pos-
8The debate over what constitutes causation goes back at least as far as Hume [62], and more recently
has been tackled by philosophers such as Lewis [e.g. 75], Armstrong [e.g. 3], Mellor [e.g. 83] and others
too numerous to list.
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sible. If on the other hand one introduces quantum trajectories as in de Broglie-Bohm
theory or the proposal in chapter 11 of this thesis, for example, then spacetime may
once again be constructed. However, even in this case this constructed spacetime is not
‘all there is’ since the wavefunction (in de Broglie-Bohm) that drives the evolution is
a complex function over the entire conformal superspace. It is also an open question
whether or not a quantum equivalent of the four-covariant field equations can be written
down, that is, a spacetime description of the quantum dynamics that is detached from
the York foliation.9
Similarly the notion of the possibility of a geometric interpretation depends on the
chosen approach to quantum theory. For any particular trajectory the geometry is clearly
defined since each point on the trajectory exactly determines the conformal geometry
(and the conformal factor, that is the scale, may be recovered via the numerical value
of the Hamiltonian density at the respective point in space, which is a function of the
dynamical ‘shape’ variables and was obtained in the Hamiltonian reduction that pro-
duced the classical theory in the first place). We discuss this in more detail in chapter
7. In the absence of trajectories one still has a complex function over conformal spatial
geometries, so the concept is not lost, although it is impossible to associate a particular
geometry with the universe at any one instant of time.
Instead of considering the emergence of some primordial quantum event at the big
bang, York-time quantum geometrodynamics denies the existence of such an event since
the big bang is simply a name of the infinite past, T = −∞. One can, of course, instead
ask about properties of the universe prior to some very early time such as the Planck
9If such a feat were accomplished, could one kick away the ladder of York time all together?
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time, but even here the quantum evolution is at all times well defined. The York-time
approach to quantum gravity gives no explanation of a beginning because the universe
simply has none. It is infinitely old. There are however a series of questions one can
ask about the early universe, such as how the classical approximation of the universe
that we observe today can be extracted from the dynamics and whether one can expect
such a classical limit to arise independently of the boundary conditions or whether
some special assumptions must be made about the quantum state of the early universe
(a ‘quantum past-hypothesis’?) and how that state might be explained.
Finally, as Isham’s wording indicates, the ‘whole question of the interpretation of
quantum theory’ is just that. It is a whole separate question. Irrespective of the choice
of York time however certain things can be said. For example, by definition (of the
universe) there is no notion of an external observer who could perform a measurement.
Hence any approach to quantum theory that relies on such a notion is inconsistent. Sec-
ond, there is only one universe, so the notion of probability cannot be understood in
a frequentist manner. Similarly, in de Broglie-Bohm theory, there is no notion of an
ensemble density ρ,10 so also the idea of quantum equilibrium versus non-equilibrium
is meaningless when applied to the entire universe, although it may apply to subsystems
of which many copies exist within the universe, such as hydrogen atoms or some pri-
mordial particle species. The conventional Copenhagen view is not applicable although
it may be possible to show, with an appropriate definition of what constitutes a mea-
surement dynamically, how measurement processes within the universe appear to obey
10In the approach proposed in chapter 11 the situation is different since there is, ontologically speaking,
an infinity of ‘classical’ universes (defined by classical variables, although not evolving according to
classical laws). However, here one really ought to view the entire collection as ‘the universe’, so the
exception is really one of nomenclature rather than substance.
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Copenhagen quantum mechanics. There is nothing fundamental about these processes
though. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is problematic irrespective of the application
of quantum theory to the entire universe, although the latter certainly makes some of
the issues more apparent.
In summary, the answers York-time quantum geometrodynamics gives to the con-
ceptual questions of quantum gravity engendered by the problem of time are on the
whole relatively conservative in that quantum gravity is reduced to a conventional field
theory via the choice of a preferred slicing. Even issues particular to gravitational theo-
ries, such as the question concerning geometric singularities, are avoided via the partic-
ular foliation chosen. In this limited sense the proposal made in this thesis is anything
but revolutionary and arguably less exciting than other proposals that present more rad-
ical departures from the gravitational and matter theories we understand. Observation
must be the ultimate arbiter.
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PART II:
CLASSICAL YORK-TIME
COSMOLOGY
111
CHAPTER 5
THE HOMOGENEOUS ISOTROPIC UNIVERSE WITH
YORK TIME
In this chapter we explore the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe in the context of York time
and perform Hamiltonian reduction explicitly in the case of a minisuperspace model
with a scalar field. We also discuss cosmological inflation in the York-time description.
The contents of this chapter were published in ref. [106], with the exception of section
5.4, which was presented in ref. [107].
5.1 The role of cosmology in gravitational theories
The equations of the full theory of general relativity are too complicated to allow us
to visualise or otherwise intuitively grasp some given solution thereof. It is, of course,
not strictly necessary to have an intuition or visualisation of such solutions in order to
understand the theory or arrive at new insights, purely formal or otherwise. However,
it would be insincere to state that intuitions play no role in how we as human beings
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with limited mental capabilities (and with brain functions primarily evolved to ensure
survival and procreation rather than consider mathematical abstractions) develop and
indeed advance comprehension of theories in physics.
Intuitive insights into a theory are gained via simplification. For example, in New-
tonian mechanics one might consider a small number of rigid, perhaps pointlike bodies
and neglect the rest of the universe or model its influence as an external field. Indeed,
this is how we spend much of our early physics education. In some cases the simple sce-
nario considered may, in fact, provide a relatively good approximation to a real-world
system. This is also the case in general relativity and reduced-Hamiltonian theories
derived therefrom. To consider a cosmology of a gravitational field theory is to impose
a large number of symmetries (such as spatial homogeneity) on the solution space, re-
ducing the degrees of freedom that characterise the physics to a finite number. The
remaining dynamics is then no longer a field theory. Such a model is also commonly
called a minisuperspace model since superspace — the infinite-dimensional configu-
ration space of the gravitational field — is reduced to a ‘smaller’ finite-dimensional
subspace. This terminology is perhaps less ambiguous than ‘cosmology’, which is used
differently in other contexts.
Cosmologies (or minisuperspace models) can, in general, be visualised because of
their simpler mathematical structure and therefore allow for an intuitive grasp of some
of the implications of the equations of the gravitational theory. Furthermore, observa-
tional evidence strongly suggests that the universe is highly homogeneous at sufficiently
large scales, so that at least some cosmological models give solutions that approximate
the actual universe.
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Considering cosmologies is clearly worth our time. However, one cannot expect to
gain a full understanding of a gravitational theory by looking at cosmologies. Some
features may be hidden by the symmetries. For example, in this chapter we explore
a model universe that is homogeneous and isotropic (a ‘Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre’ cosmol-
ogy). However, as we will see, this hides the non-canonical form of the Poisson brackets
of the reduced variables since these are related to the anisotropic degrees of freedom. In
contrast, in section 7.2 we develop an anisotropic (but still homogeneous) cosmology
where their presence becomes apparent, before proceeding to the perturbation theory
itself in the rest of chapters 7 and 8.
Minisuperspace approximations also hide a number of the ‘problems of time’ dis-
cussed in section 2.4. Fortunately for our illustrative purposes the problem of the frozen
dynamics remains since it is a result of reparameterisation invariance rather than any-
thing strictly related to field theories (in fact, we introduced it in chapter 2 first in the
context of finite dimensional theories). Yet evidently one cannot rashly generalise from
the cosmological theory to the full theory.
Later we also quantise the minisuperspace models (chapters 9 and section 10.1).
Doing so is comparatively simple since the classical theories are by design finite di-
mensional. This can be insightful as it gives us a feel for some of the features of the
theory of quantum gravity obtained via quantisation of the Hamiltonian-reduced theory.
Strictly speaking however there is a missing step if the insights are to be of any value:
One first must have reason to believe that the cosmological (dimensionally reduced /
symmetrised) limit of the quantised theory of gravity is the same or at least sufficiently
similar to the theory resulting from quantising an already cosmological (dimension-
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ally reduced / symmetrised) classical theory. In other words, one must have reason
to believe that quantising the cosmology gives the same result as ‘cosmologising’ the
quantum theory. This proviso ought to be kept in mind.
5.2 Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre cosmology ‘translated’ into
York time
Our purpose here is to explore the cosmology that is the York-time reduced gravitational
theory when restricted to spatially homogeneous and isotropic solutions. We learned in
chapter 3 that at least classically a reduced theory is equivalent to the original theory.
We therefore expect to recover the standard results of classical Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre
cosmology expressed in the ‘language’ of York time. We can exploit this in order to
check that our procedure is correct. To do so, in this section we ‘translate’ the standard
results of Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre cosmology, usually expressed in cosmological time t or
conformal time η, into the York-time description. Only later in section 5.3 do we per-
form the Hamiltonian reduction explicitly and derive and solve the resulting equations.
Consider then a homogeneous and isotropic universe. For the matter content we
choose a single scalar field φ with potential V (φ) for simplicity. The Einstein field
equations reduce to a set of equations equivalent to the so-called Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre1
1Frequently the homogeneous isotropic model is at least in part attributed to Robertson and Walker
and the equations are referred to as the FLRW or FRW (omitting Lemaıˆtre) equations. However, the
development of this model is due to Friedmann [46, 47] and separately Lemaıˆtre [74]. The contribution
of Robertson and Walker was to write influential review articles on the subject a few years later, hence
our chosen nomenclature.
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equations:
a˙2
a2
+
k
a2
=
1
3M2Pl
ρ (5.1)
a¨
a
= − 1
6M2Pl
(ρ+ 3P). (5.2)
The first of these corresponds to the time-time component of the Einstein field equations
and the second to a combination of the space-space and time-time components. Here
a dot denotes differentiation with respect to cosmological time t, corresponding to a
choice of lapse Nt = 1. The parameter k takes values 0,+1,−1 for a flat, closed and
open universe respectively. The energy density is denoted by ρ and for a scalar field
takes the form ρ = 1
2
φ˙2 + V (φ). The pressure P is given by P = 1
2
φ˙2 − V (φ). A
cosmological constant may be included formally as a constant contribution to V (φ).
Using T = −2M2Pl a˙a , written in terms of York time, equation (5.1) becomes
T 2
4M4Pl
+
k
a2
=
1
3M2Pl
ρ, (5.3)
which is purely algebraic if ρ does not contain any time-derivatives, as is the case for a
dust-dominated universe, or if we have a field for which appropriate “slow-roll” condi-
tions — for example during an inflationary phase — are satisfied, in which case we can
ignore the kinetic term. In cases where the equation is algebraic, it does not describe a
time evolution (how a quantity changes from one instant to the next) but merely a time
progression (what a quantity is at any given time). This possible reduction of order in
return for explicit time dependence will be a key feature we encounter in the reduced
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Hamiltonian formalism below. Note though that if ρ does contain time-derivatives as it
is the case for a general scalar field, then we must convert the derivative with respect
to t into one with respect to T in order to avoid reference to t. In general this requires
determination of the York lapse NT , defined by dt = NTdT (since Nt = 1).
As elsewhere in this thesis, let a prime denote differentiation with respect to T . It
is N−1T a
′ = a˙, which together with T = −2M2Pl a˙a implies N−1T = − 12M2PlT
a
a′ . Having
determined the lapse in this manner, we can replace φ˙ by N−1T φ
′ explicitly, for example.
Since a′ appears in the lapse, the resultant form of the first Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equa-
tion is not algebraic. In the simplest case, namely a free scalar field (V = 0) in a flat
(k = 0) universe, it takes the form a˙
2
a2
= 1
6M2Pl
φ˙2, which gives
a′2
a2
=
1
6M2Pl
φ′2 (5.4)
after multiplying both sides by the N−2T . In this particular case, since the equation is
homogeneous in time derivatives (all terms have two first-order derivatives) explicit
knowledge of NT would not have been necessary.
In order to ‘translate’ the second Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equation to York time, one
observes that
N−1T =
dT
dt
= −2M2Pl
d
dT
a˙
a
= −2M2Pl
a¨
a
+
1
2M2Pl
T 2 (5.5)
and combines this with the previous expression for NT to obtain
a¨
a
=
1
4M4Pl
(
T 2 +
aT
a′
)
. (5.6)
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For the scalar field the equation 5.2, after some appropriate rearrangement, takes the
form
a′
a
= − T
T 2 + 2
3
M2Pl(ρ+ 3P)
, (5.7)
which is a first order equation even after replacement of φ˙ byN−1T φ
′. Here the reduction
of order in return for explicit time dependence is general, provided ρ does not contain
second or higher order time derivatives, a property that holds true in most conceivable
physical examples. Alternatively this equation could have been obtained by explicit
differentiation using d
2
dt2
= N−1T
d
dT
(
N−1T
d
dT
)
together with N−1T = − 12M2PlT
a
a′ .
For a scalar field the last relevant equation is the Klein-Gordon equation. In terms
of t this is given by
0 = φ¨+ 3
a˙
a
φ˙+
∂V
∂φ
(φ). (5.8)
Expressed in terms of dependence on T rather than t this equation can be written in the
form
0 = φ′′ +
φ′
T
+ 4
a′
a
φ′ − a
′′
a′
φ′ +
4M4Pl
T 2
a′2
a2
∂V
∂φ
(φ) (5.9)
where extra terms have arisen from the differentiation of the lapse in φ¨ = N−1T
d
dT
(N−1T
dφ
dT
).
We have transformed the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre and Klein-Gordon equations from the
language of cosmological time t to that of York time T . Since the classical dynamics
are of the standard theory and the reduced-Hamiltonian theory developed below are
provably equivalent, the ‘translated’ equations found in this section give us the ability
to check the results of the reduction procedure.
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5.3 Reduced-Hamiltonian Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre
cosmology
5.3.1 Derivation of the Hamiltonian
In the previous section we arrived at equations for the dynamics of a homogeneous
isotropic universe by a transformation of the time coordinate from cosmological time
t to York time T . However, the equations — in particular the Klein-Gordon equation
in T , eq. 5.9 — is rather awkward to use. In fact, these equations are not the ‘natural’
equations to describe York-time dynamics. In this section we begin with an action
principle for the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe and perform a Hamiltonian reduction to
arrive at a different set of equations, which forms a more natural description (although
is, of course, equivalent to the equations above).
The action principle with which we start is simply the Einstein-Hilbert action for an
homogeneous isotropic universe, that is, where the spatial metric takes the form
gab(t) = a
2(t) γab, (5.10)
where γab is constant and in spherical coordinates given by the diagonal matrix
γab =

(1− kr2)−1 0 0
0 r2 0
0 0 r2 sin2 θ

ab
, (5.11)
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for k = 1 (spatially closed), k = 0 (spatially flat) or k = −1 (spatially open). In the
flat case (k = 0) one can also use Cartesian coordinates, in which case γab is just the
identity matrix.
The only geometric variable is the scale a, which is only a function of time and not
of spatial position. This makes the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe a special case in that
the York-time Hamiltonian reduction, in which the notion of scale is ‘absorbed’ into
the time parameter, reduces the number of geometrical dynamical variables to zero and
only leaves the degrees of freedom pertaining to matter. For simplicity here we consider
a single scalar field. One could envision a scenario with no matter content at all except
for a cosmological constant. In this case the reduction would lead to an expression for
the Hamiltonian that is only a function of time and directly encodes the volume of the
universe. There would be no dynamics, merely time passing.
With a scalar field φ with a potential V (φ) the action takes the form
Action =
∫
dτ Na3 (Lgrav + Lφ)
= 1
2
M2Pl
∫
dτ
(
6Nka− 6
N
aa˙2
)
+
∫
dτ
(
a3
2N
φ˙2 −Na3V (φ)
)
, (5.12)
where N is, of course, the lapse associated with the arbitrary temporal parameter τ and
k ∈ {0,±1} encodes the global properties of space. A dot refers to differentiation with
respect to τ (and not cosmological time t as elsewhere).
In order to obtain this expression from the Einstein-Hilbert action one must inte-
grate a spatial constant (essentially the instantaneous value of a) over all space. This
just introduces an overall constant factor. However, unless the universe is spatially
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closed (k = 1) this integral is technically infinite, so one must choose a ‘normalisation
volume’. Here we use a normalisation such that the volume is given by a3 without
any numerical factor. For the flat case, on which we will restrict our focus shortly, the
choice of normalisation has no effect and a numerical factor C drops out at the level of
the Hamiltonian constraint when written in terms of York variables (since York time T
and its conjugate momentum PT are then rescaled by 1/C and C respectively). For a
closed universe the appropriate expression for the volume is 2pi2a3 rather than a3.
The standard Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equations in cosmological time t (eqs. 5.1, 5.2)
can be obtained by variation of N and a, setting N = 1 in the resulting Euler-Lagrange
equations and identifying the time coordinate with cosmological time t. The Klein-
Gordon equation (eq. 5.8) in cosmological time is obtained via variation of φ, with
N = 1.
The canonical momenta conjugate to a and φ are
pa = −6M
2
Pl
N
aa˙, pφ =
a3
N
φ˙. (5.13)
Using these to rewrite the action in canonical form gives
A =
∫
dt
[
a˙pa + φ˙pφ −N(Hgrav +Hφ)
]
(5.14)
where
Hgrav +Hφ = − 1
12M2Pl
p2a
a
− 3kaM2Pl +
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V (φ). (5.15)
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Variation of N implies the Hamiltonian constraint,
Hgrav +Hφ = 0, (5.16)
which is the origin of many of the problems in canonical quantum gravity (see the
discussion in chapter 2).
We now begin with the Hamiltonian reduction. Recall that the procedure consists of
first transforming the Hamiltonian constraint from the variables (a, pa), encoding scale
and its rate of change, to York time T and its conjugate momentum PT , then solving
it for PT as a function of T and the other variables. York time and its momentum
(eq. 4.12) take the form,
T ≡ pa/3a2, PT = −a3 (5.17)
in the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe. It is easy to verify that indeed PT T˙ = paa˙ up to
a total derivative (which does not change the equations of motion). With the change of
variables (a, pa)→ (T, PT ) the Hamiltonian constraint is now
Hgrav +Hφ = −
p2φ
2PT
+
3
4M2Pl
T 2PT + 3kM
2
PlP
1
3
T − PTV (φ) = 0. (5.18)
This is the equation we must now solve for −PT , which will be identified with our
reduced (physical) Hamiltonian HT . It is the minisuperspace counterpart to the Lich-
nerowicz equation, written in terms of the York variables. The equation is seen to be a
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depressed cubic in P−2/3T , which may be solved by standard methods, giving
H = −pφ
[
U + 3
(
1
4
U2 − C2k
) 1
3
((
1
2
U + Ck
) 1
3
+
(
1
2
U − Ck
) 1
3
)]− 1
2
, (5.19)
where we define
U = U(φ, T ) ≡ 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) (5.20)
Ck = Ck(φ, pφ, T ) ≡
√
1
4
U2 − (2kM2Pl)3p−2φ (5.21)
for notational convenience. This solution is not valid for PT = 0, that is, the singular
case a = 0. The physical interpretation of the numerical value of H — as discussed in
chapter 3 — is that of a ‘volume’ (although in the flat and open case only volume ratios
are meaningful).
In principle there is no reason not to work with this Hamiltonian, except that it is
algebraically rather unwieldy, as are the derived Hamilton’s equations. We therefore
choose to consider the case of a spatially flat cosmology (k = 0), which simplifies the
expression significantly,2
Hk=0 = ±(p2φ/U)
1
2 = ± |pφ|√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
. (5.22)
In fact, the flat case is physically the most relevant as current data suggests that the
universe is, in fact, spatially flat. Recent data leads to an effective energy-density con-
2The results of this section were published in [106]. However, there we erroneously wrote pφ rather
than |pφ| in the numerator. This had some consequences for the resulting analysis. The error was cor-
rected in [104]. There are implications of this for the rigorous quantisation of the model. This will be
discussed in chapter 9.
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tribution of curvature given by Ωk = −0.011± 0.012 or −0.014± 0.017 depending on
the exact choice of data and dark-energy model [37] (flatness corresponds to Ωk = 0).
For the remainder of this section we will focus on the flat case and we will drop the
subscript ‘k = 0’ when denoting the Hamiltonian.
Since the Poisson structure of the non-geometric degrees of freedom is the usual
canonical ones, Hamilton’s equations for this Hamiltonian are
φ′ = ± pφ/|pφ|√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
(5.23)
p′φ = ∓
|pφ|
( 3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)) 32
∂V
∂φ
. (5.24)
The sign ambiguity arises from the fact that both sign choices for H are formal solu-
tions to the Hamiltonian constraint. The physical interpretation of the numerical value
of H is ‘volume’ (since H ≡ −PT = √g ∝ a3), from which one can readily infer
that H > 0 constitutes the physically relevant choice. Aside from this interpretation,
mathematically speaking the choice is arbitrary. The set of solutions for (φ(T ), pφ(T ))
is identical except for a reflection in phase space (swapping the signs in the correspond-
ing functions pφ(T )). Henceforth we assume the positive solution H ≥ 0, although we
emphasise that this is only relevant for the physical interpretation, not the mathematical
development.
One may be concerned that the radicand U = 3
2
M−2Pl T
2−2V (φ) in the denominator
of the Hamiltonian 5.22 (and 5.23, 5.24) may take non-positive values. Fortunately,
this is never the case. The easiest way to see this is to realise that the positivity of
the radicand is equivalent to the positivity of the kinetic energy. That is, using T =
124
−2M2Pla˙/a it is easy to show that 32M−2Pl T 2 > 2V if and only if a˙2/a2− (3M2Pl)−1V >
0, which by the first Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equation (5.1) is exactly the condition for
the kinetic term φ˙2 to be positive. That the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equations are obeyed
follows from the equivalence of the reduced-Hamiltonian and the standard formalism,
which can be derived as follows.
5.3.2 Explicit equivalence between the reduced and standard for-
malism in the case of the homogeneous isotropic universe
We already showed the equivalence of reduced-Hamiltonian and unreduced dynamics
in generality in section 3.1. Nonetheless it is insightful to see the equivalence explicitly
for the present cosmological scenario.
The Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equations with a scalar field φ in a spatially flat universe
(k = 0) written in terms of York time T are
1
4
M−4Pl T
2 = (3M2Pl)
−1
(
1
2
N−2T φ
′2 + V (φ)
)
(5.25)
a′
a
= − T
T 2 + 4
3
M2Pl (N
2
Tφ
′2 − V (φ)) , (5.26)
where the inverse York lapse is N−1T = −12M−2Pl Ta/a′. These are eqs. 5.3 and 5.7 with
ρ = 1
2
φ˙2 +V (φ) = 1
2
N−2T φ
′2 +V (φ) and P = 1
2
φ˙2−V (φ) = 1
2
N−2T φ
′2−V (φ). To show
equivalence we must be able to recover these equations from the reduced Hamiltonian
dynamics, that is, eqs. 5.23 and 5.24 together with the interpretation of the numerical
value of the Hamiltonian as ‘volume’, a3 = H , with H given by eq. 5.22.
Begin by noting that a3 = H(φ, pφ, T ) is to hold at all times, and so da3/dT =
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dH/dT . Using eq. 5.22, the right-hand side becomes the sum of three terms, two of
which cancel (since dH
dT
= ∂H
∂T
for a Hamiltonian function H , or equivalently by using
the equations of motion 5.23 and 5.24), leaving
3a3
a′
a
=
T
T 2 − 4
3
M2PlV (φ)
· pφ√
3
2
M−2Pl T 2 − 2V (φ)
. (5.27)
The second factor on the right-hand side is just the expression for the negative of the
Hamiltonian H , which cancels with the a3 term on the left, up to a sign, so that
a′
a
= − T
3T 2 − 4M2PlV (φ)
. (5.28)
Using this and eq. 5.23 implies after a little algebra
3
2
M−2Pl T
2 = 1
4
M−4Pl T
2 a
2
a′2
+ 2V (φ), (5.29)
which, after division by 6M2Pl and identification of the lapse NT yields eq. 5.25.
In order to derive eq. 5.26 we return to eq. 5.28, writing it in the form
a′
a
= − T
T 2 − 4
3
M2PlV (φ) +
(
2T 2 − 8
3
M2PlV (φ)
) . (5.30)
Using eq. 5.25 and the expression for NT to eliminate the term in parentheses in favour
of 4
3
M2PlN
−2
T φ
′2 then gives the desired result.
The Klein-Gordon equation (5.9) is recovered by differentiation of eqs. 5.28 and
5.23 with respect to T and elimination of the term involving ∂V
∂φ
. Subsequent use of eq.
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5.23 and 5.25 then allows rearrangement into the form of eq. 5.9.
Note the ‘holistic’ manner in which the dynamics is equivalent. All dynamical
equations and the interpretation a3 = H were necessary together in order to derive all
of the standard Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre and Klein-Gordon equations (although these are
not the natural equations with which to work in practice in the reduced Hamiltonian
formalism).
5.3.3 Evolution of the free scalar field
In order to discuss some of the features of cosmological Hamiltonian dynamics in York
time, we begin by discussing the free massless case, setting V (φ) = 0. Dynamics with
a general potential is treated in section 5.3.4 below. Mathematically this case is rather
trivial. However, it is our first actual application of the reduced-Hamiltonian formalism
in cosmology and helps to illustrate the role of the various physical quantities and a
number of features of such a reduced theory in practice.
The equations of motion are
φ′ =
√
3
2
MPl
sign(pφ)
|T | (5.31)
p′φ = 0. (5.32)
An interesting feature of these equations is that the evolution of the field value φ(T )
depends only on the sign of the momentum, and not its magnitude. With the momentum
a constant, this sign does not change, so that eq. 5.31 is easily solved. The physically
viable range for T is T ∈ (−∞, 0) for a spatially flat universe, so that |T | = −T in all
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cases (unless we consider the extension discussed in chapter 6). Leaving the sign of pφ
unspecified, we solve
φ′ = ±
√
3
2
MPl
1
−T (5.33)
to find
φ(T ) = φ0 ∓
√
3
2
MPl ln
( |T |
|T0|
)
, (5.34)
where φ0 = φ(T0) is an integration constant that has to be fixed by boundary data
at some reference time T0. Throughout the history of the universe the field changes
monotonically from positive to negative infinity or vice versa (depending on the sign of
pφ),how to approach such problems in practice
φ(T → −∞) −→ ∓∞ (5.35)
φ(T → 0) −→ ±∞. (5.36)
The physical interpretation of the value of the Hamiltonian is volume. In order to
make this explicit within the reduced-Hamiltonian framework, we can re-introduce the
scale factor a, now defining its third power as the value of the Hamiltonian H(T ),
a3(T ) ≡ H(T ) ≡ H(φ(T ), pφ(T ), T). (5.37)
That is, we consider the reduced formalism the fundamental theory and ‘kick away the
ladder’ used to derived it. The scale factor a has no natural role in the reduced formalism
and is merely introduced as a way to connect the results to the standard picture. In no
way does a have any dynamical role however. The time evolution of the scale factor is
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then easily calculated:
3a3
a′
a
= −
√
3
2
MPl
|pφ|
T 2
(5.38)
and therefore (using H(T ) = a3 again)
a′
a
= − 1
3T
=
1
3|T | . (5.39)
As expected, the universe grows from zero volume at T → −∞ to infinite volume as
T → 0. Eq. 5.39 is independent of the arbitrariness in the volume normalisation and in
the definition of the scale factor a.
5.3.4 Evolution of a scalar field with a potential
In the presence of a field potential V (φ) the full equations 5.23 and 5.24 must be con-
sidered. Once again the rate of evolution φ′ of the field depends only on the sign of the
momentum pφ, not its magnitude.3 However, the momentum pφ is not constant and can
change sign, leading to a discontinuity in φ′. Let us call such events ‘turning points’
and examine them more closely.
If φ′ or equivalently φ˙ is considered to pass through zero at the turning point (for
example, if φ′ is treated as some appropriate limit of a sequence of continuous func-
tions), one finds that at such points 3
2
M−2Pl T
2− 2V (φ) = 0 (one may infer from the first
Friedmann equation 5.25 and T = −2M2Pl a˙a that φ˙2 ∝ 32M−2Pl T 2 − 2V (φ), which also
guarantees the non-negativity of the radicand as discussed above). It appears that the
3This is not a general feature however. In the presence of multiple scalar fields φA with corresponding
momenta pAφ the numerator on the right-hand side of the corresponding equation of motion for φA reads
pAphi/(
∑
B p
B2
φ )
1
2 ), so that at least the ratios of the momenta matter, although φ′A is invariant under a
uniform rescaling of all momenta by the same factor.
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expressions for the Hamiltonian 5.22 and the rates of change of field and momentum
5.23 and 5.24 become singular.
Since we consider York time to be fundamental, let us frame our discussion entirely
in terms of T without reference to t or the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equations. A turning
point is defined by a change in sign of pφ, that is, by pφ = 0. Note that unlike φ′, the
momentum pφ changes continuously, so its vanishing at the turning point is established
without reference to any kind of limiting procedure. But then the expression for the
Hamiltonian 5.22 implies that either H = 0 (and therefore a3 = 0, constituting an
initial or final singularity), or (if the turning point is to occur at finite volume) that
3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) → 0 as the turning point is approached, specifically (3
2
M−2Pl T
2 −
2V (φ))
1
2 ∼ |pφ|. The implication is that φ′ → 0 with opposite signs for approach of the
turning point from the future and past.
Figure 5.1: Schematic illustration of
the evolution of the scale factor near
a turning point. The rate of growth
becomes infinite at a single point but
there is no discontinuity in the scale
factor a.
In order to understand the nature of these turn-
ing points, consider the ‘interpretation’ of the
Hamiltonian as volume, H ∝ a3. Using expres-
sion 5.22 and differentiating with respect to T
gives
a′
a
= − T
3T 2 − 4M2PlV (φ)
, (5.40)
so if the turning point is to occur at finite volume
(and therefore finite T ), we see that a′/a → ∞ as we approach the turning point. At
the turning point the fractional rate of expansion (with respect to York time) diverges,
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although the total fractional growth remains finite and there is no discontinuity in a
(see fig. 5.1). This corresponds to a de Sitter phase (of infinitesimal duration in terms
of cosmological time), where the fractional rate of expansion is constant and the York
lapse diverges, NT →∞. Note that even in a universe with a single scalar field, where
such turning points are relatively generic, they do no necessarily occur. Their existence
depends on the form of the potential V (φ).
Finding general solutions φ(T ) is difficult even for comparatively simple forms of
the potential V (φ). However, one can draw some conclusions about the evolution for
certain regimes corresponding to different cosmological periods. Of course, the present
model containing only a single scalar field does not adequately describe our actual
universe and so its ‘epochs’ do not match what we know about actual cosmological
history.
In the present model it is plausible to differentiate between an ‘early’ and a ’late’
epoch, respectively characterised by |T |  1 and |T |  1 and qualitatively different
from one another with regards to which one of the two terms 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 and 2V (φ)
dominates. Sufficiently early the term in T 2 dominates and the field behaves like the
free field discussed in section 5.3.3 unless φ(T ) behaves such that V (φ) grows at least
as fast as T 2 as one goes backwards in time. In the free theory the evolution of the field
is characterised by φ(T ) ∼ ln |T |, so that if 3
2
M−2Pl T
2  |2V (φ)| is satisfied at some
point in time and V (φ) is bounded by some polynomial in φ, then it is also satisfied
at all earlier times. Indeed if V (φ) being at most polynomial is a sufficient condition
for such a sufficiently early time to exist. If the model were considered as offering a
partial description of our universe — for example, if φ is considered as the field driving
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inflation — then one might wonder how viable candidates for the inflaton potential fare.
For an overview over such contenders based on recent observation, see ref. [81].
The end of this early epoch is reached when 2V (φ) = α2 · 3
2
M−2Pl T
2, where 0 <
α2 < 1 is chosen to suit one’s desired level of accuracy (α = 1 would correspond to the
end of the universe, T = 0 as the end of the early period). For concreteness, consider
a simple viable potential, such as a simple mass term, instantiating so-called large-field
inflation for parameter p = 2 (section A.3 in [81]), that is,
V (φ) = M4(φ/MPl)
2, (5.41)
where M is a constant corresponding to a mass scale (related to the chosen CMB nor-
malisation if the proposal of φ as the inflaton field in our universe is taken seriously).
For a first (and rather rough) approximation, let us assume that the free theory remains
valid until equality is reached. Then the boundary TB between epochs is given by the
equation
α2 · 3
2
M−2Pl T
2
B = 2M
4
(√
2 ln(−TB)√
3
)2
(5.42)
whose solution is
TB = − exp
[
−w
(
3α√
8M2MPl
)]
(5.43)
where w(x) is the Lambert Product-Log function.
For any potential that is strictly non-negative, as is the case in the chosen example,
the free evolution forms a lower bound for the (magnitude of) the scalar-field velocity
φ′ as well as the fractional rate of change of the scale factor. That is, the existence of
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a positive potential accelerates the rate of change of φ as well as the expansion of the
universe in comparison to the free theory. This applies to all epochs.
In the late epoch 2V (φ) becomes comparable to 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 in magnitude (by defi-
nition of the onset of the late epoch). This implies that the denominator in eq. 5.22
becomes small faster. Thus the interpretation a3 = H implies that the existence of a
potential causes an increase in expansion when compared to the free theory.
5.4 Inflation
Before concluding our treatment of the homogeneous isotropic universe in the York-
time reduced-Hamiltonian formalism we return briefly to the classical theory and con-
sider a particular cosmological process that plausibly characterised part of the early
history of our actual universe: inflation.
The theory of inflation poses an immediate puzzle for a description in terms of York
time. Inflation is characterised by a de Sitter phase, that is, a phase during which the rate
of spatial expansion (with respect to proper time) is exponential. The Hubble parameter
is constant and therefore so is the York parameter as the two are proportional. During
this ‘era’ the universe appears to expand by a finite amount while no time passes. The
York-time description appears singular.
The puzzle is resolved if we recall that in a realistic inflationary phase the Hubble
parameter is constant only to a first approximation and is, in fact, decreasing, albeit only
by a small amount. The implication is that an inflationary period corresponds to a very
short time interval and furthermore that the York-time description must use a higher
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order of approximation than is conventionally used in the standard picture.
Conventional slow-roll inflation assumes that during this period the matter content
of the universe is dominated by a scalar field, whose contribution to the energy density
ρ = 1
2
φ˙2 +V (φ) is in turn dominated by the field’s potential function V (φ). (Recall that
φ˙ denotes the derivative of φ with respect to conventional cosmological time t, or, more
or less equivalently, proper time.) Specifically, one assumes the ‘slow-roll conditions’
1
2
φ˙2  V (φ), |φ¨| 
∣∣∣∣∂V∂φ
∣∣∣∣ , (5.44)
while the dynamics is determined by the Friedmann and Klein-Gordon equations. Pro-
vided the slow-roll conditions hold, in terms of York time T = −2M2PlH the Friedmann
equation 5.1 becomes
3
4
M−2Pl T
2 ≈ V (φ), (5.45)
which suggests that the numerical value of the potential effectively provides a measure
of York time. Approximating the potential to be roughly constant is therefore not a
viable description.
Instead one proceeds to calculate the next-order, time-dependent correction to H ,
and hence T . At ‘zeroth’ order one ignores the contribution of the kinetic term to ρ, so
that equation 5.1 becomes
H ≈
√
V (φ)/3M2Pl, (5.46)
which can be substituted into the Klein-Gordon equation 5.8. Applying the second
slow-roll condition, the second-derivative term φ¨ can be neglected, so one is left, in
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general, with a non-linear first order differential equation, which can be solved in many
relevant cases to yield a first time-dependent approximation φ1(t) for the scalar field.
For example, for V (φ) = λφb with λ, b ∈ R the solution is
φ1(t) =
[(
b
2
− 2
)(
b
√
λM2Pl/3 t+ A
)]1/(2− b
2
)
, (5.47)
with A being an integration constant that must obey certain conditions that follow from
the slow-roll conditions, namely that the constant contribution to the potential V (φ1)
is large compared to the time-dependent one (we will show this explicitly below for a
particular example). This solution φ1 can then be substituted back into the Friedmann
equation 5.1 to give the next approximationH1(t) to the Hubble parameter and therefore
to the York parameter.4 The function T (t) obtained can now be inverted to find φ in
terms of T and give a ‘York-time only’ account of the evolution during inflation.
To illustrate this, consider a particular example of an inflationary potential, namely
the case of so-called large-field inflation already considered above, V (φ) = m2φ2. This
simple choice helps to illustrate the method of obtaining a York-time description since
unlike many other cases it leads to straightforward algebra (although it is not a choice
of potential favoured by current observation [97]). One finds,
φ1(t) = ∓
√
4
3
M2Plm
2 t+ φ0, for φ0 ≷ 0 (5.48)
where φ0 is the value of φ at t = 0, which must be chosen such that the approximation
4One could repeat the procedure iteratively but in general this is not necessary for an approximate
description of the homogeneous cosmological background and would in any case not yield higher degrees
of accuracy due to our neglect of the contribution of other matter.
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is valid at this time. We will justify the condition on the sign, which arises due to
the appearance of ‘
√
φ2’ in the Klein-Gordon equation, shortly. The first slow-roll
condition then says
2
3
M2Plm
2  m2
(
φ0 +
√
4
3
M2Plm
2 t
)2
, (5.49)
which must be satisfied throughout inflation, in particular at t = 0, that is,
φ20  23M2Pl. (5.50)
The constant contribution φ0 dominates the scalar field until t ≈ (43M2Plm2)−
1
2 , by
which point the approximation has ceased to be valid, presumably corresponding to a
time well after the end of inflation. While the approximation remains valid the sign of
φ is just the sign of φ0, hence the sign dependence in equation 5.48.
In this example the correction to ρ due to the kinetic energy contribution is constant,
1
3M2Pl
· 1
2
φ˙2 = 2
9
m2, (5.51)
while time dependence arises via the potential term,
V (φ1(t)) = m
2φ21 = m
2
(
φ0 +
√
4
3
M2Plm
2 t
)2
. (5.52)
This is consistent with the approximation since the time-independent contribution dom-
inates by virtue of equation 5.49. Substituting these back into the Friedmann equation
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gives
H21 = H
2
0
[(
1∓ φ−10
√
4
3
M2Plm
2
)2
+H−21 · 29m2
]
, (5.53)
where
H20 =
1
3M2Pl
m2φ20 (5.54)
is the initial, constant zeroth-order approximation to the Hubble parameter as given by
equation 5.46. From this one obtains the expression for York time as a function of
cosmological time,
T (t) = −2M2Pl ·H0
(
1 +
m2
9H20
−
√
4
3
M2PLm
2
t
|φ0|
)
. (5.55)
This expression may be straightforwardly inverted in order to express φ1 as a function
of T rather than t,
t =
|φ0|√
4
3
M2Plm
2
(
1 +
m2
9H20
− |T |
2M2PlHo
)
. (5.56)
The primary characteristic of inflation is the rapid (approximately exponential) growth
of the background scale factor a. In the York-time reduced-Hamiltonian formalism a
ceases to be a dynamical variable however since the ‘volume’ a3 is the momentum con-
jugate to the time parameter (up to a sign). As we discussed in section 5.3, the volume
(up to some suitable normalisation) is therefore given by the numerical value of the re-
duced York-time Hamiltonian, which for a spatially flat cosmology is given by eq. 5.22.
The York-time derivative a′ of the scale factor obtained was given by eq. 5.40, which
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read
a′
a
= − T
3T 2 − 4M2PlV (φ)
. (5.40)
Recall that the expression in the denominator is proportional to the total kinetic energy
as is apparent from the Friedmann equation (5.1). In the example above it is constant
and so one can easily calculate the number of e-folds that correspond to some inflation-
ary interval (Ti, Tf ),
Ne =
∫ Tf
Ti
dT
a′
a
= 1
2
κ
(
T 2i − T 2f
)
, (5.57)
where
κ ≡ 3
3T 2 − 4M2PlV (φ)
= const. (5.58)
has been defined for convenience. For other choices of potential the solution φ1(t) is
in general not a linear function of t and so the kinetic energy is not constant. However,
even then one can take the solution 5.47 and expand it, dropping terms of second and
higher order in t since these are small compared to the constant and linear terms by the
first slow-roll condition. As a result the non-constant contribution to the kinetic energy
is negligible even compared to the already small constant contribution. Equation 5.57
holds, therefore, more generally.
Equation 5.40 is then trivially solved, giving
a(T ) = a0e
−κ
2
T 2 , (5.59)
where the integration constant a0 hypothetically denotes a normalisation scale corre-
sponding to the value of a in the infinite t-future (T = 0), although such an inter-
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pretation is not appropriate since the inflationary description only holds for a limited
duration.
A numerical estmate for the parameter κ can be derived. For the example considered
above with the inflaton potential V (φ) = m2φ2, the empirical estimate for the value of
the Hubble parameter during inflation, 3.6 × 10−5MPl from ref. [96] (see section 4.4),
can be used to find an inequality (using equation 5.50) for the kinetic-energy correction
5.51,
K.E. 10−9, (5.60)
from which in turn one can derive an inequality for the constant κ,
κ 108. (5.61)
The expression 5.59 (with the definition 5.58) shows how the growth of the scale
factor during inflation is characterised by the potential. We have also solved (approxi-
mately) for the behaviour of the scalar field during that period. In chapter 7 we will use
inflation as the background cosmology on which to study perturbations, in particular,
the ‘freezing out’ of tensor modes.
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CHAPTER 6
A COSMOLOGICAL EXTENSION
In this chapter we argue that York time as a physically fundamental notion of time
suggests a natural extension of the cosmological timeline. We explain how the exis-
tence of this extension may have implications for the possible matter content of the
universe, such as viable inflaton potentials. The contents of this chapter were published
in ref. [104].
6.1 An end to time?
Throughout this thesis we are concerned with developing an understanding of the uni-
verse, in particular, of cosmology, in terms of a description based on York time as a
physical time, and with associated formal developments. In a spatially flat universe —
and we have observational reasons to believe that we live in such a universe — cos-
mological history apparently ends at some finite time Tend, either equal to zero or even
earlier at some small negative number (in the presence of a positive cosmological con-
stant Λ or an effective cosmological constant taking the form of a positive T → Tend
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limit of the matter field potential V (φ)). This point corresponds to cosmological time
t → ∞ in the standard description, where the Hubble parameter approaches zero or a
constant proportional to Λ.
Our hypothesis is that York time is physically fundamental. A valid question is
therefore: Why should time end at Tend ≤ 0? We leave it to philosophical discourse
to determine whether or not it is possible or even meaningful for time to ‘end’ at some
instant — that is, if instants of universal history and the York timeline form a bijection
— and what the metaphysical implications are. Either way, there is no a priori reason to
assume that time indeed ends at some particular instant Tend, equal to zero or otherwise.
Undoubtedly the point has certain dynamical significance and given that time is physical
it is not obviously absurd that the end of time should have a dynamical origin. In fact,
this is in part what we will explore in this chapter. However, this is a matter of fact that
can only be determined a posteriori, following analysis and comparison to the observed
universe.
In this chapter we explore the consequences of extending the York timeline beyond
Tend, that is, beyond t = ∞. The usual description in terms of cosmological time t
fails to describe this era. In the t-description the transition corresponds to a coordi-
nate singularity. The idea is analogous to a Schwarzschild black hole, where a new
region of space-time is revealed by the use of Kruskal-Szekeres coordinates, extending
to the ‘other side’ of the singularity (where the Kruskal-Szekeres variable usually de-
noted by ‘V ’ takes negative values), a region not described by either Schwarzschild or
Eddington-Finkelstein coordinates [86, Ch. 31].1
1Arguably there is another, simpler example: the extension of dynamics beyond a black hole’s event
horizon in the first place. The idea that spacetime extended beyond the horizon of a Schwarzschild black
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Our reasons for pursuing this line of inquiry are not, however, purely philosophical.
In fact, there are concrete reasons (described in section 6.2) why such a cosmological
extension is necessary for a consistent quantisation. However, unfortunately there is (as
far as I can see) no viable way to explore the dynamics or even the existence of this
‘other side’ of cosmological history in any direct empirical way.
The basic hypothesis here is that the dynamical equations in York time found via the
Hamiltonian reduction remain valid beyond T∞. We restrict our analysis to the homo-
geneous isotropic (‘Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre’) universe explored in chapter 5. In chapter 7
we will explore perturbations and it would undoubtedly be interesting to consider their
evolution as the universe transitions to the ‘other side’. However, this is left to future
work.
At least two questions require answering. First, how do the dynamical entities — in
our case the scalar field — evolve during the transition? Second, what evolution can we
expect on the other side? The second question is easier to answer and we will do so in
section 6.3. The first is more difficult and will be explored in section 6.4.
6.2 The necessity of a cosmological extension
Why should one take the extension seriously? There may be some purely philosophical
arguments: that time should not end at some finite value, or that the mere mathematical
possibility of the extension should at least prompt us to allow for the possibility of
hole into the region r < 2M took several decades to become apparent [38, 74, 127]. However, a crucial
difference here is that this extension concerns the removal of a mere coordinate singularity. No physical
quantities become infinite (and geodesics crossing the surface r = 2M are traversed in finite proper
time). In the York-time extension, as we shall see, physical quantities may become infinite depending on
the particulars of the matter content.
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its physicality. However, there is a considerably more compelling, physical reason to
consider it more than mere fiction.
The model employed in this chapter and chapter 5 above is that of a homogeneous
isotropic universe. This is, of course, an approximation. Let us consider the exis-
tence of inhomogeneities in this universe, in particular local singularities such as a
Schwarzschild black hole formed at some finite time from a collapsing cloud of dust
(see [86, sec. 32] and references therein for an introduction). Such a scenario can be de-
scribed by smoothly ‘gluing’ together parts of a closed collapsing Friedmann universe
shrinking to zero size (the collapsing dust cloud), a Schwarzschild region of space-time
(the near exterior of the cloud) and the chosen Friedmann cosmology (the distant rest of
the universe). When described in terms of constant-mean-curvature surfaces it is found
[22] that these surfaces smoothly connect between the different regions.2 Furthermore,
K →∞ (T →∞) as one approaches the singularity formed by the fully collapsed dust
cloud, independently of the choice of exterior cosmology.
If the cosmology is closed, all constant-mean-curvature slices inside the cloud and
Schwarzschild regions connect smoothly to exterior cosmological slices [100]. This
is one of the features of York-time slicing explored in chapter 4. If the cosmology is
flat, only slices up to K = 0 (T = 0) connect up smoothly and slices with K > 0
only exist in disconnected patches around the local singularities [22, sections VI, VII].
An observer falling into the black hole reaches the singularity in finite proper time and
therefore crosses all constant-mean-curvature surfaces up to T = ∞ in finite proper
time. If York time has fundamental physical significance, reaching the singularity con-
2Interestingly, a description in terms of a conventional time parameter t allows only for continuous
surfaces, but not smooth ones.
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stitutes arriving at the end of the universe at T →∞ no matter the exterior cosmology.
Therefore, without the extension, different areas of the universe would end at different
times: at Tend = 0 far away from the singularity, but at Tend =∞ in its vicinity.
Classically this does not immediately cause a contradiction, at least not for physical
reasons. However, quantisation of the theory is now a problem. The quantum theory is
necessarily non-local — this was one reason motivating the idea of a physically funda-
mental space-time split in the first place — and non-local effects are incompatible with
partial spatial slices of this kind.
For example, consider a pair of entangled particles, one of which enters the Schwarz-
schild radius while the other remains in some distant part of the universe. When the
falling particle reaches T = 0 its partner encounters the end of time. What happens to
the quantum state at this point is entirely unclear. At T = 0 the configuration space
(or Hilbert space) would suddenly change its dimensionality since the space on which
the dynamical entities such as matter fields are defined shrinks to a set of disconnected
finite patches. This does not allow for a consistent definition of the quantum theory.
Furthermore, since the falling particle crosses into the region T > 0 in finite proper
time this scenario cannot be dismissed as unphysical. Our theory is furthermore sup-
posed to be fundamental, so its validity cannot be limited to the exteriors of black holes,
for example.
Therefore there is a choice: Either York time is rejected as the fundamental time
parameter, or the consistency of quantisation demands the existence of the extension.
In this thesis we are interested in exploring the consequences of considering York time
as physically fundamental and so we require the cosmological extension.
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6.3 Dynamics on the other side
The equations 5.23, 5.24 governing φ and its conjugate momentum pφ are invariant
under temporal reflection about T = 0 (with the direction of time unchanged, so that dT
does not transform). Furthermore, the sign of φ′ is the same as the sign of pφ. Therefore
the set of solutions for the interval T ∈ (0,∞) is exactly the same set of trajectories as
for the interval T ∈ (−∞, 0) except that the latter are traced out ‘backwards’ and the
sign of the momentum is flipped. A solution (φ(T ), pφ(T )) for T < 0 may be used to
define a corresponding solution φ˜(T ), p˜φ(T ) for T > 0 via initial data at T0 > 0 given
by
φ˜(T0) = φ(−T0), p˜φ(T ) = −pφ(−T ), (6.1)
as can be easily verified.
The equivalence between equations 5.23 and 5.24 together with H = a3, and the
conventional Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre and Klein-Gordon equations (eqs. 5.1, 5.2, 5.8) im-
plies that we should also be able to understand this symmetry in terms of the latter, even
though the cosmological time parameter t does not cover the period T > 0. Instead we
are able to define another analogous cosmological time parameter t˜ such that t˜→ −∞
as T → 0+ and t˜ → 0 (or some other finite value) as T → ∞. This parameter t˜ does
not describe the period T < 0. Equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.8 are invariant under reversal
of the direction of time, dt → −dt. One can therefore see that if t is mapped to −t˜ as
part of the correspondence between solutions then these equations remain satisfied for
the time variable t˜ instead of t.
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However, note that in general for more complicated matter content there is no rea-
son to expect that the universe will simply ‘turn around’ and trace out its trajectory
backwards, even if there is a one-one correspondence between solutions on ‘our side’
and the extension.
6.4 Transition behaviour and classification of potentials
York time T is proportional to the Hubble parameter, so that T → 0 as t → ∞ only
if a˙
a
→ 0, which is the case, for example, in the presence of a free scalar field or a
field with a potential which goes to zero sufficiently fast as the end of conventional
cosmological history is approached. Specifically, note that 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V > 0 as we
saw above. With T → 0, this implies that if V ≥ 0 everywhere, then V → 0 faster than
3
4
M−2Pl T
2 if T is to go to zero. Otherwise, in the presence of a positive cosmological
constant, for example, T does not reach zero in finite cosmological time. While in that
case there are still corresponding solutions on the ‘other side’, there is an intermediate
interval T ∈ (T∞,−T∞) where the dynamics is not defined.
Figure 6.1: Overview of corresponding values of cosmological time t and York time T in the
case of a free scalar field. Only the left half of the time line is described by conventional cos-
mological time for a flat universe. The right hand side is however a natural extension if the
York parameter is taken seriously as a fundamental time parameter. The finite ‘starting’ and
‘end’ values of t and t′ respectively are up to convention (due to cosmological-time translation
invariance).
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We are interested in identifying the class of potentials for which there is a smooth
transition from the T < 0 to the T > 0 region. Specifically, what we mean by this is
that
• the dynamical equations 5.23, 5.24 describe the behaviour of the scalar field(s)
for the entire real line and there is no intermediate interval around T = 0 where
3
2
M−2Pl T
2 < 2V (φ),
• the energy density associated with the scalar field and the field value φ itself
remain finite everywhere.
The first condition is equivalent to the question in the cosmological-time picture whether
or not there are solutions to eq. 5.1 for all values of a˙/a. For example, the dynamics of
the free field (V (φ) = 0) can be analytically solved,3
φ′free = sign(p
free
φ ) ·
(
3
2
M−2Pl T
2
)− 1
2 , pfreeφ = const.
⇒ φfree =
√
3
2
MPl ln |T | (6.2)
for all T < 0 (fig. 6.1). The energy density is ∼ φ˙2 ∼ T 2 → 0 and therefore obviously
finite. However, φ diverges logarithmically with its sign equal to the sign of the initial
value pfreeφ .
3The relation φ′free ∼ |T |−1 illustrates a feature of the York time picture: More and more ‘happens’
in a finite time interval the closer we are to T = 0. As we discussed in section 4.4 a similar observation
was made about cosmological time regarding the very early history (close to t = 0) in the 1960s in [85],
who suggested that − ln a (or alternatively the logarithm of the homogeneous temperature, which turns
out to roughly equivalent) might be a more appropriate choice of temporal parameter to describe the
history of the universe. This is further exemplified in our language to describe the early universe in terms
of ‘epochs’ such as the ‘Planck’, ‘Grand Unifying’ and ‘Inflationary’ epochs, each of which is described
by a vastly different order of magnitude of duration. Another comparable choice is the parameter ln t as
had been advocated by Milne another twenty years earlier (cited in [85]).
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On the other hand, consider the simple case of a positive cosmological constant,
V (φ) = 2M2PlΛ, Λ > 0, and no other potential term. In terms of cosmological time, this
is associated with an eternally expanding universe with a˙/a asymptotically approach-
ing a finite value proportional to Λ (de Sitter expansion). In the York-time picture,
3
2
M−2Pl T
2−2V (φ) > 0 only up until T∞ = −16M2PlΛ and again after−T∞ = +16M2PlΛ.
In the intermediate period the dynamics is ill-defined since φ was taken to be a real
field (fig. 6.2). While the dynamical equations can indeed be applied to T > −T∞, the
transition is not smooth. We will provide a discussion of the meaning and implication
of such an intermediate period below.
Figure 6.2: Overview of corresponding values of cosmological time t and York time T in the
case of a scalar field with a positive cosmological constant. The left section of the line is
described by conventional cosmological time t, the right one by a similar parameter t′. In
the middle section, T∞ < T < −T∞, the dynamics of the scalar field is undefined, raising
philosophical questions.
A non-trivial example of a potential which leads to a well-defined transition, but
with diverging field value, is given by V (φ) = V0e−λφ/MP , where V0 and λ are constant
parameters. Potentials of this form may arise in the effective four-dimensional dynam-
ics induced by Kaluza-Klein theories, for example. A discussion of this potential in
terms of conventional cosmological time t is given in [44] and references therein, in par-
ticular [57]. This model can be solved exactly. Make the ansatz φ(T ) = φ0 + α ln |T |,
then realising that dV/dφ is monotonic one can infer that there is a time after which
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there is no further turning point, so that sign(pφ) remains fixed and equation 5.23 ef-
fectively decouples from the momentum. Solving the equation with the proposed ansatz
one obtains the solution
φ(T ) =
MPl
λ
ln
(
8V0M
2
Pl
(6− λ2)
1
T 2
)
, (6.3)
which diverges as T → 0. However,
V (T ) =
(6− λ2)T 2
8V0M2Pl
(6.4)
approaches zero in this limit, as required for the existence of a well-defined transition.
Note that due to the fact that T is physically meaningful there is no time-translation
invariance (see [106]).
A simple example of a fully smooth transition (with φ remaining finite) is provided
by a scalar field with a positive mass term, V (φ) = m2φ2, m2 > 0 (which is a ver-
sion of large-field inflation [82], albeit one not favoured by the most recent data [97]).
One does not need to solve the equations in order to analyse the behaviour as T → 0.
In the late-time limit one expects oscillatory behaviour with an amplitude decreasing
over time. Indeed, φ begins by rolling down the potential (if its initial conditions are
such that it rolls up, then eq. 5.24 ensures that pφ will pass through zero at some point,
a turning point, and φ changes direction) and passes through the minimum, at which
point p′φ changes sign (eq. 5.24). The momentum pφ will therefore pass through zero
eventually, so that a turning point results and φ reverses sign. This repeats, resulting
in oscillatory behaviour. The amplitude of the oscillations decreases since 3
2
M−2Pl T
2
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monotonically decreases, so the turning point (recall that these can be identified by the
condition 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) = 0) are reached at a lower value of V (φ) and there-
fore at a lower value of φ2 than during the previous cycle. It is noteworthy that in
the cosmological-time picture appeal to ‘Hubble friction’ must be made (the Hubble
parameter appears as a frictional coefficient in eq. 5.8), whereas in the York-time equa-
tions derived via the Hamiltonian reduction the decreasing amplitude is encoded in the
explicit time dependence.
During the oscillations the field φ remains finite since it is bound by the field value
at the most recent turning point from above and below. Both potential and kinetic
energy density furthermore approach zero, so the finiteness of the energy density ρφ is
guaranteed. In fact, we know that for oscillatory solutions that ρφ ∼ a−3 (see [44]), so
even the total energy remains finite if initially normalised.
Let us now attempt a more general characterisation. We restrict our discussion to
potentials bounded from below. For consider a potential without a lower bound. If there
is a local minimum the field may, initial conditions permitting, become trapped in the
well and the potential may be locally approximated by another potential bounded from
below. If on the other hand no such minimum exists or the initial conditions are such
that the field does not become trapped inside one, then V (φ) reaches arbitrarily negative
values, so that 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) >  as T → 0 for some finite  > 0. Therefore |φ′|
is bounded for all T greater than some reference time Tr. Since the interval (Tr, 0) is
finite, φ remains finite also. The ‘transition’ is perfectly smooth. However, it is also
not a novelty since it is reached in finite cosmological time [50]. That is, the universe
recontracts even in the conventional description. No new temporal region is revealed
150
Value of inf V (φ) Examples Value of T∞ Smoothness of transition(Existence of Transition) Field value finite? (|φ| <∞) Energy density finite?
inf V (φ) <
0
As be-
low but
with
cosm.
const.
(Λ < 0)
None. T∞ does not
exist, the universe
recontracts in finite
cosmological time.
No extension can
be made. The null
energy condition is
violated.
No real transition.
(Extension does not
exist.)
No real transition.
(Extension does not
exist.)
inf V (φ) =
0
AI, HI,
MHI,
RGI,
SBI
T∞ = 0 (transition
exists), unless there
is a local minimum
with V (φmin) > 0
in which the field
is trapped, in which
case behaviour as if
inf V (φ) > 0.
Possibly: Yes iff
there is an infinite
number of turning
points (i.e. oscillating
solutions, requires
existence of a mini-
mum) (e.g. HI, MHI,
RGI, SBI). Otherwise
φ → ±∞ at least
logarithmically (e.g.
AI).
Yes.
Example: oscillating
solutions in V ∼
|φ|n: ρφ ∼ a−m, m =
6n/(n+ 2) [44]
inf V (φ) >
0
As
above
but with
cosm.
const.
(Λ > 0)
T∞ < 0 (inter-
mediate epoch of
ill-defined dynam-
ics). C.f. model
with a cosmological
constant.
No transition.
(Epoch of ill-defined
dynamics before
other side reached.)
No transition.
(Epoch of ill-defined
dynamics before
other side reached.)
Table 6.1: Transition behaviour for potentials bounded from below. The second entry in
each line gives examples of potentials with the infimum as given in the first column from the
most favoured inflation potentials based on the 2013 Planck data as identified in [81] (although
here we do not differentiate between subcategories of a particular type of potential based on
parameter-value ranges), namely Arctan Inflation (AI), Higgs Inflation (HI), Mutated Hilltop
Inflation (MHI), Radion Gauge Inflation (RGI) and Supergravity Brane Inflation (SBI). The
third column identifies if York time reaches T = 0, the condition for a transition to the other
side to exist without an intermediate epoch of ill-defined dynamics. The last two columns provide
information on the smoothness of the transition.
through the use of York time.
Therefore, assume there exists α ∈ R such that α = inf V (φ). Table 6.1 summarises
the implications for the transition for different cases.
6.5 Discussion
The matter content of the real universe is considerably more complicated than a single
scalar field. However, during inflation a scalar field may have constituted the dominant
constituent of the matter content. Furthermore, with all other contributions to the energy
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density falling to zero in the late-time limit of the universe, a non-zero contribution
from a scalar field potential may become once again significant. Therefore considering
a scalar-field model in order to explore the ‘other side’ is appropriate.
The question of the significance of the transition properties of such potentials arises.
Indeed, one may dismiss the cosmological extension presented here as purely mathe-
matical speculation without any physical significance at all. However, if one considers
the possibility that York time may indeed play the role of a fundamental time parameter
that forms the basis of quantisation (where, as we showed, the extension is required
for consistency), then the existence of models (potentials) with an intermediate period
around T = 0 of ill-defined dynamics requires consideration. One may take one of the
following stances:4
1. Potentials which lead to such an intermediate period are ruled out by a theory
in which York time is considered fundamental. Conversely, if observational evi-
dence suggests that inflation, for example, is driven by such a potential, then this
would falsify a theory in which York time is taken to play a physically fundamen-
tal role.
2. Time may end at some finite value, so there is no contradiction in regarding York
time as physically meaningful but without taking the extension seriously. The
argument of section 6.2 is avoided by postulating some different, non-equivalent
and at this stage unknown quantisation procedure which allows time to end at dif-
ferent values in different regions of space, or a change in the classical theory that
4Not including more radical attitudes such as the view that during the intermediate epoch the dynami-
cal evolution of matter and space cannot be derived from a variational principle, or that our mathematical
tools are in some way insufficient to provide a description of the dynamics at these times. Whether or not
such a view is viable is a philosophical question outside the scope of this thesis.
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avoids the ‘patchy’ time slices for T > 0. The resulting quantum theory would
likely be not equivalent to standard quantisation and observational corroboration
may be possible.
The second point of view may be found viable for example in the context of Shape Dy-
namics [54, 13, 84] (which we touched on on multiple occasions in part I of this thesis),
where what is presumed physical is a sequence of configurations (that is, a trajectory
in configuration space) without any physically fundamental time. There a preferred
time parameter is obtained by the requirement that the dynamics be expressed in terms
of dimensionless, relational quantities only [13]. The time parameter is not physically
fundamental but instead supervenes on the properties of the system. Therefore there
is no a priori imperative that this time parameter should constitute a surjection from
the configuration-space trajectory onto the real line. Furthermore, Shape Dynamics
differs from general relativity in its description of black holes [51, 52], so the theory
may escape the argument outlined in section 6.2. In fact, in our opinion this view is the
strongest reason not to believe in the physicality of our proposed extension. Note though
that Shape Dynamics is a different physical theory, which, while locally equivalent to
general relativity in the constant-mean-curvature gauge, does differ in the global struc-
tures it allows and so is at least in principle5 observationally distinguishable. Hence,
despite its similarities, it is not the focus of this paper. Meanwhile the view adopted
here, ascribing a more fundamental role to time, remains viable at least until there is
sufficient observational evidence to strongly favour theories (of quantum gravity, for
example) which rely on a purely relational notion of time.
5The observer would have to travel through the event horizon of a black hole in order to establish a
difference.
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If we adopt the first point of view then a theoretical framework in which York time
is fundamental imposes a restriction on inflationary potentials (or, more accurately, the
complete matter content of the universe) and is therefore experimentally testable, pro-
vided cosmological flatness (Ωk = 0) is conclusively established. At the time of writing
the list of observationally unfalsified inflationary potentials is still too long to make any
definite conclusions in this context [81] and there is no obvious correlation between po-
tentials allowing for a smooth transition and those favoured by data on inflation. How-
ever, it will be interesting to see whether ‘York-time friendly’ potentials are favoured
or not as data improves. It is, however, important to bear in mind that some inflaton
potentials are merely effective (derived from some underlying supersymmetry or string
model, for example) and their form may not stay the same throughout the entire history
of the universe. A more careful analysis of individual models is necessary.
At this stage, whether or not we should give credence to predictions concerning the
unobservable epoch T > 0 depends on the existence of other evidence for York time
as a physically fundamental time parameter. In this thesis we have argued that there
are certainly are theoretical reasons. If dramatic progress is made in the development
of some theory of quantum gravity that relies on York time, and observational evidence
emerges that corroborates this theory, then this would be reason to take the extension
seriously. Indeed it would be difficult to escape its necessity.
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CHAPTER 7
COSMOLOGICAL PERTURBATION THEORY WITH
YORK TIME: PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter we lay the foundations for the development of the Hamiltonian-reduced
York-time cosmological perturbation theory to be developed in the next chapter. We dis-
cuss some formal properties relating to the Poisson structure by looking at an anisotropic
minisuperspace model and we consider some physical processes such as the ‘freezing
out’ and ‘Hubble re-entry’ of cosmological perturbations in the York-time description.
The contents of section 7.2 were published in ref. [105], while sections 7.3 and 7.4 were
contained in ref. [107].
7.1 The importance of cosmological perturbation the-
ory
Very broadly speaking, the study of cosmology can be divided into two areas: the study
of the homogeneous ‘background’, concerning global properties of the universe, and
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the study of small-scale inhomogeneities. The former is logically prior to the latter in
the sense that the evolution of the background (or at least certain quantities describing
aspects thereof) has to be sufficiently well understood before one can embark upon the
study of small inhomogeneities on that background. However, ex hypothesi there is
no ‘backreaction’ of the inhomogeneities on the cosmological background. The back-
ground value of some physical quantity (such as the value of some matter field φ, say)
is chosen to be the global average, for example, so that if one were to find that the local
change in the field δφ(x) is positive everywhere, it would be a sign that the ‘wrong’
background was chosen.
It is not guaranteed a priori that this model of cosmology — background plus pertur-
bations — adequately describes our actual universe. In fact, on sufficiently small scales
(such as on the scale of the Earth-Moon system) it does not. Given what we know
there is however strong evidence that this model does provide a viable approximation
of the early universe, as well as today on sufficiently large scales (≥ gigaparsecs). The
evolution of small perturbations into large non-linear1 inhomogeneities such as planets,
galaxies and black holes (‘structure formation’) is a significant area of research, albeit
one that we cannot do justice here.
The full equations of general relativity are highly non-linear and therefore in general
difficult to solve analytically. Numerical relativity, the analysis of gravitational dynam-
ics via computer simulation has become its own field of study in modern theoretical
physics. Perturbation theory offers a method to reduce the complexity of the equa-
tion and therefore allows one to find approximate analytic solutions, at least for certain
1‘Non-linear’ meaning that linearised (first-order) forms of the dynamical equations of gravity are not
good approximations to describe the evolution.
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regimes. The fact that the early universe is such a regime is a fortunate ‘coincidence’.
Other than through structure formation, perturbation theory may be tested experi-
mentally via studies of the cosmic microwave background (CMB). Data from missions
such as WMAP (Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe [37]) and the Planck space-
craft [97] have substantially increased our understanding of the early universe within
the last decade. The CMB provides a ‘picture’ of the universe at ca. 379,000 years after
the Big Bang when photons decoupled (photon-matter interactions became rare), leav-
ing the universe transparent. The relative late time of this event limits what is known
quantitatively about the universe prior to that, which is for the most part inaccessible.2
In order to test some theory of the early universe, one is therefore forced to evolve the
universe forward to the point of photon decoupling, which in itself brings theoretical
and numerical uncertainties.
Finding discrepancies between predicted data of the quantised York-time reduced-
Hamiltonian theory and more conventional (quantised) general relativity or other ap-
proaches to quantum gravity, remains work to be carried out in the future. In this thesis
we contend with developing the formal structure of the reduced-Hamiltonian descrip-
tion of cosmological perturbations and gaining an understanding in terms of York time
of key physical processes such as the ‘freezing out’ of (Fourier modes of) perturbations
during inflation. This is the task undertaken in this chapter and the next. A feature of
the reduced theory that is relevant here is the non-canonical Poisson structure of the
reduced variables, which we study in isolation in section 7.2. In sections 7.3 and 7.4
2A proposed method to probe the universe at earlier times is by measurements of the cosmic neutrino
background (CNB). Neutrinos decoupled about one second after the big bang and would therefore pro-
vide a much earlier snapshot of the universe. However, technologically accurate measurements of the
CNB are difficult at this point, although near-future experiments are not completely inconceivable [43].
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we study the ‘freezing’ and ‘Hubble re-entry’ of modes relating to scalar and tensor
perturbations. In chapter 8 we perform the Hamiltonian reduction with respect to York
time in the perturbative regime.
7.2 Classical anisotropic cosmology: Exploration of the
Poisson structure
In chapter 5 we developed in detail the classical theory of the cosmological background
for a homogeneous and isotropic universe in terms of York time. There was only one
canonical pair of variables associated with the geometric degrees of freedom, the scale
a and its conjugate momentum pa. These variables were eliminated in the Hamiltonian
reduction in favour of physical time T and its associated Hamiltonian. All anisotropic
degrees of freedom disappeared due to the symmetry assumptions, as did resultingly
the non-canonical aspect of the Poisson structure that we discussed in section 4.3.
In this section we focus on understanding the consequences of the non-canonical
Poisson brackets for the classical and quantum theory. In particular we wish to iso-
late this feature of our theory as far as possible from other mathematical aspects of
our theory and we therefore choose the simplest conceivable non-trivial model exhibit-
ing this structure, an anisotropic minisuperspace model. In chapter 8 we will develop
perturbation theory with the full Poisson brackets 4.28 - 4.30. Since the perturbation
theory is truly a field theory (the geometric variables have spatial dependence) we will
encounter a number of new complications. It is therefore extraordinarily useful to first
study the meaning and implications of the Poisson structure in isolation in the context
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of a finite-dimensional model.
The spatial metric gab and its associated momentum piab each have six independent
components. Their determinant and trace respectively encode the overall scale and its
evolution, the ratios of the diagonal entries relate to the relative scale in different spatial
directions and the three off-diagonal elements concern the notion of angles. (Recall
section 2.3 where we introduced the notion of a metric as a quantity defining the scalar
product of two vectors in order to see this.) Of course, a change in the coordinates used
(or a change in the frame of reference) changes what constitutes the spatial directions
and can therefore mix diagonal and off-diagonal elements. However, in the case of a
homogeneous minisuperspace model it makes sense to choose a metric representation
that is itself homogeneous. This is only possible in the case of a spatially flat cosmology
and this is what we choose to develop here. The coordinate system used in this case
is just the Cartesian one.3 In order to ensure maximum simplicity, we choose to set all
off-diagonal metric elements to zero, so that there are only three geometric degrees of
freedom, essentially corresponding to how space is ‘stretched’ along the three Cartesian
axes.
The resulting universe has little to do with the actual universe where no global
anisotropy is observed.4 Furthermore, the model developed here exhibits no stability
around the configuration-space point corresponding to isotropy, as we will see. As a
description of reality, the model is utterly abysmal. However, much can be learned
from its mathematical features. In general General Relativity (without Hamiltonian
3In spatially open and closed cosmologies one would have to use hyperspherical coordinates, analo-
gous to spherical polar coordinates in Euclidean space. In flat space such a representation is also possible,
but the Cartesian one is simplest.
4A recent study based on the Planck data calculated that the odds that there is a preferred direction in
the CMB are roughly 121, 000 : 1 against [110].
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reduction) the model is known as the ‘Kasner models’ [86].
Introduce variables Qi ≡ gii and P i ≡ piii. The metric determinant is g = Q1Q2Q3
and the trace of the momentum is pi = QiP i. The York parameter is then the usual
T = 2pi/3
√
g and its conjugate momentum is PT = −√g. The reduced variables are
qi = g
− 1
3Qi, p
i = g
1
3 (P i − 1
3
piQi), (7.1)
where Qi ≡ 1/Qi denotes the ii-component of the inverse metric gij . For convenience
we also introduce the inverse of the reduced metric variables, qi ≡ 1/qi. Because of
the ‘compression’ of two indices (gij, piij and g˜ij, p˜iij) into one (Qi, P i and qi, pi), we
employ the following summation convention for the purposes of this chapter: Indices
are summed over if they appear at least once as an upper and a lower index each. In-
dices may appear multiple times as either upper or lower indices only however without
implying a summation.
The Poisson brackets derived from the general ones for g˜ij and p˜iij (eqs. 4.28 - 4.30)
are exactly those of the simple finite-dimensional model considered in the same section,
namely
{qi, pj} = δji −
qi
3qj
(4.25)
{qi, qj} = 0 (4.26)
{pi, pj} = p
i
3qj
− p
j
3qi
. (4.27)
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In virtue of their definition the reduced variables obey the constraints
q1q2q3 = 1, (7.2)
qap
a = 0. (7.3)
The tracelessness 7.3 of pa ensures that the first constraint 7.2, the scale-free condition,
is preserved. In fact, the constraints are both first class. Furthermore, the constraints
7.2 and 7.3 are preserved by any motion generated by the momenta via this Poisson
structure 4.25, 4.27. That is, for a small vector b, the constraints are preserved under
the transformation
qa → qa + b{qa, pb}, pa → pa + b{pa, pb} (7.4)
At this point one may ask if the non-canonical structure of the Poisson brackets
is necessary following the Hamiltonian reduction, or if it is only the result of a poor
choice of coordinates and that a suitable coordinate transformation of the reduced vari-
ables will result in standard canonical Poisson brackets. However, no such variables
exist. One way to see this is algebraically by performing a general coordinate transfor-
mation, demanding that the new coordinates satisfy canonical commutation relations
and showing that no such coordinate transformations can be found. A more geometric
way to see that the coordinates must be non-canonical is to look at the phase space con-
structed. Since the momenta all generate motion within the two-dimensional constraint
surface the space spanned by the momenta is not the cotangent space of the kinematical
configuration space, which is three-dimensional. The underlying reason for this is that
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as part of the Hamiltonian reduction the momenta are constructed to generate motion
within the constraint surface.
In terms of qa, pa the Hamiltonian constraint takes the form
0 = H = 2M−2Pl
[
− pi
2
6
√
g
+
1√
g
q2ap
a2
]
= 2M−2Pl
[
3
8
T 2PT − 1
PT
q2ap
a2
]
. (7.5)
The physical Hamiltonian associated with York time is given byHphys = −PT (qa, pa, T ),
where PT (qa, pa, T ) is the function obtained when solving the Hamiltonian constraint
for PT in terms of the other variables. In the full theory the analogous equation is a
difficult elliptic equation with no known general solution. Here however it is a simple
quadratic, yielding
Hphys ≡ −PT = ±
[
8
3T 2
q2ap
a2
] 1
2
. (7.6)
As discussed in chapter 5 the choice of sign is not physical. For any given physical
trajectory corresponding to one sign choice there is a corresponding solution for the
other sign choice, characterised by qa(T ) → qa(T ), pa(T ) → −pa(T ). Since the
physical interpretation of the numerical value of Hphys is that of ‘volume’ however
and volume is conventionally defined as positive, we again assume the positive sign in
eq. 7.6.
The Hamiltonian is of geodesic form N(T )(Gijpipj)
1
2 . The solutions may therefore
be understood geometrically as geodesics in configuration space with respect to the
configuration-space metric Gij ∝ qiqjδij . Geodesic form is, in fact, a general feature of
York-time reduced Hamiltonians.
Motion generated by the Hamiltonian, qa → qa+δT{qa, H}, pa → pa+δT{pa, H},
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also maintains the constraints, although the tracelessness constraint 7.3 is required to
show that the scale-free condition 7.2 is preserved. Specifically, the equation of motion
are
q′a = {qa, H} =
√
8
3T 2 · q2kpk2
· q2bpbδba (7.7)
pa′ = {pa, H} = −
√
8
3T 2 · q2kpk2
· qbpb2δab . (7.8)
Explicit solutions to equations 7.7, 7.8 may be found by inspection using the fact
that pb′ = −qbpbδabq′a. One finds solutions
qa(T ) = (−4/3T )2(sa− 13 ), pa(T ) = (sa − 13)(−4/3T )−2(sa−
1
3
), (7.9)
with constant parameters sa satisfying s1 + s2 + s3 = 1, s21 + s
2
2 + s
2
3 = 1. These
solutions are exactly the Kasner models. In order to see this and to get a better intuition
of the relation of York time T and standard cosmological time t in these models, recall
that in the Kasner models g = t2 and the general fact that T was defined as−4/3 times
the fractional rate of change of volume, so that
T = − 4
3t
. (7.10)
This makes it apparent that 7.9 are indeed the Kasner solutions [86]. The value ofHphys
is given by −PT = √g, so that Hphys = t — cosmological time is just the numerical
value of the physical Hamiltonian.
The fact that one obtains exactly the same solutions provides further illustration of
163
the consistency of the reduced formalism.
A cosmological constant may be included in the above formalism, leading to the
substitution (8/3T 2) → (8
3
T 2 − 2Λ)−1 in Hphys. The solutions of the equations of
motion are then
qa(T ) = γa
∣∣∣∣∣T +
√
T 2 − 16
3
Λ
∣∣∣∣∣
+2(sa− 13 )
(7.11)
pa(T ) = γ−1a (sa − 13)
∣∣∣∣∣T +
√
T 2 − 16
3
Λ
∣∣∣∣∣
−2(sa− 13 )
(7.12)
where the parameters sa satisfy the same condition as in the Kasner model, γa are
constants chosen to satisfy eq. 7.2 and T is restricted to 3
8
T 2 > 2Λ.
The model developed in this section is not a good description of our universe. Global
degrees of isotropy have not been detected. However, it helped to illustrate the math-
ematical interplay of the Poisson brackets and the constraints, insights that are useful
in the perturbation theory to be developed in chapter 8. However, it is first useful to
gain some intuition for the mechanisms accounting for certain physical processes in the
early universe when described in terms of York time. This is the subject of the rest of
this chapter.
7.3 Mode freezing during inflation
Inflation originated as an explanation for various puzzles relating to cosmological ini-
tial conditions such as the horizon and flatness problems [55]. Since then, however, its
greatest success has arguably been to explain the near scale-invariant power spectrum
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of cosmological perturbations. Observations of the cosmic microwave background con-
tinue to narrow down the range of possible inflaton potentials [for example, ref. 97].5
Cosmological perturbation theory is one of the cornerstones of modern cosmology, ac-
counting for both structure formation and CMB inhomogeneities. Understanding the
evolution of perturbations in terms of York time is therefore essential if T is to be con-
sidered the physically fundamental time parameter.
Section 5.4 provided a description of inflation using the York time parameter. We
found that inflation occurs over a very short York-time interval ∆T . In fact, in the
‘naı¨ve’ de Sitter picture of inflation no York time would pass at all. Instead one has to
employ a higher-order description in which the universe is only almost de Sitter.
The rapid expansion of space during inflation leads to the ‘freezing out’ of (Fourier
modes of) cosmological perturbations as physical wavelengths grow significantly faster
than the Hubble radius. This in turn leads to the scale-invariant power-spectrum. The
freezing-our process is well understood in the conventional picture in terms of cosmo-
logical time t. In this section, we analyse the dynamics in terms of T via ‘translation’ of
the relevant equations. The mathematical mechanism by which freezing out occurs is
rather distinct from the usual, although the physics is ultimately equivalent, of course.
A more detailed analysis would lead us to consider scalar and tensor perturbations
separately. For our present purposes however it suffices to consider the single suffi-
ciently general equation of motion for a Fourier mode with wave number k,
d2yk
dη2
+
(
k2 − 1
a
d2a
dη2
)
yk = 0, (7.13)
5Despite its broad appeal, there are rival theories to inflation aiming to explain our cosmological
observations, such as, for example, bouncing cosmologies [see 21, for a recent review].
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where η denotes conformal time. The variable yk here might refer to a particular tensor
mode after rescaling by the scale factor. That is, we may parameterise the two indepen-
dent degrees of freedom of the tensor perturbation as
δgij = a
2
(
h1e
1
ij + h2e
2
ij
)
, (7.14)
where {e1ij, e2ij} form an orthonormal basis of the tensor perturbations of the spatial
metric gij , then rescale to y = 14M
2
Plah1 (and similar for h2) and perform a Fourier
transform to arrive at equation 7.13 (the equation of motion derived from the Einstein-
Hilbert action). A similar equation arises in the case of scalar perturbations (scalar
metric and scalar-field perturbations, for example), at least approximately in certain
scenarios (most importantly for us, in quasi-de Sitter scenarios), when expressed in
appropriate variables (rescaling the field φ by the scale factor a) and with an appropriate
gauge choice [87]. Equation 7.13 is therefore rather general and will form the basis of
our analysis.
The foliation is considered fixed. That is, we do not consider the back-reaction of
perturbations on the foliation and the constant-mean-curvature condition may there-
fore be violated at the level of perturbations. However, at least for tensor pertur-
bations there is no such back-reaction anyway since the perturbations are traceless
(Tr(e1ij) =Tr(e
2
ij) = 0), as a result of which the volume element
√
g and the extrin-
sic curvature K are unperturbed. The York-time analysis performed in this section is
therefore exact for tensor perturbation and approximate for scalar perturbations (since
there both equation 7.13 as well as the foliation is approximate).
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In a few cases equation 7.13 can be solved exactly, but in general one can consider
approximations in the super-Hubble and sub-Hubble regimes in which the wavelength
of a mode is respectively much larger and much smaller than the Hubble radius, or
equivalently k  aH and k  aH respectively. In the former case one can neglect the
term in k2 in equation 7.13, so that the equation has the general approximate solution
(in terms of conformal time η),
yk = c1a+ c2a
∫
dη a−2. (7.15)
The first term is static, while the second is dynamic and decays fast, so that only the
static term remains relevant. In other words, the modes are ‘frozen’. For large values
of k on the other hand the equation is approximately that of a harmonic oscillator and
such modes are evolving. During inflation, of course, a large range of modes pass from
the sub-Hubble to the super-Hubble regime.
Equation 7.13 may be transformed to York time, giving
0 = y′′k +
(
1
T
+ 2
a′
a
− a
′′
a
)
y′k +
[
4M4Pl
k2
a2T 2
a′2
a2
− a
′
a
(
1
T
+ 2
a′
a
)]
yk, (7.16)
where primes denote derivatives with respect to T as usual and we used the relative time
lapse,
dη
dT
= −2M
2
Pla
′
Ta2
, (7.17)
obtained via the relationship between T andH (see section 5.2). One can study equation
7.16 for distinct eras by choosing an appropriate function a(T ). During inflation the
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scale factor is given by equation 5.59, so that equation 7.16 takes the form
0 = y′′k −
(
T−1 + κT
)
y′k + κ
2
[
4M4Pl ·
k2
a2
− 2T 2
]
yk, (7.18)
with κ given by expression 5.58. Defining
β(T ) ≡ −(T−1 + κT ) (7.19)
ω2k(a, T ) ≡ κ2[4M4Plk2/a2 − 2T 2], (7.20)
equation 7.18 may be cast into the form of a damped-oscillator equation,
0 = y′′k + β(T )y
′
k + ω
2
k(a, T )yk (7.21)
(noting that β(T ) > 0 since T < 0 while the universe is expanding). The coefficients
are time-dependent, so this oscillator-like analysis does not provide solutions for yk
over an extended period. But it does give an indication of the qualitative behaviour of a
mode at some particular instant during inflation. Furthermore, inflation lasts for only a
short York-time interval ∆T as compared to |T |, so that the evolution of the coefficients
is, in fact, negligible apart from the time dependence entering via the scale factor.
The sign of ω2k now determines the nature of the evolution. If ω
2
k > 0, then ωk is
a real frequency and the evolution corresponds to damped oscillations. If ω2k < 0, the
frequency is imaginary, corresponding to decay and hence a freezing of the mode. Phys-
ically the k-dependent term contributing to ω2k may be expressed in a more illuminating
manner in terms of the ratio k˜ of the actual wave number k with the wave number aH
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of the mode instantaneously crossing the Hubble radius,
k˜ =
k
aH
, aH = −1
2
M−2Pl Ta, (7.22)
so that,
ω2k(a, T ) =
(
k˜2 − 2
)
κ2T 2. (7.23)
Super-Hubble modes satisfy k˜  1, so that ω2k < 0 and the modes do not oscillate. In
the sub-Hubble regime, k˜  1, the frequency is real, ω2k > 0, and the modes oscillate
provided they are not overdamped (which is not the case, as we will see).6
We may study the effect of the damping term β(T ) by identifying whether a partic-
ular mode is overdamped or underdamped.7 The relevant quantity to consider is
Dk(a, T ) ≡ β2(T )− 4ω2k(a, T )
= −16κ2M4Pl
k2
a20
eκT
2
+ 9κ2T 2 + 2κ+ T−2, (7.24)
where all terms are strictly positive except the first, which is strictly negative. Under-
damping and overdamping correspond to Dk < 0 and Dk > 0 respectively. Since
inflation occurs during a small York-time interval ∆T , where ∆T/|T |  1, one may
approximate T to be constant except for the T -dependence (entering via the scale fac-
tor) in the exponential, which decreases during inflation by a factor e2Ne , Ne being the
number of e-folds given by equation 5.57. Because the exponential term changes by
6The fact that physically the regimes are identified by k˜  1 and k˜  1 while mathematically the
critical value is
√
2 rather than 1 is of no significance provided we restrict analysis to modes sufficiently
far into the sub-Hubble or super-Hubble regime. Astrophysically speaking,
√
2 ≈ 1.
7The possibility of critical damping may be neglected since the coefficients are time dependent and
therefore no mode is critically damped for more than an instant.
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a factor N2e during the course of inflation, a set of modes with k
2 ranging over orders
of magnitude given by this factor pass from being underdamped to being overdamped.
This is, of course, conditional on the sign of ω2k not changing before the modes become
overdamped. However, under reasonable assumptions they do. That is, the sign of ω2k
changes before a mode becomes overdamped.
To see this last point, consider a mode with wave number k such that at some initial
York time Ti near the beginning of inflation ω2k(a(Ti), Ti) > 0 and Dk(a(Ti), Ti) < 0.
The frequency changes from real to imaginary (ω2k = 0) roughly when crossing the
Hubble radius, k˜ =
√
2 ≈ 1, that is, after an interval ∆Tcross given by
e2κTi∆Tcross = 2/k˜2i , (7.25)
where k˜i refers to the value of k˜ corresponding to the mode k at time Ti. Here only the
leading-order change to the exponential has been considered, κT 2 ≈ κT 2i + 2κTi∆T ,
which is once again possible since ∆T/|T |  1. Explicitly,
∆Tcross = (2κTi)
−1 ln
(
2/k2i
)
. (7.26)
Meanwhile the mode passes from one damping regime to the other when Dk = 0, or
e2κTi∆TCD =
9κ2T 2i + 2κ+ T
−2
i
16M4Plκ
2k2/a2i
, (7.27)
which may be further approximated by dropping the second and third term in the nu-
merator if κ2T 2i dominates.
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A numerical estimate for a given choice of inflaton potential makes this clear. For
the example considered in section 5.4 with the inflaton potential V (φ) = m2φ2, the
empirical estimate for H during inflation (from recent Planck data, [96]) of H . 3.6×
10−5 (in reduced Planck units) can be used to find an inequality (using equation 5.50)
for the kinetic-energy correction 5.51,
K.E. 10−9, (7.28)
from which in turn one can derive an inequality for the constant κ,
κ 108. (7.29)
This implies that the two expressions in the damping term β(T ) (equation 7.19) are of
roughly equal magnitude, while the term κ2T 2i does indeed dominate in equation 7.27.
One then has
∆TCD ≈ (2κTi)−1 ln
(
9/4k˜2i
)
, (7.30)
which is always strictly greater than ∆Tcross. Thus the frequency will change from real
to imaginary before the transition from underdamping to overdamping.
While it may be possible to construct conditions such that the above approximations
are not valid and for which this result would not hold, the result does hold under condi-
tions corresponding to inflation as it is presumed to occur in our actual universe. Hence
the freezing-out process occurs, mathematically speaking, as a result of the change of
sign of ω2k rather than a transition to overdamping.
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This mathematical mechanism is fundamentally different from the mechanism in
the conformal-time description, namely the solution 7.15 applying to the super-Hubble
regime together with modes entering this regime during inflation. The physical evo-
lution is, of course, the same. The perspective on these processes from the York-time
point of view, is however new.
7.4 Re-entry of the Hubble radius in the radiation-
dominated universe
According to our best understanding of cosmic history inflation was followed by a pe-
riod of ‘reheating’ during which the inflaton field decayed into the known particles of
the standard model, although details of this process are uncertain. The energy density
of the universe became subsequently dominated by radiation and during this period the
scale factor behaved as a ∼ t 12 . The Hubble radius grew again as ∼ t, allowing modes
to ‘re-enter’ and evolve after having previously been frozen. In this section we com-
pare the York-time and conformal-time descriptions of the ‘Hubble re-entry’ process
of Fourier modes of perturbations, much like we did for their ‘freezing out’ in the last
section.
During the radiation-dominated era York time relates8 to cosmological time as T =
8Any explicit relationship between t and T can be modified by translation in t since the cosmological
equations in t are time-translation invariant. However, the York-time theory is not T -translation invariant
since T has a physical meaning and the equations are explicitly T -dependent. The relationship given here
therefore depends on the appropriate choice of time origin, namely that t = 0 corresponds to T = −∞.
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−M2Pl/t, so that the scale factor behaves as
a(T ) = aPl
MPl
|T | 12 , (7.31)
where aPl is a proportionality constant formally referring to the scale factor at Planck
York-time, T = −M2Pl.
The physical Hubble radius H−1 (known as an explicit function of time since H =
−1
2
M−2Pl T ) may be compared with the evolution of the physical wavelength of a mode,
λphys(k) = aλ(k) = a0
(
t
t0
) 1
2
λ = a0
( |T0|
|T |
) 1
2
λ, (7.32)
where λ is the comoving wavelength and a0, t0 and T0 refer to the values of the corre-
sponding quantities at some reference time (usually today). The Hubble radius grows
faster than physical wavelengths and modes do indeed enter the Hubble radius during
the radiation-dominated era.
The equation of motion for this period takes the form
0 = y′′k +
1
2T
y′k +
M2Plk
2
a2Pl|T |3
yk. (7.33)
This can be solved exactly,
yk(T ) = c1 ·
√
|T |e−i
2MPl|k|
aPl
√
|T | + c2 · i
√
|T | aPl
4MPl|k|e
i
2MPl|k|
aPl
√
|T | , (7.34)
where c1 and c2 are arbitrary constants. The pre-factor of
√
T results from ‘absorbing’ a
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factor of a into the variable y. The actual dynamical evolution is in the phases. A mode
becomes ‘unfrozen’ when its phase changes sufficiently rapidly. With d/dT [arg yk] ∼
|k||T |− 32 , once unfrozen the speed of evolution only increases as T → 0 from below.
Contrast this with the description in conformal time η. During the radiation-dominated
era it follows from a = a0
√
t/t0 that T = −M2Plt−1 and dt
√
t0/t = a0dη (so that η =
2
√
tt0/a0 up to an additive constant). Hence the solutions 7.34 in terms of conformal
time are
yk(η) = c¯1 · η−1e−i
|k|
aPl
η
+ c¯2 · iη−1 aPl
4MPl|k|e
i
|k|
aPl
η
, (7.35)
where c¯1 and c¯2 are arbitrary coefficients (related to c1 and c2 respectively by a constant
factor). We see that the phase of each contribution is linear in η, so that the conformal
‘speed’ of evolution d
dη
(arg yk) is constant.
If the radiation-dominated period is taken to have begun at some point in time ηr =
2
√
trt0/a0 = 2M
2
Pl(a0
√|Tr||T0|)−1 when the scale factor had a value ar, then the
condition k˜  1 for a mode to be super-Hubble may be expressed as
|k|  |T | 12 · piar|Tr| 12/M2Pl = |T |
1
2 · const. (7.36)
When the inequality becomes an approximate equality,
|k| ≈ |T | 12 · piar|Tr| 12/M2Pl, (7.37)
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one expects the mode to evolve and indeed this is consistent with the solutions 7.34.
Once a mode k has become unfrozen (arg(yk) 6≈ 0), what are the time scales ∆ηk
and ∆Tk for its evolution? In terms of conformal time η the requirement for evolution
to occur is
|k|∆η ≈ a0ηr, (7.38)
while in terms of York time the condition 7.37 becomes ∆
√
T ≈ |k|M2Pl
ar
√
|Tr|
, or
∆Tk ≈ |T |
1− |k|2(
|k|+ arM−2Pl |Tr|
1
2 |T | 12
)2
 . (7.39)
In the short-wavelength limit (k → ∞), the York-time scale becomes small, ∆Tk → 0
and so evolution is fast, as expected. Similarly, for modes in the super-Hubble regime
(k → 0), which have not re-entered, one finds ∆Tk → |T |, that is, the York-time scale
approaches the full duration of the remaining history of the universe.
The description in this section and the last were not in terms of a reduced-Hamiltonian
formalism but through the transformation of the dynamical equations themselves from
t to T . This has allowed us to develop an intuition for the form of some of the math-
ematical mechanisms that play a role in the York-time description. We started with
the equations of established conventional perturbation theory. In contrast, in the next
chapter we being ‘from scratch’ with the ADM action applied to a perturbative regime
and perform the Hamiltonian reduction with respect to York time explicitly in order to
arrive at the fundamental equations of York-time cosmological perturbation theory.
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CHAPTER 8
COSMOLOGICAL PERTURBATION THEORY WITH
YORK TIME: HAMILTONIAN REDUCTION
In this chapter we develop classical cosmological perturbation theory with York time
using a perturbative approach to Hamiltonian reduction. The contents of this chapter
formed part of ref. [103].
8.1 Principles of cosmological perturbation theory via
York-time Hamiltonian reduction
The developments in sections 7.3 and 7.4 gave us a ‘hand-on’ understanding of ex-
amples of physical processes when viewed from the perspective of York time. This
was achieved by the transformation in the time parameter from cosmological time t to
York time T for a known background expansion a(t). In this section we finally develop
the reduced-Hamiltonian formalism for cosmological perturbation theory. The insights
we gained in section 7.2 about the non-canonical Poisson structure will be useful. In
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section 10.2 we quantise the theory developed here.
Hamiltonian reduction applied to perturbation theory differs from the reductions
carried out for minisuperspace models (sections 5.3, 7.2) in a number of ways: First,
variables have a spatial dependence (they are field variables and not homogeneous), so
that the momentum conjugate to T gives a physical Hamiltonian density, while the phys-
ical Hamiltonian itself is recovered by integration over all space. Second, the Hamil-
tonian density is derived perturbatively and therefore not exact. Third, the foliation is
fixed at the level of the background but not initially at the level of perturbations. So
a gauge choice has to be made. For reasons we will discuss, the choice that imple-
ments York time exactly at the perturbative level (rather than only approximately) is not
only theoretically the most desirable but also algebraically advantageous. However, in
principle other choices exist.
Quantising the theory developed here does not give a true theory of quantum grav-
ity, which would have to be non-perturbative. Analogous to the question that arose in
the case of the quantisation of cosmologies, a caveat of the perturbative approach of this
section is that it is not obvious that the quantisation of the perturbatively developed clas-
sical theory is physically equivalent to a perturbative limit of the full quantum theory. In
much of the literature on quantised perturbations (irrespective of any York-time refer-
ence) this is tacitly assumed. However, in the absence of a complete theory of quantum
gravity, all such work is contingent on that final theory being compatible in this way.
Fortunately we know that the observed universe is well described in terms of a homoge-
neous isotropic ‘background’ together with perturbations described by linearised field
equations. While the reduced Hamiltonian at which we arrive is not fundamental and
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the quantised theory does not constitute a fundamental theory of quantum gravity, the
theory’s experimental predictions may nonetheless be compared to the observed uni-
verse. Whether corroborated or falsified, the result would narrow the search for the
fundamental theory.
This chapter is without doubt the one heaviest on algebraic developments. For better
readability some of the details have been banned into ‘sidebars’ (boxes) and the reader
is welcome to skip them on a first reading.
The method we employ here in order to derive the cosmological York-time per-
turbation theory is as follows. One first splits the geometric and matter variables and
momenta appearing in the Hamiltonian constraint into homogeneous isotropic back-
ground variables and perturbations. For matter content we choose a set of scalar fields
φa for simplicity. One can then solve the Hamiltonian constraint to zeroth order and de-
rive a Hamiltonian for the background dynamics, essentially the result found in chapter
5. The zeroth-order equations of motion may then be solved and one substitutes their
solutions as functions of York time back into the Hamiltonian constraint, which one
can then solve to second order in the perturbation variables in order to arrive at a re-
duced Hamiltonian that is also second order in those variables. Note that first-order
quantities in general vanish if the background equations of motion are satisfied, so that
the Hamiltonian describing the perturbations is second order only and therefore gives
linear equations of motion.
Before we can write down the perturbative expansion of the dynamical variables and
the resulting Poisson structure explicitly, the matter of foliation-related gauge freedom
must be addressed. The issue is well known from conventional cosmological pertur-
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bation theory [87, 88]: writing down some perturbative expansion of the three-metric
and matter fields does not by itself separate truly physical perturbations from apparent
perturbations due to the choice of coordinate system. Furthermore, small adjustments
in the coordinate system (the ‘gauge choice’) allow one to move the physical content of
the perturbation expansion between the different variables. Ultimately one is interested
in the two physical degrees of freedom, manifest in gauge-independent quantities such
as the Bardeen variables [14].
When performing perturbation theory with York time the situation is similar, al-
though the gauge freedom is limited to three-diffeomorphisms on the spatial slice since
the foliation itself is fixed if exact York slicing is chosen. It is possible to make a dif-
ferent choice of foliation (at the perturbative level) while still using York time as the
time parameter and performing the Hamiltonian reduction. In the case of a homoge-
neous isotropic background the zeroth-order (background) foliation is exactly that of
the standard Friedmann description, although the slices are differently parameterised,
and one has the full gauge freedom of standard cosmological perturbation theory avail-
able. There is no bar to developing perturbation theory in this framework.1
However, it turns out that in this case the resulting expressions occurring in the dy-
namical equations, for example, are algebraically considerably more complicated. The
primary reason for this is that the partial2 gauge choice of what we will call the ‘York
gauge’ — implementing the York slicing on the perturbative as well as the background
level — imposes conditions that ensure that the determinant of the metric g ≡ det(gab)
1The findings of sections 7.3 and 7.4 correspond to a description in terms of York time without
choosing the exact constant-mean-curvature slicing, although in the case of tensor perturbations exactness
of slicing was recovered in virtue of the perturbation type.
2Freedom to choose coordinates on each slice, that is, to perform a spatial three-diffeomorphism,
remains. Only the foliation itself is fixed
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and the trace of the conjugate momentum pi ≡ Tr(piab) remain unperturbed, or equiv-
alently that the linear change in the metric δgab and in the momentum δpiab are both
traceless at first order. A change in these quantities would correspond to a shift in York
time T , perturbing the foliation. These conditions eliminate a large number of terms
in various stages of the perturbative expansion. Furthermore, the terms through which
scalar fields couple to the geometry are exactly those proportional to perturbations of
the volume element
√
g, so that the York gauge not only simplifies the algebra but also
decouples matter and geometry, at least to leading order. The York gauge is also the
‘correct’ gauge to use if York time really is considered the physical time parameter.
Working in the York gauge from the beginning, we perturbatively expand the re-
duced variables g˜ab, p˜iab only (rather than the original canonical variables gab, piab), and
the variables describing the scalar field. Throughout this chapter we denote zeroth-order
(background) terms by an overbar. We define the perturbation variables hab(x), νab(x)
in terms of the reduced variables g˜ab and p˜iab (see section 4.3 ) as
g˜ab ≡ γab + hab, , (8.1)
p˜iab ≡ ˜¯piab + νab = νab, (8.2)
where γab is the scale-free metric of the background (in the case of a flat universe
this is just the identity) and the last equality holds because the scale-free part of the
background does not evolve, so its conjugate momentum ˜¯piab vanishes. That is, the
reduced momentum is perturbation only. The associated Poisson brackets to first order
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are
{hab(x), νcd(y)} =
[
δ(ca δ
d)
b − 13γabγcd + 13γcdhab
− 1
3
γabh
cd + h.o.
]
δ3(x− y), (8.3)
{νab(x), νcd(y)} = 1
3
[
γcdνab − γabνcd] δ3(x− y). (8.4)
Indices of hab and νab are raised and lowered by γbc and γbc respectively and ‘h.o.’
stands for higher-order terms. These equations are derived from the general Poisson
brackets 4.28, 4.29 and we used the fact that the expansion of the inverse metric is (to
first order) g˜ab = γab − hab, with the scale-free inverse background metric γab defined
via δca = γabγ
bc.
By construction the physical Hamiltonian obtained in the reduction is quadratic
because the perturbation expansion is to second order, although the terms contain time-
dependent coefficients determined by the solution of the background dynamics. Later
on both background and perturbations will be quantised. In order to obtain trajecto-
ries for the background dynamics, that is, functions of time which will constitute the
coefficients of the perturbation terms, we employ the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave for-
mulation of quantum mechanics [34, 18, 59], where such trajectories are part of the
fundamental ontology. De Broglie-Bohm trajectories have previously been used as a
mathematical tool in cosmological perturbation theory in [94, 95], although with con-
ventional cosmological time rather than York time. The fact that the Hamiltonian is a
sum of quadratic terms means that the quantisation procedure is straightforward (there
are no ‘square-root’ operators at the perturbative level) once a representation of the
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commutator algebra derived from the non-canonical Poisson structure is found. The
time-dependent coefficients do however make finding solutions to the quantum dynam-
ics more difficult.
The fact that the variables are not canonical does not hinder quantisation, as will be-
come clear in the following chapters. However, the fact that the momentum-momentum
bracket does not vanish implies that the quantum theory cannot possess a momentum
but only a position representation, a matter we discuss in section 10.1 below. The fact
that the quantum theory has a preferred basis, the position representation, may be taken
to provide hints for answering foundational questions in quantum theory. For exam-
ple, formulations in which the position representation has a special status, such as the
de Broglie-Bohm formulation, would not have to explain why the position representa-
tion should be taken as fundamental.
8.2 The perturbative Hamiltonian constraint
As in the case of minisuperspace models, we begin with the ADM action for general
relativity (see section 2.3 and ref. [4]) minimally coupled to a set of scalar fields φA
with momenta pφA ,
3
S =
∫
dt d3x
[
g˙abpi
ab + φ˙ApφA −NiH i −NH
]
, (8.5)
3The choice to consider multiple scalar field rather than just one is not of further importance. The
zeroth-order terms found correspond to a mild generalisation of the minisuperspace model of chapter 5,
where we looked at a single scalar field.
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where
H = −M2Pl
√
gR +
1
M2Pl
√
g
(gacgbd − 12gabgcd)piabpicd
+
1
2
√
g
p2φ +
√
g
2
gabφA,aφA,b +
√
gV (φ), (8.6)
H a = −2∇bpiab + pφAgab∂bφA (8.7)
constitute the Hamiltonian and momentum constraints respectively for this choice of
matter content. Summation over repeated field indices (A, etc.) is assumed. As before
R denotes the scalar three-curvature of space, MPl the Planck mass, p2φ =
∑
A pφA
2
and V (φ) is a currently arbitrary potential of the scalar fields φ = {φ1, φ2, . . . }. We
suppress the spatial and temporal arguments of the field quantities where they are un-
ambiguous in order to avoid notational clutter.
The goal is to solve the Hamiltonian constraint, H = 0, for PT = −√g, the
momentum conjugate to the York time parameter T ≡ 2pi
3
√
g
. One therefore performs the
change of variables {gab, piab} → {g˜ab, p˜iab, T, PT} (see chapter 3). In the perturbative
case considered here we instead make the change {gab, piab} → {hab, νab, T, PT} with
hab and νab defined by eqs. 8.1 and 8.2 respectively. The fields are expanded as
φA = φ¯A + δφA, pφA = p¯φA + δpφA . (8.8)
We keep terms up to second order in the geometric and matter perturbation variables.
While not difficult, this leads to some lengthy expressions.
The scaling of the matter terms in 8.6 is straightforward since their only scale-
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dependence is in the prefactor g
1
2 ∼ PT or g− 12 ∼ P−1T . The curvature terms obtained
in the expansion of R are homogeneous in their scale dependence, R ∼ g− 13 ∼ P−
2
3
T
and only the momentum terms are inhomogeneous in their T, PT -dependence. The
latter fact follows from the expression obtained when writing piab in terms of p˜iab,
piab = g−
1
3 p˜iab + 1
3
pig−
1
3 g˜ab
= H−
2
3
T ν
ab + 1
3
(
3
2
THT
) · H− 23T (γab − γacγbdhcd + γacγdeγfbhcdhef) , (8.9)
the last equality holding to second order. The Hamiltonian constraint equation becomes
the equation determining HT ,
0 = HT
(
− 3
8M2Pl
· T 2 + [‘V ’]
)
+H
1
3
T
(
[‘R’] + [‘∇φ’]
)
+M−2Pl Thabν
ab
+H−1T
(
M−2Pl γacγbdν
abνcd + [‘pφ’]
)
, (8.10)
where we have introduced the shorthand [‘X’] to denote the terms in the perturbative
expansion after factoring out the scale dependence which are derived from the term
containing X in the Hamiltonian constraint 8.6. With the York gauge applied these are
given by
[‘R’] = −M2Pl ˜¯R−M2Plδ˜R
(1) −M2Plδ˜R
(2)
(8.11)
[‘pφ’] = 12 p¯
2
φ + p¯φAδpφA + δp
2
φ. (8.12)
[‘∇φ’] = 1
2
γijδφA,iδφA,j (8.13)
[‘V ’] = V (φ¯) + δφA
∂V
∂φA
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
+ 1
2
δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
. (8.14)
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For the algebraic details of the expansion as well as the form of the first and second-
order curvature-perturbation terms δ˜R
(1)
, δ˜R
(2)
, see the box below. Throughout this
chapter we use superscripts ‘(n)’ to denote the nth-order contribution to the preced-
ing quantity. At this point we have retained the first-order terms, although these will
cancel when the background equations of motion are satisfied. This is a general result
following from the fact that the equations are derivable via an extremisation principle.
Expansion of relevant terms up to second order
Prior to application of the York gauge (that is, if York time is only implemented at the
background level and one retains the full gauge freedom of standard perturbation theory),
expressions 8.11-8.14 are
[‘R’] = − 1
2κ
(
˜¯R+ δ˜R
(1)
+ η(1) ˜¯R+ δ˜R
(2)
+ η(1)δ˜R
(1)
+ η(2) ˜¯R
)
[‘∇φ’] = 1
2
γijδφA,iδφA,j
[‘pφ’] =
1
2
(
p¯2φA − η(1)p¯2φA + 2p¯φAδpφA
+
(− η(2) + (η(1))2)p¯2φA − 2η(1)p¯φAδpφA + δpφA2)
[‘V ’] = V (φ¯) + η(1)V (φ¯) + δφA
∂V
∂φA
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
+ η(2)V (φ¯) + η(1)δφA
∂V
∂φA
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
+
1
2
δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
,
where
η(1) = 12habγ
ab
η(2) = 18(habγ
ab)2 − 14hachbdγabγcd
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are the first and second order fractional perturbation in the metric. In the York gauge
these are set to zero. Note that the expansions of [‘pφ’] and [‘V ’] contain mixed terms,
which would lead to a coupling between matter and geometric perturbation in the linearised
equations of motion. However, in the York gauge the perturbation is set to zero, eliminating
exactly those terms.
The expressions for the perturbative expansion of R˜ are
˜¯R = g¯
1
3 R¯ = g¯
1
3 g¯ijR¯ij = γ
ijRij ,
δ˜R
(1)
= g¯
1
3 δR(1) = g¯
1
3 δ(gijRij)
(1) = γijδR
(1)
ij + (−γikhklγlj)R¯ij ,
δ˜R
(2)
= g¯
1
3 δR(2) = g¯
1
3 δ(gijRij)
(2)
= γijδR
(2)
ij + (−γikhklγlj)δR(1)ij + (−γikhklγlmhmnγnj)R¯ij .
with
δR
(1)
ij = ∂kδΓ
(1)k
ij − ∂iδΓ(1)kjk
δR
(2)
ij = ∂kδΓ
(2)k
ij − ∂iδΓ(2)kjk + δΓ(1)kij δΓ(1)lkl − δΓ(1)kil δΓ(1)ljk ,
where
δΓ(1)qrs =
1
2γ
qt(htr,s + hts,r − hrs,t)
δΓ(2)qrs = −γquhuvδΓ(1)vrs
denote the perturbation in the Levi-Civita connection.
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8.3 The physical Hamiltonian and the equations of mo-
tion
After multiplication byHT eq. 8.10 is a sextic equation inH
1
3
T , which in general cannot
be solved analytically. As previously anticipated, the procedure now is to first solve
this equation at zeroth order and use the solution as the basis for solving it up to second
order perturbatively. At each order only a new linear equation has to be solved. Since
the background is homogeneous the zeroth-order terms4 have no spatial dependence
and the equation is a simple polynomial,
0 =
(
− 3
8M2Pl
· T 2 + V (φ¯)
)
H
(0)2
T −M2Pl ˜¯RH
(0) 4
3
T +
1
2
p2φ. (8.15)
Since the H 0 term in 8.10 was second order only, the zeroth-order equation does not
have a corresponding term and therefore after multiplication by H(0)−2T takes the form
of a depressed cubic in u ≡ H(0)−
2
3
T , which has solutions
u = (A+
√
A2 − C3) 13 + (A+
√
A2 − C3) 13 , (8.16)
with
A =
1
p2φ
(
3
8M2Pl
· T 2 − V (φ¯)
)
, C =
1
6p2φ
M2Pl
˜¯R. (8.17)
4At zeroth order (the background) the universe is homogeneous, so that the Hamiltonian itself is just
equal to the Hamiltonian density (up to a constant multiplicative factor). Hence we write H(0)T rather
thanH(0)T , consistent with the notation in chapter 5.
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These are, of course, exactly the solutions found in chapter 5, generalised to more than
a single scalar field. For the purposes of our model we now make the assumption that
the universe is flat at zeroth order, just as we did before. Again this choice is motivated
by the two facts that (1) the algebra in what follows is significantly less convoluted,
even at the level of the background and that (2) observation suggests that the universe
is flat on sufficiently large scales within experimental uncertainty. Having chosen the
global geometry of the background we can also fix the background frame of reference,
making the obvious (inertial) choice γab = diag(1, 1, 1). However, for the most part we
will retain reference to γab explicitly.
With the assumption of flatness one has ˜¯R = 0 and the background equation 8.15 is
trivially solved,
H
(0)
T = ±
[
1
2
p¯2φ
3
8M2Pl
· T 2 − V (φ¯)
] 1
2
. (8.18)
The ambiguous sign has no physical effect. Recall that a change in the choice of the sign
in 8.18 leads to the same set of physical trajectories with the exception that the sign of
corresponding momenta are swapped (see chapter 5). That is, the set of solutions of the
dynamical equations obtained from the Hamiltonian density HT in 8.18 with a positive
sign is related to the set of solutions of HT with a negative sign via a reflection in phase
space. The physical interpretation of the numeric value of the Hamiltonian is that of
volume (since HT =
√
g, see chapter 3), which suggests that HT ≥ 0 is the more
physically meaningful choice, and indeed we will adopt this convention here too.
For a single scalar field, the dynamics of this spatially constant Hamiltonian density
was discussed in chapter 5, where integration over a conformal normalisation volume
was assumed. The details depend on the choice of V (φ). Note that there are no remain-
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ing geometric degrees of freedom at the background level since the scale variable g and
its conjugate momentum pi have been eliminated in favour of T and PT = −HT . In the
case of a set of free fields the momenta pφA are constant and the fields simply evolve
according to the Hamiltonian density 8.18 for V = 0, leading to
φ′A =
pφA√
3
4M2Pl
· p2φT 2
, (8.19)
so that, for an expanding universe (T < 0),
φA(T ) =
pφA√
3
4M2Pl
· p2φ
ln |T |. (8.20)
The volume of the universe is the numerical value of the background Hamiltonian den-
sity obtained by substituting the solution back into expression 8.18, up to a constant
determined by the coordinate volume chosen for normalisation in the case of a flat uni-
verse as discussed above (the volume is well-defined without normalisation for a closed
universe, though here the Hamiltonian takes a more complicated form).
For general V (φ) one obtains solutions (φA(T ), pφA(T )) by an appropriate method
of solving Hamilton’s equation for the Hamiltonian obtained after integrating H(0)T over
a (comoving) normalisation volume. Assuming Hamilton’s equations for the back-
ground to be satisfied one can show that the first-order terms in eq. 8.15 (note that
these are matter terms only) cancel out.
With H(0)T found, one can substitute the result back into eq. 8.10 and proceed to first
order. This is trivially [H
1
3
T ]
(1) = 0 since there are no first-order terms. The second
order equation may be solved to yield the [H
1
3
T ]
(2) from which one then obtains the
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second-order contribution to the Hamiltonian density,
H(2)T (x) = F (T ) ·
[
M−2Pl γikγjlν
ijνkl +H
(0)
T ·M−2Pl Thijνij
−H(0)
4
3
T ·M2Plδ˜R
(2)
(hab) +
1
2
δp2φ −H(0)
4
3
T · 12γijδφA,iδφA,j
+H
(0)2
T · 12δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
]
(8.21)
where
F (T ) ≡ H(0)−1T ·
[
3
4
·M−2Pl T 2 − 2V (φ¯)
]−1
=
[
2(3
8
·M−2Pl T 2 − V (φ¯))p¯2φA
]− 1
2 . (8.22)
The details of this procedure are spelled out in the box on the perturbative approach to
solving the Hamiltonian constraint to second order. The Hamiltonian determining the
perturbative dynamics is
Hpert =
∫
V
dvol HT (x), (8.23)
where V is the chosen normalisation coordinate volume. (Hence a change in the choice
of coordinates on the slice at this stage would imply a change in the limits, leaving
value of the Hamiltonian overall unchanged. However, having chosen some coordinates
initially one now has that dvol= 1 · d3x since the notion of scale has been extracted
during the Hamiltonian reduction.)
Perturbative approach to solving the Hamiltonian constraint to second order
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Writing x ≡ H
1
3
T , eq. 8.10, after multiplication byHT = x3, has the form
0 = ax6 + bx4 + cx3 + d, (8.A)
where, separating different orders visually,
a =− 3
8M2Pl
· T 2 + V (φ¯) + δφA ∂V
∂φA
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
+ 12δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
b = −M2Plδ˜R
(1) −M2Plδ˜R
(2)
+ 12γ
abδφA,aδφA,b
c = M−2Pl Thabν
ab
d = 12 p¯
2
φA
+ p¯φAδpφA + δpφA
2 +M−2Pl γacγbdν
abνcd.
Here we assumed a spatially flat background, so that ˜¯R = 0. As in the text we let a(0)
denote the zeroth order term of a and so on. Similarly, we expand the sought function order
by order, x = x(0) + x(1) + x(2).
One first solves the zeroth-order equation,
0 = a(0)x(0)6 + d(0),
so that
x(0)6 = −d
(0)
a(0)
=
1
2 p¯
2
φ
3
8M2Pl
· T 2 − V (φ¯) , (8.B)
consistent with the result in chapter 5. The first order equation is trivial since a(1), b(1)
and d(1) vanish when the background equations are satisfied, hence x(1) = 0. Then the
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second-order equation is
0 = a(2)x(0)6 + 6a(0)x(0)5x(2) + b(2)x(0)4 + c(2)x(0)3 + d(2),
an equation linear in x(2), giving after substitution of the coefficients and the background
solution 8.B,
x(2) =
[
1
2
δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
x60 −
(
M2Plδ˜R
(2)
+
1
2
γijδφA,iδφA,j
)
x40
+M−2Pl Thijν
ijx30 + δpφA
2 +M−2Pl γikγjlν
ijνkl
][(
3
8M2Pl
T 2 − V (φ¯)
)
x50
]−1
.
The Hamiltonian density at second order is then
HT = (x(0) + x(2))3 = x(0)3 + 3x(0)2x(2). (8.C)
From the perturbation Hamiltonian one can obtain the equations of motion,
∂hab
∂T
= {hab(x), Hpert}
= F (T )
[
2 ·M−2Pl νab +H(0)T ·M−2Pl Thab
]
, (8.24)
∂νab
∂T
= {νab(x), Hpert}
= F (T )
[
−H(0)T ·M−2Pl Tνab − 2H
(0) 4
3
T ·M2Pl
(
δ(ab)(cd) − 1
3
γabγcd
)
γijhic,jd
]
(8.25)
where δ(ab)(cd) ≡ δ(amδb)n γmcγnd. The term in the last line is derived from the perturbation
of the scale-free curvature, ∂δ˜R
(2)
/∂hij , and is discussed in the box discussing the
expansion of curvature terms at the end of this section.
Since the Hamiltonian density contains only second-order terms, only zeroth-order
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contributions to the Poisson brackets 8.3, 8.4 contribute to first-order terms in equations
8.24, 8.25. That is, the momentum-momentum Poisson bracket 8.4 is effectively canon-
ical, while the position-momentum bracket remains non-canonical due to the ‘−1
3
γabγ
cd
term. For the purposes of first-order perturbation theory the relevant Poisson structure
is therefore determined by the background only.
It is easy to confirm using eqs. 8.24, 8.25 that the tracelessness of hab and νab is
indeed conserved as contraction of eqs. 8.24 and 8.25 with γab and γab respectively
reveals. Therefore the constraints γabhab = 0 and γabνab = 0 are first class.
The equations for the scalar fields are
∂δφA
∂T
(x) = {δφA(x), Hpert} = F (T ) · δpφA(x) (8.26)
∂δpφA
∂T
(x) = {δpφA(x), Hpert}
= −F (T )
[
H
(0) 4
3
T
∫
d3y γij∂i
(
δ3(x− y)∂jδφA(y)
)
+H
(0)2
T
∂2V
∂φA∂φC
δφC(x)
]
(8.27)
It is a noteworthy feature that these equations have decoupled from the geometric de-
grees of freedom. This is a particular feature of the York gauge since matter-field pertur-
bations would otherwise couple with perturbations in the local scale, that is, the metric
determinant. In the box at the end of the last section we discussed what the matter-
geometry mixed terms are and how they are eliminated by the York gauge. This result
does not generalise to any form of matter, however. In particular, tensor fields coupling
to the metric would lead to mixed terms not eliminated by the choice of gauge and
therefore a geometric-matter interaction even at the linear level.
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By construction equations 8.24 and 8.25 (as well as 8.26 and 8.27) are linear and
therefore may be Fourier analysed. The behaviour of the solutions strongly depends
on that of the time-dependent factors F (T ) and HT (T ), which is in turn dependent on
the choice of potential V (φ). For an analysis of the behaviour of the background, in
particular at late times T → 0− and for candidates of inflationary potentials, see our
discussion in chapter 6. If we consider a free field, explicit functions of time for F (T )
and H(0)T (T ) can easily be written down since pφA(T ) = pφA(T0) is constant and fixed
by the boundary conditions at some time T0:
F (T ) =
√
4
3
M2Pl|T |−1, (8.28)
H
(0)
T (T ) =
√
4
3
M2Plp
2
φ(T0)|T |−1 =
√
p2φ(T0) · F (T ). (8.29)
For the Fourier analysis we first expand the perturbation variables,
hab(x) =
∫
d3k ξ(k)abe
ik·x, νab(x) =
∫
d3k µab(k)eik·x. (8.30)
Eq. 8.24 defines the relationship between h′ab and the momenta ν
cd and, after acting
with
∫
d3x e−il·x on both sides, yields
ξ′ab(k) = F (T ) ·M−2Pl
[
2γacγbdµ
cd(k) +H
(0)
T Tξab(k)
]
(8.31)
and is independent of the chosen mode. Eq. 8.25 contains the actual dynamics and leads
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to k-dependent terms,
µab′(k) = F (T )
[
−H(0)T ·M−2Pl Tµab(k)
+ 2H
(0) 4
3
T M
2
Pl
(
δ(ab)(cd) − 1
3
γabγcd
)
γijξickjkd
]
, (8.32)
Terms relating to perturbations in the curvature
Derivation of the classical equations of motion involves the term
{νab(y),
∫
d3x δ˜R
(2)
(x)} =
∫
d3x {νab(y), δ˜R(x)}
=
∫
d3x {νab(y), hcd(x)} ∂δ˜R
(2)
∂hcd
. (8.D)
For the flat background assumed in the text and expressed in a frame with Cartesian coor-
dinates, one has
δ˜R
(2)
= γijδRij + (−γikhklγlj)δR(1)ij
= γij
(
∂kδΓ
(2)k
ij − ∂iδΓ(2)kjk + δΓ(1)kij δΓ(1)lkl − δΓ(1)kil δΓ(1)ljk
)
− γikhklγlj
(
∂kδΓ
(1)k
ij − ∂iδΓ(1)kjk
)
.
Since δ˜R
(2)
is first order, the Poisson bracket only contributes at zeroth order and is
therefore spatially constant and may be taken outside the integral. The remaining term is
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then, abbreviating δ(3) ≡ δ(3)(x− y),
∫
d3x δ(3)
∂δ˜R
(2)
∂hcd
(y)
=
∫
d3y
[
τ
(1)k.cd
ij.k [δ
(3)]γij − τ onek.cdjk.i [δ(3)]γij + σ(0)k.cdij [δ(3)δΓ(1)lkl ]
+ σ
(0)l.cd
kl [δ
(3)δΓ
(1)k
ij ]− σ(0)k.cdil [δ(3)δΓ(1)ljk ]γij
− σ(0)l.cdjk [δ(3)δΓ(1)kil ]γij − γimδcdmnγnj(∂kδΓ(1)kij − ∂iδΓ(1)kjk )
− τ (0)k.cdij.k [δ(3)hij ] + τ (0)k.cdjk.i [δ(3)hij ]
]
(8.E)
with
σ(0)q.abrs [f ] = −12γqt(δabtr ∂s + δabts ∂r − δabrs∂t)f
σ(1)q.abrs [f ] = −γq(aδΓ(1)v)rs · f + 12γvtγqu(δabtr ∂s + δabts ∂r − δabrs∂t)(huvf)
τ
(0)q.ab
rs.i [f ] =
1
2γ
qt(δabtr ∂i∂s + δ
ab
ts ∂i∂r − δabrs∂i∂t)f
τ
(1)q.ab
rs.i [f ] = δ
ab
uvγ
qu∂i(δΓ
(1)v
rs f)− 12δabuvγquγvt(htr,si + hts,ri − hrs,ti) · f
+ 12γ
quγvt(δabtr ∂i∂s + δ
ab
ts ∂i∂r − δabrs∂i∂t)(huvf),
defined as
∫
d3x σ(0)q.abrs [f ] =
∫
d3x
∂Γ
(1)q
rs
∂hab
f∫
d3x σ(1)q.abrs [f ] =
∫
d3x
∂Γ
(2)q
rs
∂hab
f∫
d3x τ
(0)q.ab
rs.i [f ] =
∫
d3x
∂
∂hab
[
∂iΓ
(1)q
rs
]
f∫
d3x τ (1)q.abrs [f ] =
∫
d3x
∂
∂hab
[
∂iΓ
(2)q
rs
]
f,
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where f is any appropriate functions of the spatial coordinates. The mismatch of notational
superscripts (n) was chosen in order to remain consistent with their role of identifying the
order of perturbation, which is reduced by one as a result of the differentiation with respect
to hab.
Expression 8.E contains a number of total derivatives as well as a significant degree of
symmetry and evaluates to the simpler expression
∫
d3x δ(3)
∂δ˜R
(2)
∂hcd
(y) = −2δ(cd)(kt)γijhit,jk
after all boundary terms have been dropped, which follows from assuming appropriate
boundary conditions, and the constraint γijhij(x) = 0 has been used.
8.4 Analysis of the dynamics
The dynamics of the perturbations is now completely defined. However, it is useful to
develop an idea about some of the mechanisms that follow from this set of equations.
Equations 8.31 and 8.32 were derived as part of a framework that described the full dy-
namics of the universe: both background and perturbations. But carefully considering
the steps carried out above makes clear that the equations for ξab and µab are inde-
pendent of the specifics of the background, so that any background evolution may be
chosen and substituted into the expressions for H(0)T (T ) and F (T ). Hence it is possible,
for example, to describe perturbations for an inflationary scenario, whose background
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was developed in section 5.4. There one would use (with all symbols defined as above)
H
(0)
T infl(T ) = a
−3
0 e
3
2
κT 2 (8.33)
Finfl(T ) = a
−3
0 e
3
2
κT 2 ·
[
3
4M2Pl
T 2 − 2m2φ0(1− 0 + µT )
]−1
(8.34)
for the inflaton potential V (φ) = m2φ2.
Here we are interested in some more general features of the dynamics defined by
equations 8.31 and 8.32. In particular, for each of the equations there are two regimes
corresponding to the dominance of one of the two terms inside the respective square
parentheses. Consider equation 8.31 in the regime where
H
(0)
T Tξab(k) 2µab(k). (8.35)
Indices are raised an lowered using γij and its inverse. This regime could correspond to
a very large universe (large volume H(0)T ) at a sufficiently early time, for example, or an
appropriately sized mode function ξab(k) versus the corresponding ‘momentum mode’
µab(k) for some given mode with wave number k. In this regime the equation becomes
independent of µab,
ξ′ab = M
−2
Pl F (T )H
(0)
T T · ξab, (8.36)
which is readily solved by
ξab(T ) = ξab(T1)e
M−2Pl
∫
dTF (T )H
(0)
T T , (8.37)
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where T1 is some reference time. Each mode just evolves as a function of time depend-
ing on the background and, crucially, the details are independent of the wave number
of the modes, so that the overall shape of the perturbation (given by hab) is unchanged.
There is no genuine evolution, corresponding to frozen modes. During an inflation-
ary scenario, for example, H(0)T grows dramatically while T itself does not change
significantly, so that a large number of modes (modes with a large spread of ratios
ξab(k)/µab(k)) enter this regime and freeze out.
In the opposite regime,
H
(0)
T Tξab(k) 2µab(k), (8.38)
the resulting equation
ξ′ab(k) = 2F (T ) ·M−2Pl γacγbdµcd(k) (8.39)
has essentially the usual form ‘velocity∝momentum’, up to an overall time-dependent
scaling factor that depends on the background. This equation implies that the dynamics
are not frozen out (µab = 0 would contradict the assumption about the regime) and
therefore corresponds to genuine evolution. Just like in the case of a particle system
where the corresponding equation is ‘x˙ = p/m’ the real content of the dynamics is
found in the equation describing the evolution of the momentum.
The regimes for the equation 8.32 describing the ‘momentum modes’ are not identi-
cal to the regimes of equation 8.31 but instead correspond to long and short wavelengths
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(small and large |k| respectively). In the long wavelength regime one has
|T |µab(k)M4Pl2H(0)
1
3
T
(
δ(ab)(cd) − 1
3
γabγcd
)
γijξickjkd, (8.40)
which means that the equation 8.32 has the approximate form
µab′(k) = M−2Pl F (T )H
(0)
T |T | · µab (8.41)
and therefore solutions (in an expanding universe, where T < 0)
µab(T ) = µab(T1)e
−M−2Pl
∫
dTF (T )H
(0)
T T , (8.42)
that is, all long-wavelength momentum modes scale alike (independent of the exact
value of k) as a function of time whose form is dependent on the background only and
which furthermore matches the (inverse of the) time evolution of the frozen ξab modes.
In other words, in the long-wavelength regime the momentum modes do not experience
real evolution.
On the other hand, for short wavelengths (large |k|) the second term dominates and
the equation approximates to
µab′(k) = F (T )H
(0) 4
3
T M
2
Pl
(
ξajkJk
b + ξbjkjk
a − 2
3
γabξijkikj
)
, (8.43)
which corresponds to genuine evolution since there is linear dependence on the variable
ξab. This is furthermore an indication that one could describe the system once again
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in terms of a damped harmonic oscillator with time dependent terms (compare section
7.3).
The system described by these equations is complicated and a full analysis likely
requires numerical tools. We will not explore the classical dynamics further here. In-
stead, in the next part of this thesis we proceed with the development of the quantum
theory derived by canonical quantisation of the theory developed here.
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PART III:
CANONICAL QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
WITH YORK TIME
202
CHAPTER 9
QUANTUM FRIEDMANN-LEMAIˆTRE COSMOL-
OGY
In this chapter we canonically quantise the cosmological minisuperspace model devel-
oped in chapter 5. We discuss some of the features of quantum theories derived via
canonical quantisation from York-time Hamiltonian-reduced classical theories in the
context of this model. The contents of this chapter were published as part of ref. [106].
9.1 Quantum theory of the free scalar field
Whether or not the application of the quantisation recipe to gravity leads to a viable
theory of quantum gravity remains to be seen. However, our theory of gravity obtained
via Hamiltonian reduction from the ADM formalism does not suffer from the problem
of time and so canonical quantisation is at least possible. A fundamentally different
quantisation procedure will be proposed in chapter 11 and applied to cosmology in
chapter 12.
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Ultimately empirical data must determine the correct form of quantum gravity.
With such measurements however unavailable at the time of writing and, arguably, in
the foreseeable future, theoretical motivations may be considered. The application of
canonical quantisation to the metric field is motivated by the success of its application
to matter fields, specifically the fields of the Standard Model. Canonical quantisation of
gravity is therefore plausible if the gravitational field is sufficiently ‘matter-field-like’.
In the aside on proper time in section 4.2 we touched on some arguments suggesting that
gravity ought to be considered a dynamical field like matter fields and that it is special
only in that it has dynamics which allows for a geometric representation. Specifically,
it couples to all other fields in a specific way, namely via so-called minimal coupling.
In this picture the geometric aspect is however not fundamental. If, on the other hand,
the converse is true and the gravitational field tensor gab (or (4)gµν) really is just a math-
ematical representation of actual spatial (or spatio-temporal) geometry, then treating it
like a matter field with regards to quantisation is ad hoc.1
Conversely, the success of different treatments of gravity with regards to quantisa-
tion may give an indication of which ‘view’ is correct. This requires the pursuit of all
lines of enquiry. Quantising the 3-metric field (with a particular, theoretically motivated
choice of foliation) is one such line. The simple minisuperspace model considered here
is a first step along that line, although it does, of course, have direct physical application
given the observed approximate homogeneity and isotropy of our universe.
To begin, we wish to construct a quantum theory using the classical theory devel-
oped in chapter 5 as a starting point. For illustrative purposes, we first consider the free
1This is one example where philosophical reasoning and the details of one’s realist stance are tied to
how one proceeds mathematically.
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theory (with V (φ) = 0). In the free theory the sign of the momentum is unchanging, so
that classically we may replace |pφ| → pφ,2 up to a sign (though recall that the sign of
the Hamiltonian is arbitrary anyway). The classical Hamiltonian is then
H = −
√
2
3
MPl
pφ
−T . (9.1)
We promote the canonical variables to operators, φ → φˆ and pφ → pˆφ = −i ∂∂φ , to
act on a wavefunction Ψ(φ, T ) and as our law of evolution we take the Schro¨dinger
equation:
i
∂Ψ
∂T
(φ, T ) = HˆΨ(φ, T ) = −i
√
2
3
MPl
1
T
∂Ψ
∂φ
(φ, T ). (9.2)
The Hamiltonian, being proportional to pˆφ, is a time-dependent generator of trans-
lations in the configuration space of φ. Thus the wavefunction is shifted in its entirety
and the evolution is real (in the sense that if Ψ only takes real values at one time T0, it
takes real values at all times). To see this explicitly, first consider the evolution of Ψ
over a small time interval T0 → T0 + δT . To first order in δT we have
Ψ(φ, T0 + δT ) = Ψ(φ, T0) + δT
∂Ψ
∂T
(φ, T0)
= Ψ(φ, T0)−
√
2
3
MPl
δT
T0
∂Ψ
∂φ
(φ, T0)
= Ψ
(
φ−
√
2
3
MPl
δT
T0
, T0
)
. (9.3)
2This assumption was made inadvertently in ref. [106] where we first reported these results. This
treatment is however technically incorrect: That the momentum is not changing sign is a result of the
classical dynamics and not a defining feature of the theory. The more accurate way to proceed would
be the method applied in the next chapter and briefly discussed in the box below, where a square-root
Hamiltonian is interpreted via diagonalisation of its square. Fortunately, the results obtained with the
present method are however encouraging. The pseudo-classical behaviour of the quantum trajectories
(see below) has also been deduced by John [65], although without reference to York time and with a
slightly expanded notion of quantum trajectory.
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Thus during the interval δT the wavefunction is shifted in the direction of decreasing φ
(since T0 < 0 by assumption). For T0 → T = T0 + ∆T with finite ∆T , it is readily
shown that
Ψ(φ, T ) = Ψ
(
φ−
√
2
3
MPl ln
T
T0
, T0
)
(9.4)
satisfies eq. 9.2.
Eq. 9.4 implies that for T → −∞ the wavepacket is located at φ → +∞ and for
T → 0 at φ → −∞, matching the classical evolution of φ. Since the shape of Ψ in φ-
space remains unchanged, the probability current j(φ, T ) will be uniform in φ (though
T -dependent). This will be seen explicitly below when we consider the de Broglie-
Bohm trajectories.
In standard quantum mechanics (without trajectories) the ‘classicality’ of the quan-
tum evolution may be seen at the level of expectation values. For an appropriately
narrow wave function, we can apply Ehrenfest’s theorem and obtain
d
dT
〈φ〉 =
√
2
3
MPlT
−1,
d
dT
〈pφ〉 = 0, (9.5)
that is, the classical evolution, but for expectation values. Using trajectories, we will
show that the assumption of a narrow wave packet is, in fact, unnecessary in order to
obtain the classical-like behaviour.
First, however, consider now the role of the scale factor a. Previously we argued
that the numerical value of the Hamiltonian is to be interpreted as the volume of the
universe (section 3.2). This is also true for the quantum theory.
In a more usual context the classical interpretation of the value of the Hamiltonian
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is that of energy. In the quantum theory this translates into an energy spectrum, given
by the eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian operator (with corresponding eigenstates). Anal-
ogously, it is natural here to interpret the eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian as elements of
a ‘volume spectrum’ with corresponding ‘volume eigenstates’. In the quantum theory
it is therefore plausible to characterise the volume (or scale factor) associated with a
particular state via the expectation value of the Hamiltonian3
a3 ≡ 〈Ψ | Hˆ |Ψ〉 . (9.6)
In order to see that this makes sense, consider the eigenstates of the Hamiltonian.
It is easy to confirm that these are given by Ψk(φ) = Nke−ikφ, where k ∈ R labels the
eigenstate and Nk is a normalisation constant. The corresponding eigenvalues, which
we write as ‘a3k’ since they are to correspond to a volume, are
a3k =
√
2
3
MPlT
−1k. (9.7)
Thus the eigenvalue depends linearly on the wavenumber of the eigenstate and in-
versely on York time T . Since k can take any real value, the spectrum is continu-
ous. Note that the time dependence is the same for all eigenstates and therefore also
for arbitrary linear superpositions. Since the set of Ψk form a complete basis the
time dependence is therefore identical for all states. Consider a linear superposition
Ψ(φ) =
∑
k AkΨk(φ) =
∑
k AkNke
−ikφ, where Ak ∈ C are arbitrary coefficients. The
3If a were a dynamical variable of our Hamiltonian system (as it was in the unreduced model), this
equation would denote a constraint imposed at the level of expectation values. However, in our case a is
not such a variable and is instead introduced as a definition.
207
volume expectation value (9.6) is
〈Ψ | Hˆ |Ψ〉 =
∫
dφ Ψ∗HˆΨ
=
√
2
3
MPl
1
T
∑
k.k′
∫
dφ A∗k′Ψ
∗
k′kAkΨk
=
√
2
3
MPl
1
T
∑
k
k|Ak|2 (9.8)
where in the last step we used the orthonormality of the eigenfunctions. The volume ex-
pectation value is thus inversely proportional to T . The chosen state Ψ only determines
an overall factor
∑
k k|Ak|2.
Finally consider the time evolution of a3 for an arbitrary state Ψ. From da3/dT =
d 〈Ψ | Hˆ |Ψ〉 /dT , and using eq. 9.6, we see that
a′
a
= − 1
3T
(9.9)
independently of Ψ. Note that this is exactly the equation giving the evolution of a in
the classical theory.
If we consider quantum trajectories as they appear in the de Broglie-Bohm formu-
lation these will be geometrically parallel in the extended configuration space (φ-T -
space). The velocity (and therefore guidance equation for the trajectories) can be read
off from eq. 9.4 to be
vφ(T ) =
√
2
3
MPl
1
T
. (9.10)
This result could also have been obtained by evaluating ∂
∂T
|Ψ|2 using the Schro¨dinger
equation in order to arrive at the continuity equation for the probability density. This
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result matches eq. 5.31, the equation for the classical trajectories. Thus the de Broglie-
Bohm and classical trajectories are identical. This may have been expected for a free
theory. However, below we show that a similar result holds even in the presence of a
potential, which one would not naturally expect.
The use of quantum trajectories allows for an alternative method to calculate the
evolution of a via the identification of ‘local expectation values’ a3 ≡ Re[ψ∗Hˆψ/|ψ|2](φ, T )
(evaluated along the trajectory), in the sense of Holland [59, sec. 3.5]. However, in this
thesis we choose to employ the identification of a3 via eq. 9.6.
A more careful treatment of ‘square-root’ Hamiltonian
Above we treated the ‘square-root’ Hamiltonian via the simplification of considering the
quantisation of the Hamiltonian 9.1 rather than the more fundamentally correct expressions,
HT = −
√
2
3
MPl
−T
√
p2φ.
This modification is adequate for the classical theory where the momentum pφ does not
change sign. In fact, we will use it again below in section 9.2 even in the presence of a
potential where the applicability of this modification of the Hamiltonian is more limited
(see our discussion of ‘turning points’ in chapter 5). The fact that it is classically adequate
follows from the classical dynamics and so, strictly speaking, this should not be assumed
in the quantum theory. This raises the question how to interpret the operator resulting from
the quantisation of the classical phase-space function
√
p2φ. One might be tempted to write
√̂
p2φ =
√
pˆ2φ =
√
−∂2φ,
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(with ∂φ = ∂∂φ ) which is not problematic but does not offer a resolution either since one is
left to interpret the mathematical meaning of the square root of a second derivative.
The way to deal with this difficulty is by interpreting the expression via diagonalisation.
In general, if |h〉 is an eigenfunction of hˆ with eigenvalue h, hˆ |h〉 = h |h〉, then it is also
an eigenfunction of fˆ ≡ hˆ2 with eigenvalue h2,
hˆ2 |h〉 = h2 |h〉 .
The converse is in general not true: there may be eigenfunctions of fˆ which are not eigen-
functions of hˆ. However, if fˆ is diagonalisable with a complete set of eigenstates (this
follows from Hermiticity), then these also form a set of eigenstates for hˆ = fˆ
1
2 with square-
rooted eigenvalues.
Regarding Hermiticity, if hˆ is Hermitian, then so is fˆ . Again, for arbitrary operators the
converse is not true: If Aˆ2 = Bˆ and Bˆ is Hermitian, then it is not guaranteed that Aˆ is
Hermitian. However, if Aˆ = Bˆ
1
2 is defined in terms of the diagonalised operator, then Aˆ
will be Hermitian too (up to a subtlety that we will establish below for the particular case
of the quantisation of the anisotropic universe in section 10.1, where we will deal with the
square-root operator more carefully than in the present chapter. The subtlety is that Bˆ must
be positive semi-definite, that is, it must have only non-negative eigenvalues, so that their
square roots are real). That is, not every square root of a Hermitian operator is Hermitian,
but one can always find one via diagonalisation.
Let us consider the implications for the minisuperspace model considered in this chapter.
Define the square of the Hamiltonian operator,
Fˆ ≡ Hˆ2T = 23M2PlT−2pˆ2φ
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and find its eigenfunctions ψk, satisfying
Fˆψk(φ) =
2
3M
2
PlT
−2(−∂2φ)ψk(φ) = gψk(φ).
This is solved by the eigenfunctions
ψk(φ) = Ne
ikφ
with eigenvalues
g = 23M
2
PlT
−2(−k2).
The prefactor N is a normalisation constant. In general k could be any complex number.
However, the functions are only bounded for k ∈ R, so viable eigenfunctions are restricted
to real values of k.a The eigenvalues of the actual Hamiltonian are then
h = −
√
2
3MPl
|k|
T
and are therefore unchanged from what was established in the text using the simplified
square-root-free Hamiltonian.
In order to derive the de Broglie-Bohm velocity v one needs the probability current [125],
given via the continuity equation
∂|Ψ|2
∂T
− ∂φ(|Ψ|2v) = 0.
Using the Schro¨dinger equation and its conjugate one arrives at an expression for the ve-
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locity:
v = −|Ψ|−2∂−1φ
[
i
(
(HΨ)†ψ − ψ†(Hψ)
)]
.
In general the inverse operator ‘∇−1’ cannot be evaluated explicitly and some other ma-
nipulation is necessary for an explicit result. However, in the one-dimensional case the
operator ∂−1φ simply denotes integration with respect to φ. The integration constant cor-
responds to the general divergence-free term that may be added to the de Broglie-Bohm
velocity without affecting the probability density and its evolution. The application of Hˆ
to a general state Ψ is evaluated via the decomposition of Ψ into volume eigenfunctions,
Ψ =
∑
k
ckψk,
with the sum being over all values of k for which there is a non-vanishing complex coeffi-
cient ck. The action of the Hamiltonian on ψk is known.
aThe functions must be bounded if it is to be possible to interpret |ψk|2 as a probability distri-
bution. It is not completely clear if the possibility of such an interpretation is a necessary feature of
a theory describing the evolution of a single isolated universe, especially if the universe were rep-
resented by a de Broglie-Bohm trajectory and the role of the ψk is fundamentally that of a guiding
wave. So relaxing this condition may be a defensible option in the present case. However, complex
k imply complex volume eigenvalues. (This essentially relates to the fact that Hermiticity of the
Hamiltonian is not established for unbounded functions, a mathematical detail that is rarely relevant
in conventional quantum mechanics, where the existence of a probability interpretation is assumed.)
9.2 Quantum theory with a potential
The quantisation of the homogeneous isotropic minisuperspace model with a non-vanishing
scalar-field potential proceeds along similar lines. Here (as we did in ref. [106]) we will
also make the simplification of replacing the ‘square-root of the squared momentum’
operator by the momentum itself. Unlike in the case of the free theory where the mo-
mentum does not change sign classically, it may do so in the case of a potential, so that
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the applicability of the quantised theory developed in this section is limited. A proper
treatment should proceed along the lines described in the box above. In the next chap-
ter, we will give an example of the proper treatment of a square-root Hamiltonian in the
form of the quantisation of the anisotropic minisuperspace model of section 7.2.
The recipe of quantisation is ambiguous for a non-zero potential V (φ) 6= 0 due to
the necessity of choosing a factor ordering in the Hamiltonian 5.22. Different choices
will lead to different dynamics. It turns out that the symmetric choice
Hˆ = −1
2
(
Uˆ−
1
2 pˆφ + pˆφUˆ
− 1
2
)
= +
1
2
 i√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
∂
∂φ
+
∂
∂φ
i√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
 , (9.11)
results in a Hermitian Hamiltonian, as may be readily verified.4 The term U is a short-
hand defined by equation 5.20. At the end of this section we will also show that this
ordering has the special property that the resulting de Broglie-Bohm trajectories match
those of the classical theory just as they did in the free case, although the applicabil-
ity of this result is limited given that the modified Hamiltonian without the square-root
operator is used.
4Other orderings, while not in general Hermitian, are however PT-symmetric for even potentials
V (φ), and so they may conceivably be considered as other viable choices, provided the treatment is
adjusted accordingly (with appropriately modified inner products). See Bender [16] for an introduction
to PT-symmetric Hamiltonians in quantum theory. As always, ultimately the right choice is determined
by observation.
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Application of Ehrenfest’s theorem gives
d
dT
〈φ〉 =
〈
1√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
〉
d
dT
〈pφ〉 = −
〈
1
( 3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)) 32
∂V
∂φ
pφ
〉
+
1
2
〈pφ, 1
( 3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)) 32
∂V
∂φ
〉 ,
(9.12)
where the equation for φ has the form of the classical evolution equation, while the
momentum equation differs by the second expression. For a state that is sufficiently
‘classical’, that is, appropriately localised in both position and momentum (while con-
sistent with the uncertainty principle) such that for a relevant functions f(φ) it is the
case that
〈f(φ, pφ)〉 ≈ f(〈φ〉, 〈pφ〉), (9.13)
we have for F (φ) = ( 3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ))− 32 ∂V
∂φ
that
〈[pφ, F ]〉 = 〈(pφF − Fpφ)〉 = 〈pφF 〉 − 〈Fpφ〉 = 0, (9.14)
having used the condition 9.13 for the choice f(φ, pφ) = pφ · F (φ) in the last equality.
Thus the final term in the second equation of (9.12) vanishes. Condition 9.13 also
allows us to replace the remaining expressions on the right-hand sides of eqs. 9.12 by
the appropriate functions of 〈φ〉 and we obtain classically evolving expectation values
since the equations have the same form as the classical equations fo φ′ and p′φ. Below
we will show the recovery of classicality more fully at the level of trajectories.
Let us consider the evolution of the scale factor a given by (9.6). Proceeding as for
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the free theory, we first find the ‘volume eigenfunctions’. These are
ψTk = Nk
(
1− 4M
2
PlV (φ)
3T 2
) 1
4
e
−ik ∫ dφ(1− 4M2PlV (φ)
3T2
) 1
2
, (9.15)
as is easy to verify. Unlike the eigenfunctions for the free theory, which were time
independent (only the eigenvalues carried time dependence), the functions here are time
dependent also. 5
Note that we could have rescaled the eigenfunctions ψTk by an arbitrary function
of time. This ambiguity is resolved by demanding that for early times −T  1 the
eigenfunctions match those of the free theory. This is a reasonable condition since
we have already established that the early-time dynamics for the trajectories is well
approximated by that of the free theory.
The eigenvalues corresponding to these eigenfunctions (9.15) are
a3k =
√
2
3
MPl
k
T
, (9.17)
that is, they match those of the free theory. However, the eigenfunctions ψk are not nor-
malisable over the entire real line, φ ∈ (−∞,∞) unless the V (φ) falls off sufficiently
fast as φ → ±∞, which is not the case for many commonly investigated potentials,
such as V (φ) = M4(φ/MPl)2 considered above.
5Indeed, it is easy to see why this must be so. Suppose we wish to find time-independent eigenfunc-
tions χk(φ), satisfying Hˆχk = wk(T )χk(φ), where wk(T ) are the corresponding eigenvalues, which
may depend on time T . Evaluating Hˆχk, the condition on χk would be that
wk(T ) = iU
− 12
(
∂ lnχk
∂φ
− 1
2
U−1
∂U
∂φ
)
(9.16)
is only a function of time T (since the eigenvalue wk(T ) cannot have dependence on φ). But no time-
independent χ can satisfy this condition since U(φ, T ) is time dependent.
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Time-dependent eigenfunctions of a time-dependent Hamiltonian do not, in general,
evolve into eigenfunctions (that is, a general eigenstate ψT0k of H(T0) does not evolve
into an eigenstate ψT1k′ of H(T1)) and few general results are known. We will postpone
detailed analysis of appropriate models to future work.
Instead, let us consider a general superposition Ψ(T0) =
∑
k Ak(T0)ψ
T0
k (T0) at time
T0. For later times, we write Ψ(T ) =
∑
k Ak(T )ψ
T
k (T ), where we must include the
time-dependence of the coefficients Ak(T ) in order to account for the fact that eigen-
functions ofH(T0) do not evolve into eigenfunctions ofH(T ) for some T > T0. Setting
a3 ≡ 〈Ψ |H |Ψ〉, we find
a3 =
∑
k
|Ak(T )|2|Nk|2
∫
dφ
√
1− 4M
2
PlV (φ)
3T 2
·
√
2
3
MPl
k
T
. (9.18)
Differentiation with respect to T gives
a′
a
= − 1
3T
1−
∫
dφ 2V (φ)/
√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)∫
dφ
√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
+ ∑k |Nk|2 · k · ddT |Ak(T )|2
3
∑
k |Nk|2 · k · |Ak(T )|2
.
(9.19)
We note that in this expression only the last term depends on the quantum state. In
general, the two integrals may be divergent and care must be taken when evaluating
their ratio. In practice, some regularisation method may have to be applied. The result
for the free theory is recovered in the case when V (φ) = 0.
Consider finally the de Broglie-Bohm trajectories. From the Schro¨dinger equation
for this Hamiltonian Hˆ it is straightforward to derive the continuity equation for the
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probability density,
∂|Ψ|2
∂T
=
∂
∂φ
(
U−
1
2 |Ψ|2
)
(9.20)
from which we read off the guidance equation for the de Broglie-Bohm trajectories,
vφ = −U− 12 = − 1√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
. (9.21)
This is indeed the classical velocity φ′ for an arbitrary potential V (φ).
It is interesting to note that the velocity vφ is independent of the state Ψ and only
depends on the position in φ-configuration space. This is a result of the first-order form
of the Hamiltonian and contrasts to more conventional second-order systems (where the
velocity might depend on the phase of Ψ, for example).
The identical law for the classical and de Broglie-Bohm trajectories implies that our
considerations for the classical evolution of the universe apply to the quantum evolu-
tion, too. This enables us to develop a perturbation theory that is entirely quantum,
using the fact that the homogeneous background evolves just as if it were classical and
independently of the quantum state.
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CHAPTER 10
QUANTUM YORK-TIME COSMOLOGICAL PER-
TURBATION THEORY
The goal of this chapter is the canonical quantisation of the reduced-Hamiltonian cos-
mological perturbation theory developed in chapter 8. As a preliminary step, in order to
discuss the unconventional commutator structure we first consider the canonical quan-
tum theory of the anisotropic minisuperspace model of section 7.2 before moving on
to perturbation theory proper. Section 10.1 was published as part of ref. [105], while
section 10.2 formed part of ref. [103].
10.1 Quantisation, representations and the anisotropic
homogeneous quantum universe
Whether or not following the canonical quantisation recipe is appropriate for arriving
at a quantum theory of gravity is yet to be determined. Rather than theoretical specu-
lation about what formal features we expect a quantum theory of gravity to have, our
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approach is to examine the theory resulting from an application of the standard quanti-
sation procedure to the classical reduced-Hamiltonian theory. If the quantum theory is
found to be wanting with regards to internal consistency or empirical adequacy, another
approach will have to be proposed.
The quantisation procedure is not completely straightforward. In the homogeneous
case we were able to follow the canonical-quantisation procedure without difficulty
(the only ‘unusual’ feature was having a strongly time-dependent Hamiltonian and its
‘square-root’ form). In contrast, in the present anisotropic model and in the general
case the non-canonical Poisson brackets must lead to a modified commutator-bracket
structure.
It is therefore worth isolating this feature of the quantum theory by exploring the
canonical quantisation of the anisotropic minisuperspace model of section 7.2 before
proceeding to the quantisation of perturbation theory itself. While empirically inad-
equate with regard to our actual universe, useful insights about the structure of the
quantum theory are gained.
10.1.1 Quantisation with non-canonical Poisson brackets
The natural generalisation of the usual bracket ‘promotion’, schematically expressible
as
“ {q, p} = 1 ” −→ “ [qˆ, pˆ] = i~1ˆ ”, (10.1)
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is that the right-hand side of the Poisson equations is also promoted to operators and
multiplied by a factor i~,
“ {q, p} = f(q, p) ” −→ “ [qˆ, pˆ] = i~f̂(q, p) ” (10.2)
and similar for other non-commuting brackets. Few works consider quantisation in
general for non-canonical Poisson structure. One notable exception is ref. [128]. In
general this promotion procedure leads to factor-ordering ambiguities however since the
right-hand side may contain (classically) products of ps and qs, or other non-Poisson-
commuting combinations (such as ps and ps in our case). This implies that there is,
strictly speaking, an ambiguity due to factor order in the function denoted by f(q, p)
above. The ambiguity is however ‘small’ since all possible orderings are related by
adding or subtracting a commutator bracket on the right-hand side. This commutator
bracket, when evaluated, introduces a factor of ~ (in addition to the overall factor of ~
present on the right), so that the ambiguity is of order ~2, while the unambiguous part
of the commutator expression is only of order ~. Nonetheless the quantisation recipe is
indisputably ambiguous when applied to classical theories with such Poisson structures.
Fortunately for our purposes there will be easy criteria to choose an appropriate order
in the cases we have to consider.
The Poisson structure of the reduced variables in the general York-time reduced-
Hamiltonian theory is given by eqs. 4.28 and 4.29 (and the vanishing of {g˜ab, g˜cd}). The
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resulting commutator algebra is then given by
[ˆ˜gab(x), ˆ˜gcd(y)] = 0 (10.3)
[ˆ˜gab(x), ˆ˜pi
cd(y)] = i~
(
δ(ca δ
d)
b − 13 ˆ˜gab ˆ˜gcd
)
δ3(x− y) (10.4)
[ˆ˜piab(x), ˆ˜picd(y)] =
i~
3
(
ˆ˜gcd ˆ˜piab − ˆ˜gab ˆ˜picd
)
δ3(x− y). (10.5)
The operators ˆ˜gab and ˆ˜picd act on wave functionals Ψ.1 The inverse-metric operator g˜ab
has the obvious meaning, satisfying g˜abg˜bc = δca. For reduced notational clutter it is
useful to suppress the position arguments (x, y, etc.).
By inspection one can find a ‘position’ basis for Ψ, that is, a representation of the op-
erators and the wave functional such that Ψ is expressed as a functional of the reduced-
metric configurations g˜ab(x) and constitutes eigenfunctions of the operator ˆ˜gab with the
eigenvalue being the argument of Ψ,
ˆ˜gabΨ[g˜ij] = g˜abΨ[g˜ij]. (10.6)
The momentum operator acts as
ˆ˜piabΨ[g˜ij] =
[
−i~
(
δ
(ab)
(cd) − 13 g˜abg˜cd
) δ
δg˜cd
]
Ψ[g˜ij]. (10.7)
One can verify that this is indeed a representation of the commutators 10.3 - 10.5.
However, there is no momentum representation. This follows directly from the fact
1In the presence of matter this functional also depends on the matter field configuration, such as a
scalar field φ(x). Since this is not important for our purposes here, we do not include it here in order
to avoid obscuring the notation. Of course, Ψ is furthermore dependent on York time T , which we also
suppress at this stage.
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that momenta do not commute with each other, eq. 10.5. A momentum representation
would require functionals Ψ[p˜iij] such that
ˆ˜piabΨ[p˜iij] = p˜iabΨ[p˜iij], (10.8)
but then
pˆiabpˆicdΨ˜[piij(x)] = piabpicdΨ˜[piij(x)] = picdpiabΨ˜[piij(x)] = pˆicdpˆiabΨ˜[piij(x)], (10.9)
contradicting the commutator relation 10.5. The box below discusses the physical and
formal meaning of this and draws contrasts with loop quantum gravity.
The position representation identically satisfies the quantum constraint demanding
the vanishing of the trace of the momentum for physical states,
ˆ˜gab ˆ˜pi
abΨphys[g˜ij] = 0. (10.10)
The ‘scale-free’ constraint,
ˆ˜gΨ[g˜ij] = 1ˆΨ[g˜ij], (10.11)
on the other restricts Ψ to be non-vanishing on the surface defined by the condition
g = 1. This may be more clearly understood in the context of a finite-dimensional
model, such as the anisotropic cosmological model considered in this chapter.
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10.1.2 Application to the anisotropic homogeneous universe
Applying this quantisation scheme to the anisotropic cosmological model developed in
section 7.2, we promote the (reduced) variables qi and pi to operators that are under-
stood to act on kinematically allowed quantum states Ψkin. ‘Kinematically allowed’
encompasses all states that are expressible as suitable normalisable functions over the
Hilbert space that corresponds to the classical configuration space defined by the three
position variables q1, q2, q3. Much smaller is the space of physically allowed states —
states to which a physical meaning can be given and which are not mere mathematical
artifacts. These states must also satisfy the quantum constraints, obtained by operator-
promotion of the classical constraint equations. That is, a constraint φ(qi, pj) = 0 acts
on states as φ(qˆi, pˆj)Ψphys = 0, selecting physically meaningful states Ψphys.
In the present case the constraint equations were given by eqs. 7.2 and 7.3 with the
resulting quantum constraints
qˆ1qˆ2qˆ3Ψphys = 1Ψphys (10.12)
qˆapˆ
aΨphys = 0. (10.13)
The Poisson algebra is promoted to a commutator algebra of operators:
[qˆa, pˆ
b] = i~
(
δba − 13 qˆaqˆb
)
, (10.14)
[pˆa, pˆb] =
i~
3
[
pˆaqˆb − pˆbqˆa] (10.15)
The momentum operators do not commute, so as in the general case the theory does
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not possess a momentum representation. However, there is a ‘position’ representation
(a representation defined by the fact that the operators qˆa act by multiplication of the
argument, qˆaΨ(qi) = qaΨ(qi)), given by
qˆaΨkin(qi) = qaΨkin(qi), (10.16)
pˆbΨkin(qi) =
[
−i~ (δba − 13qbqa) ∂∂qa
]
Ψkin(qi). (10.17)
It is easy to verify that these do indeed satisfy the commutation relations 10.14, 10.15.
We are left to consider the meaning of the constraints. The tracelessness requirement
in operator form 10.13 is satisfied identically in this representation, so that it does not
restrict the space of physical wavefunctions. On the other hand, the absence of absolute
scale, taking the form of the self-adjoint quantum constraint 10.12 implies that physical
wavefunctions must vanish off the two-dimensional surface Σ given by q1q2q3 = 1. On
the full configuration space physical wavefunctions are therefore discontinuous at Σ.
One may be worried that this is problematic given that one encounters expressions of the
form ∂/∂qi Ψphys, which are derivatives across the discontinuity. However, derivatives
in the position representation only appear in the form of linear combinations as given by
the momenta, which are directional derivatives tangent to the constraint surface. This
is, of course, the quantum result corresponding to the fact that classically momenta
generate motion within the constraint surface. Specifically, considering a basis for the
tangent space to Σ at an arbitrary point by writing q3 = (q1q2)−1 and calculating the
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corresponding tangent vectors,
T1 ≡
(
∂q1
∂q1
,
∂q2
∂q1
,
∂q3
∂q1
)
=
(
1, 0,−1/q21q2
)
, (10.18)
T2 ≡
(
∂q1
∂q2
,
∂q2
∂q2
,
∂q3
∂q2
)
=
(
0, 1,−1/q1q22
)
, (10.19)
the momenta can be expressed in terms of this basis,2
pˆ1 =
(
2
3
T1 − q2
3q1
T2
)
· ∇ (10.20)
pˆ2 =
(
− q1
3q2
T1 +
2
3
T2
)
· ∇ (10.21)
pˆ3 =
(−1
3
q21q2T1 − 13q1q22T2
) · ∇. (10.22)
The evolution of the value of Ψphys at some point ~q is therefore ‘blind’ to the properties
of Ψphys outside the constraint surface, regardless of the form of the Hamiltonian.
10.1.3 The quantum theory of the anisotropic universe
The dynamics of the quantum theory is determined by the quantised, time-dependent
Hamiltonian,
Hˆ =
√
8
3T 2
√̂
q2i p
i2. (10.23)
Since classically the numerical value of the Hamiltonian is ‘volume’, in the quantum
theory Hˆ defines a ‘volume spectrum’ with volume eigenfunctions and eigenvalues
rather than the more conventionally encountered energy spectrum (section 3.2).
The obvious difficulty with Hˆ is the appearance of a ‘square-root’ operator, whose
2Furthermore, one notes that the momenta are not linearly independent operators.
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meaning is not initially clear. Another question is the factor-ordering ambiguity in
the radicand. Regarding the latter, one can show using the commutation relations that
changing the ordering of (qˆaqˆapˆapˆa) either has no effect or merely corresponds to adding
or subtracting a constant 4
3
~2 or 8
3
~2. A different ordering choice therefore corresponds
to a shift in the Hamiltonian eigenvalues but does not change the eigenfunctions. Where
necessary, we will therefore with minimal loss of generality assume the ordering ‘qqpp’,
also expressible in the form
qˆaqˆapˆ
apˆaΨphys(q) =
(
q2a∂
a2 − 1
3
qaqb∂
a∂b + 2
3
qa∂
a
)
Ψphys(q). (10.24)
The square-root operator could be dealt with formally by assuming the existence of
a series expansion,
Hˆ = (8/3T 2)
1
2
∞∑
n=0
wn,a(q)(∂
a)n, (10.25)
which acts straightforwardly on a state when expressed as a Fourier transform,3
ψ(q) =
∫
d3k ψ˜(k)eik
cqc , (10.27)
3Note however that the Fourier expansion does not constitute a integral over momentum eigenstates
since no momentum representation exists. In fact, the relation of the Fourier components kc and the
momenta can be seen via the action of the latter on the former,
pˆaψ(q) = ~
∫
d3k ψ˜(k) · (δab − 13qaqb)kb eik
cqc = ~kaψ(q)− ~
3
∫
d3k ψ˜(k) · qaqbkb eikcqc . (10.26)
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giving
Hˆ
(
ψ˜(k)eik
cqc
)
=
∫
d3k
∞∑
n=0
wn,a(q) (ik
a)n · ψ˜(k)eikcqc
=
∫
d3k
√
q2a(ik
a)2 − 1
3
qaqb(ika)(ikb) +
2
3
qa(ika) · ψ˜(k)eikcqc .
(10.28)
This formal result does not seem however very practical or insightful.
A more productive approach is to deal with the square-root explicitly. We intend to
interpret hˆ = (qˆ2apˆ
a2)
1
2 in the manner described in the general discussion in the box at
the end of section 9.1: Since analysis of Hˆ2 is a lot easier than Hˆ itself (as there is no
square root and so the interpretation of the operator expression is clear) interpretation
of the operator via diagonalisation offers the way forward. Hermiticity and positive
semi-definiteness need to be established for this to be viable however.
The operator fˆ ≡ hˆ2 is Hermitian only on Σ, not on the full, unconstrained config-
uration space. In order to establish its Hermiticity it is useful to perform a change
of coordinates (q1, q2, q3) → (u ≡ q1, v ≡ q2, w ≡ q1q2q3), so that w = 1 de-
scribes the constraint surface, facilitating the integration. With ∂u = ∂1 − (w/u2v)∂3,
∂v = ∂
2 − (w/uv2)∂3, ∂w = (1/uv)∂3, the momenta are
pˆ1 = −i~
(
2
3
∂u − v
3u
∂v
)
(10.29)
pˆ2 = −i~
(
2
3
∂v − u
3v
∂u
)
(10.30)
pˆ3 =
i~
3
(
u2v
w
∂u +
uv2
w
∂v
)
, (10.31)
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the volume element is dq1dq2dq3 = (uv)−1dudvdw and the operator fˆ is
fˆ ≡ qˆaqˆapˆapˆa = −2~
2
3
[
u2∂2u + v
2∂2v − uv∂u∂v + v∂v + u∂u
]
. (10.32)
In terms of these coordinates the Hermiticity of fˆ on the constraint surface,
∫
Σ
ψ†phys(fˆχphys) =
∫
Σ
(fˆψphys)
†χphys, (10.33)
is easily shown. The momenta themselves are not Hermitian and therefore do not con-
stitute ‘observables’ in the conventional sense (see box below for a formal discussion).
For example,
∫
Σ
ψ†phys(pˆ
1χphys) =
∫
Σ
(pˆ1ψphys)
†χphys−
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
du dv
1
uv
· i~
u
ψ†physχphys. (10.34)
The reason we chose to examine the simplest model in which the Poisson brackets
are non-trivial is that it allows us to explore their quantisation without having to worry
about too many cumbersome notational or other details. An added benefit of this model
is that the Hamiltonian eigenequation, that is, the ‘volume eigenspectrum’ can be solved
exactly. This is because fˆ is a homogeneous operator (eq. 10.32) whose eigenfunctions
may be readily found by inspection,
φn,m(u, v) = An,mu
nvm, (10.35)
228
with eigenvalues
fˆφn,m(u, v) = −2~
2
3
[
n2 +m2 − nm]φn,m(u, v). (10.36)
Naı¨vely m,n ∈ C, although the values will be restricted shortly. With the interpretation
of the square-root operator discussed above, the Hamiltonian eigensolutions are
Hˆφn,m(u, v) = hn,m(T ) φn,m(u, v), hn,m(T ) = i
4~
3|T |
√
n2 +m2 − nm.
(10.37)
The eigenfunctions φm,n(u, v) are, however, not normalisable on u, v ∈ (0,∞) for
any values n,m. But they are bounded (and, in fact, of constant magnitude) for purely
imaginary n,m, and divergent for all other values. That is, let n = iβ,m = iδ, β, δ ∈ R.
Then
hiβ,iδ(T ) = − 4~
3|T |
√
β2 + δ2 − βδ, (10.38)
where β2 + δ2 − βδ ≥ 0 always, so that the eigenvalues are real. Thus the reality
of eigenvalues is equivalent with the non-divergence of the eigenfunctions. This is
closely analogous to the ‘plane wave’ eigenfunctions of a free particle in basic parti-
cle quantum mechanics. There the eigenfunctions are of the form exp(ikx) for real k
and therefore not normalisable either but bounded with constant magnitude. Imaginary
values of k are excluded even though they solve the eigenvalue equation because they
entail divergent eigenfunctions. The analogy can be made more apparent by writing
φiβ,iδ = e
i(β lnu+δ ln v). The eigenvalues are sign-definite, that is, either all positive or all
negative, depending on the choice of sign in the Hamiltonian. As we did in the classical
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theory we can choose ‘volume’ to be positive, so that the Hamiltonian is a positive-
semidefinite operator. We see furthermore that there is a unique minimum-volume state,
φ0,0, which has constant eigenvalue zero, somewhat analogous to a ‘vacuum’ state.
One can also derive uncertainty relations. However, since the momenta are not ob-
servables the relevance of these relation is questionable and their meaning is obscure.4
Nonetheless we include them for completeness. One finds
σqiσpj ≥
~
3
(i = j) (10.39)
but the other non-zero relations are not as well-behaved and state-dependent,
σqiσpj =∞, (i 6= j) for H-eigenstates (10.40)
σpiσpj = 0 or∞ depending on symmetry properties of chosen state. (10.41)
Including a cosmological constant in the quantum theory is relatively straightfor-
ward since only the time-dependent pre-factor of the Hamiltonian changes, with the
resulting Hamiltonian eigenvalues changing accordingly. The eigenfunctions remain
the same.
The model developed in this section is not a good approximation to our universe.
However, the analysis of the Poisson brackets, in particular, how it guarantees motion
on the constraint surface and leads to a position representation that automatically sat-
isfies one of the quantum constraint while maintaining the other independent of the
4And not just in the way in which even in canonical systems the meaning of the uncertainty relation
remains full of controversy.
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Hamiltonian, will help us understand the analogous structure in the more complicated
case of cosmological perturbations, developed in the next section.
Momentum observables:
Reduced-Hamiltonian quantisation versus Loop Quantum Gravity
The origin of the non-Hermiticity of the momenta may be understood as follows. In the
usual formal canonical quantisation procedure one constructs a commutative C∗-algebra of
complex functions and the action of complex vector fields on the configuration space (with
its representation respecting an involution) in order to ensure that all phase-space functions
become ‘observables’ in the quantum theory. For example, in Loop Quantum Gravity this
is implemented via the shift to the loop variables, which have the appropriate structure.
There one has a kinematical (i.e. prior to ‘knowledge’ of the constraints) phase space in the
form of a cotangent bundle over the configuration space and can proceed accordingly. Loop
quantum gravity is perhaps the most advanced approach to canonical quantum gravity (a
phrase borrowed from ref. [68]), with a rigorously defined quantisation and Hilbert space.
However, the introduction of loop variables comes at the cost of having configuration vari-
ables that (arguably) lack a clear physical interpretation.
The present theory, as constructed via the Hamiltonian reduction, differs qualitatively
from the procedure used for Loop Quantum Gravity. The metric-derived variables gab (or
qi in the anisotropic minisuperspace model) and associated momenta do not lead to the
full structure of a C∗-algebra. The set of position operators form their own (smaller) C∗-
algebra (with gab = g∗ab = gab or q
∗
a = qa, and F (gab)
∗ = F¯ (gab) or F (qa)∗ = F¯ (qa) for
the involution) and this ensures the existence of the position basis (e.g. theorem 29.2.2 in
ref. [128]). What is not present here is the involution of the vector fields on configuration
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space. This leads to the momenta not being ‘observables’ and neither is the operator form
of a general phase-space function involving the momenta (although some functions may
be, including, fortunately, the Hamiltonian).
In contrast with conventional canonical quantisation such as employed in the construction
of Loop Quantum Gravity, the reduced momenta do not span the cotangent space of the
kinematical configuration variables gab (or qi) since instead they maintain the constraint
g = 1 (or q1q2q3 = 1) by construction, acting only tangentially to the constraint surface.
The Poisson structure also ensures that the other constraint, gabpiab = 0 (or qipi = 0) is
maintained by any generator constructed from the momenta and variables. In the quantum
theory this is in effect the reason the analogous quantum constraint holds identically at the
operator level.
Fortunately, the lack of momentum observables does not make the quantum theory unfea-
sible. Physically speaking, as has been pointed out by Feynman and Hibbs [45, ch. 5] and
repeatedly been emphasised by Bell [15, e.g. p. 196] all physical observation is ultimately
that of positions, such as time-of-flight measurements for particle momenta or simply the
position of an apparatus pointer that is appropriately coupled to the system.
Elaborating on this point, note that quantum theories may be viewed as theories of posi-
tions. In general, this requires one to view the position basis as preferreda, although for our
purposes this is already the case in light of the Poisson structure, as argued in the text. Par-
ticular types of position measurements can be interpreted as ‘momentum measurements’.
For example, in the standard quantum mechanics of a single particle with the wavefunc-
tion initially localised in position space, the statistical spread of position-measurement out-
comes after a fixed time interval corresponds to the probability distribution of potential
momentum-measurement outcomes. The initial uncertainty in position becomes negligible
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at sufficiently long times of flight (see ref. [45, sec. 5-1] for a detailed analysis). Accept-
ing that the observation of momentum is only a particular type of position measurement,
it becomes clear that a quantum theory is not strictly required to have this structure. The
absence of self-adjoint momentum operators implies that the theory lacks certain formal
properties in contrast with conventional quantum theories, but it is not physically inconsis-
tent or unviable.
aSome formulations, such as de Broglie-Bohm theory, do this at the fundamental level, whereas
in the Everettian formulation, for example, an (approximate) position basis may be preferred as a
result of decoherence.
10.2 Canonical quantisation of York-time cosmological
perturbation theory
The primary physical object in a quantum theory is the quantum state, which is repre-
sented as a complex function (or functional) defined on the configuration space of the
variables of the classical theory and on which operators derived from the classical vari-
ables and momenta act. It evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation defined by the
operator-promoted Hamiltonian. In general the state may also be expressed as a func-
tion of other variables, such as the momenta. This is not the case here, as we discussed
in the box in section 10.1, since the classical momenta do not Poisson commute among
themselves, a feature they retain when ‘promoted’ to commutator brackets between op-
erators. Instead due to the asymmetric nature of the g˜ab and p˜iab only a ‘position’ (that
is, field-value) representation can be constructed. If sufficient evidence were found to
lend credence to York time as a physically fundamental time, then this asymmetry may
be taken to suggest that position is a physically preferred basis.
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In the particular case of the perturbation theory, the ‘position’ variables are hab,
while the momenta are νab. The promotion of their Poisson structure (given by eqs. 8.3,
8.4), yields
[hˆab(x), νˆ
cd(y)] = i~
[
δ(ca δ
d)
b − 13γabγcd + 13γcdhˆab
− 1
3
γabhˆ
cd + h.o.
]
δ3(x− y), (10.42)
[νˆab(x), νˆcd(y)] =
i~
3
[
γcdνˆab − γabνˆcd] δ3(x− y). (10.43)
From this commutator algebra — or alternatively from the general framework dis-
cussed at the beginning of this chapter — one obtains the representation of the operator-
promoted perturbation variables hˆab and νˆab for a wave functional in the position basis,
hˆabΨ(hij) = habΨ(hij) (10.44)
νˆabΨ(hij) = −i~
(
δabcd − 13(γab − γamhmnγnd)(γcd + hcd)
) δ
δhcd
Ψ(hij)
= −i~(δabcd − 13γabγcd − 13γabhcd + 13habγcd + h.o.) δδhcdΨ(hij). (10.45)
Since the matter variables are canonical and furthermore commute with the geo-
metric variables, their representation is not restricted to a particular basis. While one
could imagine ‘mixed’ bases such that Ψ = Ψ(g˜ab, pφA) (or Ψ = Ψ(hab, δpφA) in
the present case), here we assume the full position basis where Ψ = Ψ(g˜ab, φA) (or
Ψ = Ψ(hab, δφA)), although since our focus in on the geometric degrees of freedom,
this is not important for our discussion.
The quantum dynamics is determined by the operator form of the Hamiltonian given
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by 8.21-8.23. However, the Hamiltonian involves explicit functions of time obtained
from solutions of the classical dynamics of the background. For the purposes of the
quantum theory one could choose to adopt the same form, contending with quantised
perturbations on a classical background. Here we are interested in a cosmological the-
ory that is fully quantum and we therefore also quantise the background. Standard
quantum mechanics does not, however, provide solutions that could be substituted for
the classical ones since there are no trajectories in configuration space, as the object
of interest is the state or wavefunction. We resolve this conundrum by employing
the trajectories obtained in de Broglie-Bohm theory [34, 18, 59], similar to methods
employed in conventional (unreduced, York-time unrelated) cosmological perturbation
theory [e.g. 93, 92]. While non-equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm theory when applied to
cosmological applications may lead to a distinct phenomenology [136, 138, 137, 131]
it agrees perfectly in its statistical predicitons with standard quantum mechanics in its
equilibrium form and can therefore be employed as a mathematical tool even if one
is unwilling to make any form of ontological commitment. The fact that de Broglie-
Bohm theory regards the position basis as privileged is furthermore consistent with its
special status in the present formalism. Whether or not this consistency adds credence
to de Broglie-Bohm theory as the fundamentally correct (with respect to ontology) way
to formulate quantum mechanics, is another discussion.
We fully solved the background dynamics for a single scalar field in the last chap-
ter, where we found that the quantum trajectories do, in fact, match the classical ones
(although this is not generally the case and even here certain provisos regarding our
quantisation procedure apply). Furthermore, the Hamiltonian expectation values —
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physically the volume of the universe up to a constant, analogous to the notion of en-
ergy in quantum mechanics of more conventional systems — also match the evolution
of the classical volume (this is true without the provisos). A similar quantum-classical
correspondence was established using de Broglie-Bohm theory for other appropriate
matter content with standard cosmological time and outside the reduced-Hamiltonian
picture in [65]. While such results are encouraging, the equality of classical and quan-
tum trajectories is not necessary for the method described here to be applied. However,
the fact that the two do match for certain scenarios may explain why quantising only the
perturbations and leaving the background classical, as is often done, is empirically suc-
cessful. For the case of a free field we found φ(T ) ∼ ln |T | and 〈Ψ | HˆBG |Ψ〉 ∼ |T |−1
with the factors of proportionality depending on the chosen initial state (see section
9.1).
Having solved the background one has explicit functions of time φ¯A(T ) and p¯φA(T ),
and the quantum analogue of H(0)T (T ) is given by the expectation value of the back-
ground Hamiltonian. This fully determines the perturbation Hamiltonian in the quan-
tum theory.
The dynamics is further defined by the presence of the constraints implied by the
York gauge, that is, the choice of gauge such that the foliation is parameterised by York
time exactly rather than merely at zeroth order. Classically this condition implied that
hab and νab are traceless, which according to the Dirac quantisation procedure leads to
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constraints on the set of physical states Ψphys,
γabhˆabΨphys = 0 (10.46)
γabνˆ
abΨphys = 0. (10.47)
In the position representation the first of these implies that Ψphys must vanish off the
classical constraint surface defined by hij = 0, reducing the dimensionality of the phys-
ical configuration space by one per spatial point.5 From the linearity of the Schro¨dinger
equation it follows that the vanishing of Ψphys off the surface is consistent with its time
evolution. This result is exactly analogous to what we found in our analysis for the
anisotropic minisuperspace model of section 10.1.
The physical wave functional is therefore necessarily discontinuous in the full (un-
constrained) configuration space. This is nonetheless not in conflict with the action of
the momenta νˆab as derivatives since they act tangential to the constraint surface, just
as their classical generator counterparts and analogous to their nature in the minisuper-
space model. Here one could also change variables (separately at each point in space)
in order to express all operators in terms of tangential derivatives only, as we did above,
although we will not do so here since no further insight is gained.
The momentum-trace constraint 10.47 does not restrict the set of possible physical
states any further since it is identically satisfied by the choice of representation of ˆ˜piab
even in the general case (eq. 10.7).
The momentum operator is Hermitian only when considered to zeroth order (mean-
5Recall that the true number of physical degrees of freedom is, of course, further reduced by the
3-conformal-diffeomorphism invariance.
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ing the first two terms in 10.45), where its form is fully determined by the background.
At this order a momentum representation exists, although note that the representation
of the momentum in the position basis is still not the canonical one. The classical ana-
logue is that the Poisson brackets only contribute to the linear perturbation equations at
zeroth order as discussed above. The Hamiltonian may be made Hermitian by choosing
the symmetric ordering for the mixed term,
F (T )H
(0)
T ·M−2Pl T · 12(hˆij νˆij + νˆijhˆij). (10.48)
The reason Hermiticity cannot be established at all orders is in part that in the deriva-
tion of the Hamiltonian it was assumed that the perturbation variables hab and νab are
sufficiently small for a second-order Hamiltonian to adequately describe the dynamics.
The statement that the momentum or Hamiltonian operators be Hermitian however is,
algebraically speaking, a claim involving the functional integral over all allowed func-
tions hij , including those where individual components may be large. Therefore one
would have to apply finite (and adequately small) limits to the functional integral, or
use an appropriate attenuation functional, representing the notion that physical wave-
functionals must become small for functions hij(x) with large upper bounds. However,
even then one can at best hope to establish Hermiticity approximately. This issue does
not depend on whether or not one restricts the functional integration to the constraint
surface, whereas in the non-perturbative finite-dimensional model developed in sec-
tion 10.1 Hermiticity can be established if one does make that restriction.
In practice one might ignore these issues and consider expression 10.45 to leading
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order only, so that the Hamiltonian is Hermitian and a well-defined probability current
exists. One consequence of this is however that the geometric momentum operator νˆab
is therefore only a quantum observable at leading order. At this order, however, the
quantum theory is well defined. Even at higher order however there is no issue with
the momentum not being an observable as we discussed in the box in section 10.1.
Momentum is only approximately observable.
The quantum theory developed here is consistent and at this stage not obviously
unreasonable. However, a full understanding can only be achieved once a number of
topics have been described within this framework, such as detailed solutions (possibly
through numerical work), the notion of a vacuum state, what kind of quantum effects
might be detectable, and so on. This will comprise a significant amount of work that is
left for future inquiry. Here we instead return to a more fundamental issue and question
whether there are alternatives to the canonical quantisation method.
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PART IV:
QUANTUM COSMOLOGY WITHOUT
THE WAVEFUNCTION
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CHAPTER 11
TRAJECTORY-WEYL QUANTISATION
In this chapter we propose a new quantisation procedure that does not rely on a ‘wave-
function’ and may be specifically suited to the quantisation of cosmological theories.
The approach combines aspects from two different lines of inquiry: the quantisation
based on ensembles of trajectories and quantum mechanics understood as a dynamical
Weyl geometry on configuration space. This chapter closely resembles the contents of
ref. [102].
11.1 Introduction to trajectory-based quantisation
Formulating a consistent theory of quantum gravity requires a modification of either
our classical theory of gravity or our method to arrive at a quantum theory from a clas-
sical theory, or possibly both. In the past chapters we considered almost exclusively the
former, introducing the notion of a physically preferred time and exploring the conse-
quences of doing so. In this final part we finally consider the latter, a modification of
the quantisation process. We reported the contents of this chapter in ref. [102]. The
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schematic developments in chapter 12 have not yet been published in any form.
Among the conceptual troubles of formulating a theory of quantum gravity is, for
example, the interpretation of the wavefunction of the universe, in particular with re-
gards to probabilistic notions. The scheme proposed here does not include any form of
wavefunction. However, the idea presented here is still in its infancy and this final major
part of the present thesis should therefore be understood as a starting point for a future
line of investigation rather than a fully developed proposal for a theory of quantum
gravity. In fact, in this chapter we present the proposed formalism without any refer-
ence to gravity at all and focus almost entirely on the quantisation of non-relativistic
theories with finite-dimensional configuration spaces. In the next chapter we discuss
the application of this scheme to gravity and cosmology, although results are at this
point only schematic. The proper extension of this approach to field theories involves
certain technical complications, which we will address in future work.
The present proposal is based on two recent but entirely independent developments
in the foundations of quantum theory. The first is a number of ‘trajectory-only’ formu-
lations of quantum theory [120, 56, 130, 20, 98, 117, 118], though also see ref. [60],
intended to recover quantum mechanics without reference to a physical wavefunction.
Two related approaches which however lead to an experimentally distinguishable theory
are the real-ensemble formulations of refs. [121, 122]. The other recent development of
importance to us is the insight that the non-classical nature of quantum dynamics may
be understood as a geometrical phenomenon, as has been shown for non-relativistic
particle mechanics [111, 27, 90], relativistic particle mechanics [112, 113] and for the
particle Dirac equation [114, 115, 116]. In this chapter we demonstrate that these two
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ideas form a natural union, and that this union may indeed help to overcome a technical
problem of the trajectory-only approach that has remained largely, though not entirely,
unaddressed.
We will show how quantum theory may be understood as a natural extension of clas-
sical mechanics by allowing the configuration-space geometry to be dynamical. Here
we focus on the non-relativistic theory. In previous approaches to such trajectory-only
formulations quantum mechanics was recovered by postulating a ‘force’ term that was
Newtonian in the sense that it appeared on the right-hand side of ‘mx¨ =’ (but was
not Newtonian in any other sense of the word). In its simplest formulation [120] this
term was chosen to match the quantum potential of Bohm [18, 59] with the substitution
|ψ| → √ρ. That is, the Born probability amplitude |ψ| was replaced by the square root
of the system density ρ in configuration space. This eliminates any reference to a wave
function ψ, which is not part of such a trajectory-only theory. However, it does require
that ρ is a physically real quantity. This means it requires the reality of all dynamically
allowed configuration-space trajectories, making it a theory of many worlds.1
We take a different approach and do not postulate such a force. Instead, we begin
by reconsidering aspects of classical mechanics, constructing an action that leads to
a simultaneous determination of all dynamically possible paths. Mathematically this
is almost trivial given the action for a single trajectory. However, it prepares the next
step, the introduction of a geometrical term in the action. This term is nothing but
the curvature of the configuration space. So the action to be associated with quantum
1Some authors in their presentation have therefore likened aspects of the many-trajectory approach
to Everettian ‘many-world’ theory. We find this more confusing than helpful since the two have very
little in common with the exception of being described as theories of ‘many worlds’, a phrase with rather
distinct meanings in the two theories.
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mechanics will be the sum of two terms: The classical matter action plus a curvature.
Formally it is similar to the Einstein-Hilbert action, although this analogy should not
be taken too literally since the latter concerns the curvature of (3 + 1)-spacetime, not
configuration space.
The action we obtain is effectively that of Santamato [111], but unlike Santamato’s
it does not rely on the minimisation of expectation values. Nonetheless a substantial
part of our derivation is taken from [111]. Our action differs from that of [90] in its
functional form, although it turns out to be numerically equal on shell.
The trajectories we find turn out to be exactly those of de Broglie-Bohm theory
[18, 59, 34] for an ensemble in equilibrium (ρ = |ψ|2).Equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm
theory exactly recovers all experimental predictions of quantum mechanics, and so the
theory presented here does so too. There is, however, a subtlety , which we will address.
The dynamical geometry of the configuration space is a so-called Weyl geometry
[141], of which we will give a brief review in section 11.3. We will find that the ge-
ometry has singularities, namely at points which in conventional quantum mechanics
(or de Broglie-Bohm theory) correspond to nodes in the wavefunction (ψ = 0). This
will lead us to refine our approach: We will move from trajectories in the configuration-
space manifold to a manifold of trajectories. This refinement is crucial to what is to
follow, as well as strongly preferable for philosophical reasons. However, for reasons
of presentational clarity we will only make this change in our perspective once the basic
tenets of our theory are established.
As the final step in our recovery of the phenomenology of quantum mechanics we
address the aforementioned ‘subtlety’, namely the quantised nature of angular momen-
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tum, manifest in the fact that loop integrals of the form
∮
~p · ~dl may be non-zero, yet
only take values 2pi~ ·m, m ∈ Z. In standard de Broglie-Bohm theory this result fol-
lows from the multi-valuedness of the phase of the wavefunction and the fact that the
phase is undefined at nodes. In a naı¨ve trajectory-only theory it is entirely unclear why
such a result should hold, or how the integral could be non-zero at all. This was first
pointed out by Wallstrom [140] in connection with hydrodynamical approaches and has
remained largely unaddressed.2
Coming from the perspective of de Broglie-Bohm, the idea of ‘many de Broglie-
Bohm world’ theory may be considered a precursor to the trajectory-only theory. Here
an infinite ensemble of worlds evolves according to the laws of standard de Broglie-
Bohm theory, guided by an ontological wave function. The notion appeared inadver-
tently as a result of the ‘many-worlds-in-denial’ objection to de Broglie-Bohm theory
[35, 25] and was discussed and criticised by Valentini [135], whose position was sub-
sequently challenged by Brown [24]. Since there is a physical wave function in this
theory, Wallstrom’s problem does not arise. The concept is also discussed by Sebens
[120], who calls the theory ‘prodigal QM’, although he considers it with only a finite
number of trajectories.
Let us now turn to many-trajectory theory proper. It is instructive to outline the
approaches of other authors briefly and review how they have addressed the Wallstrom
objection, before summarising the solution presented in this paper. This short survey
is not intended to be comprehensive or detailed. I am however not aware of any such
survey on the subject in the existing literature (with the exception of ref. [102], of
2Strictly speaking only the first of these questions is the one asked by Wallstrom in [140]. However, I
will use the phrase ‘Wallstrom’s objection’ more broadly and include also the second where applicable.
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course, which contains significant overlap with the present chapter).
The idea of formulating quantum mechanics in terms of the flow of an ensemble
of configuration-space particles is sometimes traced back to ideas of Madelung [78].
However, this is a rather anachronistic reading of Madelung and historically inaccurate
[5]: Madelung imagined the electron as a charged fluid in three-space and he did not
make the leap to configuration space as the arena of the dynamics, nor did he con-
sider individual trajectories within the fluid to have any ontological significance. His
approach is therefore more akin to that of Schro¨dinger than having any resemblance to
the trajectory-based approached with which we are concerned here.
Sebens [120] arrives at the trajectory-only theory by starting from the point of view
of de Broglie-Bohm, introducing an ensemble of ‘worlds’ distributed according to |ψ|2
and then eliminates ψ in favour of the ensemble density. However, he suggests that this
is only a continuum limit of a more fundamental ontology with only a finite (though
large) number of worlds. As such, quantum mechanics is considered to be only ap-
proximately correct, though sufficiently accurate for a difference to be experimentally
undetected at this point. Sebens addresses Wallstrom’s objection by introducing an ap-
propriate quantisation condition, although stating that this is preliminary and that for
now the quantised nature of these loop integrals is an empirically discovered feature of
our universe.
The approach of Hall et al. [56] is similar to that of Sebens, except that they discuss
in more detail the nature of the inter-world interaction in the case of a finite number of
worlds and indeed provide a concrete example for a one-dimensional model. They also
apply the theory to a series of quantum phenomena and use it as a tool to numerically
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approximate ground state wavefunctions. They do not address Wallstrom’s objection
however.
Tipler [130] (but also see his earlier work [129]) begins with classical mechanics
with an infinity of trajectories and then introduces the ‘smoothing potential’ U (equal
to the quantum potential once the function R appearing in the definition of U has been
made) as the unique correction to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation that avoids the cross-
ing of trajectories and thereby ensures the smoothness of Hamilton’s principal function
S and, in his words, prevents ‘god from playing dice’, referring to the ambiguity in
evolution where trajectories would cross in the absence of the smoothing potential. He
likens this addition to Maxwell’s introduction of the displacement current in Ampe`re’s
law. The constant ~ must exist based on dimensional grounds. He also discusses the
recovery of Born probabilities and the uncertainty principle in terms of his theory. How-
ever, despite employing an example involving angular momentum he does not address
Wallstrom’s issue. Indeed, S is a real valued function by construction —the classical
Hamilton principal function— and therefore any non-zero value of angular momentum
remains to be explained.
A critique of Tipler’s proposal can be found in Bostro¨m [20]. Bostro¨m’s approach
shares features with that of Sebens, Hall et al. and Tipler, but he is very careful about
discussing the philosophical and logical foundations required for the construction of
his theory. Somewhat peculiarly though the existence of a wave function is one of
the postulates of his theory, although he makes clear that ‘existence’ here is meant in
a mathematical sense (that is, such a function is definable) and not in some ontologi-
cal sense. This does help his theory to overcome Wallstrom’s objection, although the
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theory may be seen as somewhat unsatisfactory given the reliance on a wave function,
ontological or not. Unlike Sebens and Hall et al., Bostro¨m argues in favour of a contin-
uous infinity of worlds rather than a large but finite number and he briefly discusses the
measure-theoretic foundations for such a picture, in particular in response to criticism
by Vaidman [133].
The approach of Schiff and Poirier [98, 117] is different in that their formulation
does not rely on the introduction of a quantum potential in the usual form. Instead, they
consider higher-order time derivatives of the variables to appear in the expressions for
the Lagrangian and energy of their theory. Certain constraints on their form then allow
the identification of a term that effectively constitutes (at least numerically) the quantum
potential as the simplest option (although at least in the time-dependent case reference
to a density of trajectories in configuration space cannot be avoided). The authors show
how the function S can be recovered as the action integral along a trajectory, but why
this function should indeed be phase-like in its multivaluedness remains unaddressed.
Schmelzer’s [118, 119] construction is somewhat similar to Tipler, Sebens and Hall
et al., although he discusses a number of foundational points not addressed by them
and, crucially, provides a detailed discussion of Wallstrom’s objection together with a
proposal to overcome it. He shows that a regularity postulate for the Laplacian of the
density ∆ρ suffices to restrict the value of the loop integrals
∮
~p · ~dl to take values equal
to±~. The postulate is equivalent to demanding that the nodes of the wave function are
simple zeros. Since other integer values are however possible in standard quantum the-
ory such situations must correspond to the presence of multiple zeros within the loop.
For this to be viable one must consider quantum mechanics to be merely an approxi-
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mation to some underlying ‘subquantum’ theory, whose exact nature is unknown, but
which may be empirically distinguishable, at least in principle. Therefore, while not
proposing an experimentally distinct theory, Schmelzer’s reasoning may nonetheless be
experimentally assessible, although hard to ever rule out since, if standard quantum me-
chanics holds up, one is always able to change the regime (scale) on which differences
are expected to become detectable. Despite this departure from quantum mechanics,
Schmelzer does resolve the Wallstrom objection in his framework. The regularity pos-
tulate itself is justified by another principle concerning the nature of the elusive sub-
quantum theory, which he calls the ‘principle of minimal distortion’, together with a
recognition of the role of ∆ρ in the energy-balance equation associated with the tra-
jectories, although he acknowledges that this specification is ‘speculative in character’
[119] because it concerns the unknown subquantum theory.
Smolin [121, 122] has made two proposals for real-ensemble formulations, mean-
ing formulations of quantum mechanics in terms of ensembles of identical systems in
a single (our) world. As such they do not belong to the family of many-trajectory the-
ories discussed so far. However, Smolin’s theories address Wallstrom‘s objection and
are therefore of interest to our purposes, although we cannot, of course, do his ap-
proaches justice here. His first formulation [121] is based on a stochastic dynamics
governing how systems copy their beables onto those of similar system (in addition to
a further deterministic dynamical law concerning a ‘phase’ associated with each sys-
tem). Wallstrom’s objection is avoided in virtue of the form of the action, in which the
phase variables appear as phases, not their real-valued gradient. There are other issues
with this approach however, notably what the author calls ‘phase alignment’, for which
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a mechanism is suggested but which, in the author’s own words, “is ad hoc and can
probably be improved on”. His second formulation [122] does not rely on a stochas-
tic mechanism but the ‘principle of maximal variety’, which effectively drives systems
towards greater distinctiveness (a term which is given a quantitative definition) with re-
gards to their relation to the rest of the universe. Mathematically this is achieved via
a potential-energy term that is a function of the ensemble properties, in particular the
aforementioned ‘distinctiveness’. In the appropriate limit quantum mechanics can be
recovered, although one can expect experimental deviations from quantum mechanics
for appropriately rare systems, such as macroscopic objects. Motivation for this idea
is found in Leibniz’ Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Smolin addresses Wall-
strom’s issue by introducing unimodular complex beables to take the role of momenta,
rather than real-valued phases. This is a relatively straightforward solution, although it
may be criticised on the basis that it was introduced specifically to solve this problem
and without independent motivation.
Our solution to the Wallstrom’s objection consists of a slight generalisation of our
action, bringing it into the most general form that still retains the same equations of
motion. While this modification is, of course, prompted by the necessity to address
Wallstrom’s objection, we emphasise that the new term is by no means ad hoc. Rather,
it is the most general total derivative that can be consistently added to the Lagrangian
and the addition of the total derivative in the first place is connected to the open-endpoint
variation employed in the construction (see sec. 11.2).
At the end of this chapter we discuss the viability of this quantisation scheme to
field theory and gravity. The detailed implementation thereof is left to future work.
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11.2 Relevant aspects of classical mechanics
In this section we discuss two somewhat unconventional aspects of classical mechanics
that will be relevant when we introduce our action for quantum trajectories below. The
first of these is variation of an action without fixing the end point, apparently leading to
the condition that the momenta pi vanish. However, if the Lagrangian is specified only
up to a total derivative of some unknown function S (this does not change the equations
of motion), then the condition obtained is pi = ∂iS. This use of open-endpoint variation
is due to Santamato [111]. Tipler [130] uses open-endpoint variation in a similar though
not identical manner in his derivation of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. The second
point of discussion is the simultaneous variation of multiple trajectories in configuration
space by summing (or integrating) the actions of each individual system. At first this
remark may appear almost trivial, yet it will present a natural starting point for our
derivation of quantum trajectories later on.
11.2.1 Open-endpoint variation and total derivatives
Let us assume that in our classical theory the trajectories q(t) traced out in a configura-
tion space C may be obtained by extremisation of an action,
I1 =
∫
dt L(q(t), q˙(t), t) (11.1)
where q = {q1, . . . , qn} are the configuration variables and L is the Lagrangian. A dot
denotes differentiation with respect to the time parameter t. In the usual approach one
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fixes the two end points of the trajectory, that is, the configuration of the system at two
times t0 and t1: q0 = q(t0) and q1 = q(t1), where t1 > t0. Since the value of I1 (and L
and the intermediate points q(t)) depends on the choice of end points, we should strictly
write
I1(q0, t0; q1, t1) =
∫ t1
t0
dt L
(
q(q0; q1; t), q˙(q0; q1; t), t
)
. (11.2)
This is usually not done since it is cumbersome notation and the choice of end points
q0 and q1 does not affect the equations of motion. Only the functional form of the
Lagrangian is of significance. Rarely is the numerical value of the action integral of
interest.
The variation δq at t0 and t1 is assumed to vanish, and so there is no boundary
term when performing the partial integrations that lead to the equations of motion. But
consider now the case where we only set δq = 0 at t0, but leave it open at t1.3 We
therefore write
I1(q0, t0; t1) =
∫ t1
t0
dt L
(
q(q0; t), q˙(q0; t), t
)
. (11.3)
In that case variation yields a non-zero boundary term, proportional to the variation at
t1:
δI1(q0, t0; t1) =
∂L
∂q˙i
(
q(t1, q0), q˙(t1, q0), t
) · δqi(t1, q0)
−
t1∫
t0
dt
[
∂
∂t
∂L
∂q˙i
(
q(t, q0), q˙(t, q0), t)
)− ∂L
∂qi
(
q(t, q0), q˙(t, q0), t
)] · δqi(t, q0).
(11.4)
3We could have chosen to leave both open, or only the initial variation. The reasoning that follows
would be similar.
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The variation δq(t1, q0) at the end point is independent of the variation δq(t, q0) at in-
termediate times. The vanishing of the boundary term is not a result of the vanishing
of the integrand along the path. Rather it is the result of the applications of Hamilton’s
principle, demanding that δI1 = 0 for any choice of path and endpoint. As a result
each of the two terms must vanish separately. Hence an extremisation of I1 implies that
the term multiplying δq(t1, q0) must vanish, as does the expression inside the square
brackets. The latter gives the usual Euler-Lagrange equation, while the former implies
that
pi
(
q(t1, q0), q˙(t1, q0), t
) ≡ ∂L
∂q˙i
(
q(t1, q0), q˙(t1, q0), t
)
= 0. (11.5)
The momenta at the end point vanish. In fact, the appearance of such an end-point
constraint is a general feature of variational problems with open boundary conditions
[72, chap. 2]..
In the context of Lagrangian mechanics this condition appears rather undesirable,
as it seems to suggest that ‘ignorance’ of the final position of our system implies that its
momenta must vanish (and if our action principle is be extremised for any choice of t0
and t1 the implication is that the momenta would have to vanish at all times). Nonethe-
less open-endpoint variation has found to be useful in the elimination of unphysical
(gauge) degrees of freedom via a procedure called ‘best-matching’ [8, Sec. 4], which
we briefly discussed in chapter 2. Here we employ the method for another purpose
however.
A slight generalisation of our Lagrangian alleviates any concern we might have
regarding the boundary equation 11.5. It is well known that the equations of motions
are unchanged if a total time derivative of an arbitrary function S(q, t) of the system
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variables and time is added to the Lagrangian:
I¯1(q0, t0; t1) =
∫ t1
t0
dt
[
L
(
q(q0; t), q˙(q0; t), t
)− dS
dt
(
q(q0, t), t
)]
. (11.6)
The relative minus sign is for later convenience. Note that dS
dt
= ∂S
∂t
+ q˙i∂iS. Performing
the variation as before, the boundary equation is now
pi
(
q(t1, q0), q˙(t1, q0), t
)− ∂iS(q(t1, q0), t) = 0, (11.7)
where pi is defined as above (that is, in terms of the original Lagrangian without the
total time derivative). Since this is to hold for any interval [t0, t1], we have in general
that pi = ∂iS. This equation can be seen as determining S up to an arbitrary additive
function of time.4 It only restricts the momenta pi in that these must be the gradient of
some function.
Of course, S turns out to have all the properties of a generator of those canoni-
cal transformations that represent the time evolution of the system. In a more usual
approach we might have introduced it as such. However, here we see that such a
function can also be introduced in the Lagrangian picture as an arbitrary addition to
the Lagrangian that leaves the equations of motion unchanged. For example, using
q˙ipi = q˙
i∂iS =
dS
dt
− ∂S
∂t
, together with H(q,∇S, t) ≡ q˙i∂iS − L(q, q˙, t) allows one to
obtain the usual Hamilton-Jacobi equation for our function S.
Returning briefly to the use of open-endpoint variations in the context of ’best-
4If we really wish to add the most general total derivative to the Lagrangian (which still does not
change the equations of motion, of course), then another subtlety arises regarding the function S. We
will not go into it here though but reserve it for section 11.5, where it will be of relevance.
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matching’, it is worth noting that Barbour’s and his collaborators’ use [8] and ours is
perfectly consistent, provided we demand that the function S depend only on physical
and not on non-physical gauge degrees of freedom. Then the momenta associated with
the non-physical variables vanish, while those associated with physical ones satisfy pi =
∂iS. In fact, we believe this to be a promising line of investigation for the construction
of a fully relational quantum theory from first principles. This might then be extended
to form a natural quantisation scheme of Shape Dynamics (see chapter 2) to produce a
promising candidate for a viable theory of quantum gravity.
11.2.2 Action principles for multiple simultaneous trajectories
The extremisation of I1 (or I¯1) determines dynamically allowed configuration-space
trajectories of a single system, starting at q0 at time t0. In the absence of a fixed end
point, a second boundary condition (such as the initial velocity q˙(t0)) must be given in
order to pick out a single trajectory uniquely.
Suppose now that instead of one such system we have N systems of the same type,
located at positions q0(1), q0(2), . . . at start time t0, with q0(J) = {q10(J), . . . , qn0(J)}, J =
1, . . . , N . The usual thing to do would be to extremise I¯1(q0(J), t0; t1) for each q0(J).
Each time we would get the same equations of motion and only the initial conditions
differ. That is, we have a different action for each system (taking different numerical
values), although all the actions are identical in their functional form. This latter fact is
the reason that in practice we would only derive the equations of motion once and then
merely introduce the boundary conditions when solving them.
However, it is also possible to extremise a single action in order to obtain all N
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trajectories at once (provided sufficiently many boundary conditions are specified). To
do so we use the action
IN(q0(1), . . . , q0(N), t0; t1) =
1
N
N∑
J=1
I1(q0(J)). (11.8)
The factor 1/N is not necessary for finite N but is introduced here for consistency with
what is to follow. The variations δq(t, q0(J)) for each J are independent of one another
and so this action yields N sets of formally identical Euler-Lagrange equations. In
addition we have N sets of boundary equations 11.7, one for each system.
We can generalise this to an infinite number of systems. For a countable infinity we
take the limit,
I∞ = lim
N→∞
IN(q0(J); J ∈ N). (11.9)
Here the factor 1/N is important since otherwise the numerical value of the action
would in general be infinite and thus not extremisable.5 Here we will not consider the
countable case any further.
For a continuous (uncountable) infinity of system we must define a measure µ(q0)
over the configuration space, representing the density of systems at q0 at time t0. Since
µ is defined over the whole configuration space (with µ = 0 in places where there are no
systems), the starting positions q0 take on the role of coordinates. Let us therefore make
the purely notational replacement q0 → x. Instead of the discrete label J = 1, 2, . . . ,
systems are now labelled by the value of their initial position x (or q0). The total action
5Alternatively we could have written down an infinite sum explicitly, but then we must use coefficients
αJ , which converge to zero sufficiently quickly as J → ∞, so that the sum
∑∞
J=1 αJI1(q0(J)) is finite.
However, this would give different ‘weights’ to different systems.
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for this infinite ensemble of systems is now an integral over all starting positions x with
measure µ(x), which we assume to be normalisable. The action is therefore
IEns =
∫
C
dnxµ(x)I1(x, t0; t1)
=
∫
C
dnxµ(x)
∫ t1
t0
dt
[
L
(
q(t, x), q˙(t, x), t
)− dS
dt
(
q(x, t), t
)]
(11.10)
Let us reiterate: x labels the initial position at time t0 and therefore functions as a
coordinate for an ensemble whose distribution in C forms a continuum (or at least may
be approximated by one). The dynamical variable itself is q(t, x), that is, the variables
are labelled by their initial position q(t0, x) = x. The integral of x over the configuration
space C is not an integral of the dynamical variable but of the initial positions. (It would
be nonsensical to integrate over all q and at the same time attempt to arrive at dynamical
laws for q.)
Note that µ(x) is a function over the configuration space describing the ensemble
density at time t0, not over the variables q. This measure turns the integral over configu-
ration space into an integral over all systems in the ensemble. If the ensemble is allowed
to evolve for some time, and then the systems are ‘relabelled’ at some later time t′0 by
their instantaneous positions q(t′0, y) = y, the new density function µ
′(y) will of course
not be identical with the original µ(x).
One may furthermore show using standard results of classical mechanics that the
measure µ obeys a continuity equation,
∂µ
∂t
+ ∂i
(
q˙iµ
)
= 0. (11.11)
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This follows from the fact that the momentum pi is given by the spatial gradient of
a function S, which ensures that trajectories can never cross (or begin or end) and
furthermore are continuous on the configuration space.
We are now in a position to make the step towards the quantum theory.
11.3 Review of Weyl geometry
In this short section we present the main ideas and relevant results of a Weyl geometry.
The primary source (and in our opinion still the best one despite its age) is found in the
mathematical sections of Weyl‘s own work [141].6 Here we will remain brief and only
quote the results relevant to us.
In order to avoid confusion we emphasise that a Weyl geometry is a concept that is
distinct from those of the perhaps more widely known ‘Weyl transformations’, ‘Weyl-
invariant theories’ and so on. The latter concepts are applicable to Riemannian geome-
tries. For example, a Weyl-invariant theory is a theory determined by an action princi-
ple which is invariant under a local rescaling gµν(x) → Ω2(x)gµν(x) (plus matter-field
rescaling depending on their conformal weights) and has found application in some
spacetime theories of gravity and matter.
A Weyl geometry on the other hand is a generalisation of a Riemannian geometry
in the sense that it is concerned with manifolds equipped with a metric gij but also
further geometric degrees of freedom not encoded in the metric. They key difference
to a Riemannian geometry is that ‘length’ is not comparable across finite distances. In
6The sections on physical interpretation in Weyl’s paper are also of extraordinary interest, although it
seems that the (rather beautiful) idea to identify the Weyl one-form with the electromagnetic 4-potential
ultimately fails. See the Einstein-Weyl correspondence following Weyl’s other 1918 paper [77].
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Weyl’s words, it is a ‘pure infinitesimal geometry’. Consider a vector Ak at some point
P in the manifold, and suppose the vector is parallel-transported along some curve C to
a point P ′, where the transported vector is denoted by A′k. In the case of a Riemannian
geometry the direction of the vector is dependent on the connecting curve C. However,
its length is not. The length |A′| = √gijA′iA′j depends only on the local metric gab(P ′).
In this sense length is path-independent and can be compared across finite distances in
a Riemannian manifold.
This is not the case if the geometry is a Weyl geometry. Here the length |A′| of
the transported vector Ak is also path dependent. For reasons described in [141] it is
arguably natural to demand that for an infinitesimal transformation P → P + dP , or in
coordinates xi + dxi, the change in length is linear. That is, for a general length `, we
find
`+ d` = `+ `φkdx
k, (11.12)
where φk is an arbitrary one-form and the full geometric properties of the manifold are
given by the pair (gij, φk). The two sets of variables gij and φk are a priori independent
from one another, so that they may be varied independently in the application of an
action principle, for example.
In general, an infinitesimal transport results in a change in the vector given by δAk =
Γkijdx
iAk, where the coefficients Γkij are a priori arbitrary. However, this definition of
Γkij , together with δ|A|2 = δ(gijAiAj), implies that
Γkij =
1
2
gkl (∂igjl + ∂jgil − ∂lgij) + 1
2
gkl (gliφj + gljφi − gijφl) , (11.13)
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If φk ≡ 0, this expression reduces to the usual Christoffel symbol and the geometry is
Riemannian. That is, the vectors undergo no change in length as they are transported
along a curve.
Curvature is defined exactly as in the Riemannian case as a commutator of covariant-
derivative operators, RijklA
j = ∇l∇kAi − ∇k∇lAi, leading to the usual expression in
terms in the connections Γkij , although their expression 11.13 differ from the Rieman-
nian case. After some algebra we see that the scalar curvature (the one pertinent to our
action) is given by
R = RRiem + (n− 1)(n− 2)φkφk − 2√
g
(n− 1)∂k(√gφk). (11.14)
Also note that the covariant derivative (defined in the usual way) of the metric does not
vanish:
∇kgij = gijφk. (11.15)
This implies that if one chooses coordinates such that locally the metric is gab =
diag(1, 1, . . . ) it is not the case that the connection coefficients Γabc vanish.
7
One can in general consider a joint local transformation of the two geometric de-
grees of freedom, gij → ωgij , φk → φk − ∂k lnω, under which it is reasonable to
demand that a physical theory be invariant, given that such a transformation does not
change the local notion of length and angles, or how to transport them. These gauge
transformation are clearly similar to the notion of ‘Weyl transformations’ in a Rieman-
nian geometry since the metric gij transforms in the same manner, but the latter does not
7Contrast this to General Relativity, where ∇gµν = 0, so that Lorentz frames (where gµν =
diag(−1, 1, . . . ) locally) are inertial frames (where Γαµν = 0) and vice versa (see [86])
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have the separate notion of φk, that is, path-dependent transport properties of length.
Accordingly, one can make a gauge choice by choosing ω(x) with some given initial
values gij and φk. In particular, if the Weyl geometry is integrable, meaning φk is
the gradient of a scalar function, then it is possible to choose ω such that after the
transformation φk = 0 and the geometry is Riemannian. If on the other hand the metric
can be expressed gij(x) = λ(x)g¯ij everywhere with g¯ij constant, then one can choose a
gauge such that gij is spatially constant and only φk has spatial dependence, so that the
curvature is only a function of φk. This latter scenario will be the case relevant to us
below.
For our considerations below we do not consider the Riemannian part of the ge-
ometry, that is, the part determined by the metric gij , to have any dynamical meaning.
Ultimately the metric geometry of the configuration space may find some application
but at this preliminary stage we contend with illustrating that the Weylian part (deter-
mined by φk) of the configuration-space geometry can be understood to encode the
difference between classical and quantum dynamics. In [111] Santamato chose a sim-
ilar route. He chose to include explicit reference to the metric gij “[o]nly for the sake
of generality, as well as in view of further extension to spinning particles” [p. 216]. For
the sake of algebraic simplicity we will not include reference to gij in this work and
leave a generalisation and extension entirely to future inquiry.
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11.4 Quantum trajectories from an action principle
In this section we allow the geometry of the configuration space to become dynamical.
To this end, we treat the Weyl one-form φk as a dynamical variable and add to the
classical ensemble action IEns a curvature term with an appropriately chosen constant
of a form closely resembling conformal coupling. Extremising this action we obtain
the equation of motion for q (now with an extra non-classical term stemming from
the curvature term), the continuity equation (from variation of the function S) and the
relationship between the geometry and the measure µ. We show how these equations
reproduce quantum behaviour, up to a subtlety that we will address in section 11.5.
11.4.1 Preliminary remarks
In our discussion in section 11.2 the density µ(x) did not play any dynamical role
since in the extremisation of the ensemble action IEns the total minimum was found as
the weighted sum of the minima of each trajectory. That is, the minimisation of one
trajectory was independent from the minimisation of any other. We will now introduce
a term that effectively constitutes an interaction between trajectories. More precisely,
we add the curvature of the configuration space to our Lagrangian (with a suitably
chosen coupling constant that essentially turns out to correspond to ~2 up to a numerical
factor resembling a conformal coupling). This curvature is that of a Weyl geometry
(see section 11.3 and [141]) and its Weyl one-form φk is considered to be a dynamical
variable. The role of the ‘Riemannian’ part of the curvature (due to the metric gij) is
yet to be investigated. Here it is of secondary importance and gij is not considered
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dynamical for our current purposes.
Much of the mathematical structure appearing in this construction is again due to
Santamato [111] and our notation is close to (though not identical with) his. However,
Santamato’s approach is founded on the stochastic approach of Nelson and Madelung,
not a many-trajectories theory. Santamato’s quantum action also involves the minimisa-
tion of an expectation value, which one might find ontologically questionable.8 In our
case, the minimisation principle remains unchanged from the classical minimisation of
IEns. Merely an interaction term is added in the form of the curvature term. This curva-
ture term constitutes an interaction between ‘neighbouring’ trajectories since it contains
configuration-spatial derivatives.
Note that our (and equivalently Santamato’s) action is numerically identical to the
action used in [90] after use of dS
dt
= ∂S
∂t
+ q˙i ∂S
∂qi
, pi = ∂S∂qi and H = q˙
ipi − L. However,
we consider our action to be a more natural starting point as a natural extension of
the classical action. The approach of [90] also differs in three other regards: Firstly,
the authors are committed to consider a geometry on space rather than configuration
space and their approach therefore only applies to a single particle (although without
this commitment their formalism easily generalises). Secondly, the variation of their
curvature term is done in the style of Palatini, that is, by considering the connection
Γabc as independent variables. Here on the other hand we will vary the curvature R
as a function of the Riemannian metric gij and Weyl one-form φk, although this latter
difference is primarily aesthetic. The final difference is that they presuppose the Weyl
geometry to be integrable, whereas in our formalism (just as in Santamato’s) this is a
8How can we make sense of the concept prior to having a theory of measurement and without the
notion of quantum states, for example?
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result that follows from the equations of motion.
11.4.2 The quantum action and its variation
We now append the classical Lagrangian by a curvature term γ(n)λ2R[g, φ], where λ is
a coupling constant that is ultimately fixed by observation. The term γ(n) = 1
8
n−2
n−1 is a
numerical constant dependent on the dimensionality of the configuration space, chosen
for later convenience.9 That is, the action for the Trajectory-Weyl theory (TWT) is
ITWT =
∫
C
dnx
√
gµ(x)
t1∫
t0
dt
(
Lclass(q, q˙, t)−dS
dt
(q, t)+γ(n)λ2R[gij(q, t), φi(q, t)]
)
,
(11.16)
where
R[gij(q, t), φi(q, t)] ≡ RRiem[gij] + (n− 1)
[
(n− 2)φiφi − 2√
g
∂i
(√
gφi
)]
(11.17)
as obtained above. Note that we have included
√
g in the volume element inside the
integral since we allow for a general metric gij . The dependence of the variables on the
initial position x has been suppressed.
In what follows, we assume for simplicity that the configuration-space C is flat in
the Riemannian sense (RRiem = 0) and the
√
g is merely determined by coordinates.
For the purposes of illustration one may choose the coordinates to be Cartesian, so that
√
g = 1. This fixes the Weyl gauge in the manner described at the end of section
11.3. The only geometric degree of freedom is φk, which, we emphasise, is a variable
9Note that this expression for γ is introduced with the knowledge of hindsight. Without this hindsight,
we might have absorbed any such constant into λ2.
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independent of gij .
We take note though that in classical mechanics C may have a non-zero RRiem for
systems with certain types of constraints which lead to a reduced configuration space
(a (n − l)-dimensional surface with non-vanishing curvature within the n-dimensional
configuration space, where l is the number of independent constraints). Whether or
not the ‘quantisation’ method proposed here could (or should) be applied to a classical
reduced configuration space in the presence of constraints is to be investigated in the
future.
The similarity of 11.16 with the Einstein-Hilbert action is obvious and may in part
be the superficial appeal of this approach. However, the analogy is minimal. Our action
is defined in configuration space, not physical space(-time). Furthermore, because we
do not worry about tensorial properties relating to a theory’s general covariance (as
one would in general relativity with matter fields) but use fixed coordinates we do not
have to generalise the derivative operators in the Lagrangian to covariant derivatives.
Covariant generalisations are left to future work.
Let us for the sake of specificality consider the classical starting point to be an N -
particle system in three dimensions (n = 3N ) with particle masses mI , I = 1, . . . N .
The masses can be absorbed in the metric gij on C in the usual way. For example for two
particles of masses m1 and m2, we would take gij = diag(m1,m1,m1,m2,m2,m2)
(in Cartesian coordinates), enabling us to write terms in the form
∑
I
1
2
m1~˙qI · ~˙qI =
1
2
gij q˙
iq˙j = 1
2
q˙iq˙i and
∑
i
1
2mI
~pI · ~pI = 12gijpipj = 12pipj , and so on, being careful to
keep track of the natural index position for the dynamical quantities. See [72] or any
other book on analytic mechanics for further details. Hence there is no need to include
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explicit mass terms in what follows.
Variation of q: The law of motion Since R has only dependence on q and not q˙, the
boundary equation is unchanged, pi = ∂iS, and the Euler-Lagrange equation simply
acquires an extra term γλ2 ∂R
∂qi
:
0 =
d
dt
∂Lclass
∂q˙i
(
q(t, x), q˙(t, x), t
)− ∂Lclass
∂qi
(
q(t, x), q˙(t, x), t
)
− γλ2∂R
∂qi
[
gij(q(t, x), t), φi(q(t, x), t)
]
(11.18)
The new term will ultimately be interpretable as a ‘quantum potential’ Q that matches
Bohm’s, as we will see. The equation then takes the form of the classical equation of
motion with Q appearing in the role of a new potential term, at least formally.
Variation of φ: Relationship between φ and µ We note that only the new term
carries dependence on the Weyl one-form φ. Hence we wish to minimise
IR = (n+ 1)
∫
C
dnx
√
gµ
[
(n− 2)φiφi − 2√
g
∂i(
√
gφi)
]
= (n+ 1)
∫
C
dnx
[
µ
√
g(n− 2)φiφi +√gφi · 2∂iµ
]
. (11.19)
where we have partially integrated in order to arrive at the last line. The boundary
term drops out since µ is normalisable and therefore vanishing at infinity. For better
readability arguments have been suppressed.
Following [111], a little algebra reveals that the term to be extremised can be written
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as
IR = −n− 1
n− 2
∫
C
dnq µ
√
ggij∂i(lnµ)∂j(lnµ)
+
n− 1
n− 2
∫
c
µ
√
ggij
(
(n− 2)φi + ∂i(lnµ)
)(
(n− 2)φj + ∂j(lnµ)
)
. (11.20)
This brings IR into a form that is independent of derivatives of φi. Furthermore, the
first term contains no dependence on φi and can therefore be ignored for the purposes
of extremisation.
The extremisation is easy since the integrand is positive definite (with
√
g and µ
being positive definite and the rest being of the square form gijWiWj with Wi = (n −
2)φi + ∂i(lnµ)). Hence the the minimum must be bounded from below by zero and
indeed it is clear that this minimum is obtained by
φi = − 1
n− 2∂i(lnµ). (11.21)
This shows that the Weyl geometry is integrable, that is, there is a scalar function f
on C such that φi = ∂if . Hence a local scale may be defined on C and the final length
of a vector transported between two points in C is path-independent. As we stated an
integrable Weyl geometry allows a gauge choice such that φi = 0 (that is, f = const.)
everywhere. However, in our case we already fixed the gauge such that the Riemannian
metric gij is constant.
The continuity equation The continuity equation may be obtained in the same man-
ner as for the classical case, using the fact that the momentum is given by a spatial
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derivatives at all times as a result of the boundary equation 11.7. The presence of the
curvature term has no impact. It takes the form
∂µ
∂t
+ ∂i
(
µq˙i
)
= 0. (11.22)
Had we not fixed the coordinates to be Cartesian, then the equation would include
additional factors of
√
g [see 111],
∂
∂t
(
√
gµ) + ∂i
(√
gµq˙i
)
= 0, (11.23)
The appearance of
√
g with µ corresponds to the fact that µ is a scalar density of weight
one.
From the meaning of µ, introduced in the process of taking the continuum limit for
a configuration-space ensemble, we should have expected such a continuity equation
to hold. It confirms that µ may be interpreted as a density. This equation furthermore
shows that µ is conserved along a trajectory.
11.4.3 Equivalence with equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm theory
Substituting the solution 11.21 into the expression 11.17 for the curvature, we find that
(by simple algebra, and using γ = 1
8
n−2
n−1 )
R = RRiem +
n− 1
n− 2
[
∂i(lnµ)g
ij∂j(lnµ) +
2√
g
∂i
(√
ggij∂j(lnµ)
)]
= RRiem +
1
2γ
√
µ
∂i
(√
ggij∂j
√
µ
)
. (11.24)
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With this, the Hamilton-Jacobi equation derived from the Lagrangian L− dS
dt
+γλ2R
becomes
0 =
∂S
∂t
+H(q,∇S, t)
=
∂S
∂t
+Hclass(q,∇S, t)− γλ2RRiem − λ
2
2
∂i(
√
ggij∂j
√
µ)√
µ
, (11.25)
where we used the fact that the momentum conjugate to φi vanishes identically since φ˙i
does not appear in the expression for R.
The reader familiar with de Broglie-Bohm theory in Bohm’s second-order formu-
lation will recognise the last term on the right as the quantum potential (at least for a
broad class of particle systems), provided λ2 = ~2 (which ultimately is just the exper-
imental discovery of the value of a constant, or, viewed differently, the discovery of a
property of the system of units used) and that µ, the configuration-space measure, can
be interpreted as the equilibrium density |Ψ|2. But the measure µ was introduced as
describing the local (in C) density of systems of our ensemble in the continuum limit
and so this is indeed the natural interpretation.
In order to obtain the evolution of the ensemble as a whole, eq. 11.25 must now be
solved simultaneously with the continuity equation (eq. 11.22) for µ and S, which in
practice would be done by combining them into the complex field ψ =
√
µeiS/~ on C.
Solving for a single trajectory alone is not possible, since R contains reference to µ,
which is determined by the collection of all trajectories.
The equations 11.25 and 11.22 match, of course, the usual quantum Hamilton-
Jacobi and continuity equations known from equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm theory, with
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the difference that no reference to any wavefunction ψ is made and the ‘quantum poten-
tial’ contains
√
µ instead of |ψ|, with the consequence that there is no state of quantum
non-equilibrium.10
Note that de Broglie’s first-order dynamics11 also emerges from this formalism (at
least for certain Lagrangians), namely as the condition pi = ∂iS derived from the
boundary equation resulting from the open-endpoint variation.
Thus the equations derived here are equivalent with those of de Broglie-Bohm the-
ory. It appears that therefore the predictions of quantum mechanics have also been
recovered. However, this conclusion would be incorrect, as we will discuss in the next
section.
11.5 Nodes and the phase-like nature of S
In this section we discuss the inequivalence between the present theory as it stands
and de Broglie-Bohm quantum mechanics. The issue is related to the respective single
versus multi-valuedness of S. However, we show how the phase-like behaviour of S can
be recovered in our theory using a further generalisation of our Lagrangian. To do so,
we first discuss the concept and nature of ‘nodes’ in our theory and their relationship
to the geometry. This requires a shift in our perspective: from a configuration-space
manifold with trajectories to a manifold of trajectories.
10The term ’non-equilibrium’ here is meant in the sense of de Broglie-Bohm, that is, a state where
ρ 6= |ψ|2. This is impossible here since ψ is not an ontological entity in its own right but only definable
in terms of ρ and S (up to an unphysical overall phase factor). Contrast this to ‘many-de Broglie-Bohm
worlds’ theory [120, 135], where such ρ and |ψ| are a priori independent of one another.
11The distinction between the theories of de Broglie and Bohm is often overlooked. The equilibrium
state of de Broglie’s dynamics is stable (an ensemble in quantum non-equilibrium, ρ 6= |ψ|2, will ap-
proach equilibrium), while in Bohm’s theory there is a a more general form of non-equilibrium (where
de Broglie’s relation ~p = ∇S is violated), which is unstable [29].
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11.5.1 Wallstrom’s criticism
The problem with the above theory, and indeed any many-trajectories theory with or
without a geometric foundation [120, 56, 117] is that the space of solutions of such a
theory is smaller than that of de Broglie-Bohm quantum mechanics.12 While on a small
local patch in configuration space the equations have the same solutions, a difference
in the possible global properties of the solutions arises. To our knowledge this was first
noted by Wallstrom [140] in the context of the Madelung hydrodynamic approach.
The function S, when introduced as the phase of the (physically real) wavefunction
ψ = |ψ|eiS/~, is multi-valued, S ∼ S + m · 2pi~, m ∈ Z. Furthermore, S is undefined
at nodes of the wavefunction (points where ψ = 0). These two facts together imply that
there may be ‘states’ (functions ψ) such that a closed loop L may be found such that
∮
L
∂iS dl
i 6= 0, (11.26)
where dl is a line element in the configuration space. Specifically this is possible if and
only if L is non-contractible, in the sense that it is impossible to deform L continuously
into a point without passing through a node. Such loops exist in the presence of (n−2)-
dimensional nodes (points in two dimension, lines in three dimensions, etc.).
Contrast this to the case where S is introduced as a scalar function on C [such as
in ref. 116]. Here S is defined even where µ = 0 and is a real field on C, so that the
integral 11.26 vanishes for any loop.
12Alternatively a many-trajectories theory may be constructed using the velocities or momenta them-
selves as the variables and not making reference to a function S. In this case the space of solutions is not
smaller than that of de Broglie-Bohm but instead larger since angular momenta can take continuous val-
ues. Hence there are two versions of Wallstrom’s criticism applicable to different sorts of formulations.
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Solutions to the Schro¨dinger equation that display this non-integrability of ∂iS arise,
for example, in the case of stationary states of hydrogen-like atoms with non-zero an-
gular momentum. It follows that the present theory and other, similar many-trajectories
theories do not allow for non-zero angular momentum states and therefore do not match
the predictions of quantum mechanics.
Wallstrom’s criticism has remained largely unaddressed by authors proposing many-
trajectory theories, as we discussed in the short survey above. The solution we will
construct here is superficially similar to Smolin’s [122], who introduces a unimodular
complex variable w (a ‘complex factor beable’) in place of the momentum. However, in
our case the goal will be achieved via a generalisation of the total derivative appearing
in the Lagrangian, not by revising the mathematical representation of momenta.
11.5.2 Nodes
The necessity of having nodes present in cases where this mismatch between our ‘trajec-
tory-Weyl theory’ (TWT) and quantum mechanics arises leads us to investigate the
nature of nodes in the former. The term ‘node’ in TWT is, of course, not a good choice
of terminology given that no waves are involved. However, it is clear what is meant: A
point P in C is a node if µ(P ) = 0. In de Broglie-Bohm theory this does not necessarily
imply that there is no trajectory that passes through the node. Whether a consistent
law of motion exists for this system depends on whether the phase function S(q) or at
least the velocity field can be analytically extended through the node. This is trivial if
the wave function is real (e.g. the n = 2, ` = 1, m = 0 state of hydrogen), in which
case the particle placed at the node remains at the node. On the other hand, the n = 2,
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` = 1, m = 1 state does not allow for such an analytic extension. There can be no
continuous velocity field that includes the node and no trajectory can exist there within
the framework of the theory. More generally, a trajectory exists (in a mathematical
sense) at the node if and only if the loop integrals
∮
L
∂iS dl
i around the node vanish.
Whether or not this extra ‘world’ exists in an ontological sense is however irrelevant
for the dynamics of all other ‘worlds’ in the case of ‘many-de Broglie-Bohm-worlds’
theory. Furthermore, adding a single trajectory does not change the local system density.
Above we obtained the result φi = − 1n−2∂i(lnµ) (eq. 11.21). At a node, where
µ = 0, this becomes undefined. That is, the mathematical notion of vector transport
and the idea of ‘scale’ fails to make sense at nodes. So nodes correspond to a certain
kind of geometric singularity.
Let us examine the behaviour of the Weyl form φi in the immediate vicinity of a
node. Suppose µ ∼ r2m as we approach the node, where r is the distance from the
node and m is some (not necessarily integer) positive power. The factor of two in the
exponent is for later convenience.
Approaching the node radially, that is, moving in the negative-r direction, we see
that
φ−r = − 2
n− 2
∂
∂(−r) ln r
2m =
2m
n− 2
1
r
, (11.27)
which shows that the length of a vector being transported radially towards the node by
a small distance δr grows by a factor proportional to r−1. Since the Weyl geometry is
integrable, we can also look at the length of a vector itself, which goes as
` ∼ − ln r, (11.28)
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and so `→∞ as r → 0.
11.5.3 From a manifold with trajectories to a manifold of trajecto-
ries
It is now time for a shift in our thinking. We began by considering systems moving in
the configuration-space manifold C with time, forming trajectories in the ‘configuration-
space-time’ (C ⊗ time, sometimes called the ‘extended configuration space’ [72]). How-
ever, the dynamics of the theory imply that geometric properties are undefined at certain
points in C, namely those points not occupied by a system. This suggests that instead of
considering systems particles (or ‘corpuscles’, or ‘worlds’) moving in a manifold, we
should consider the manifold of all system particles (or of all trajectories if we think
of it in a configuration-space-time picture), which we shall call T . The configuration
space merely becomes a way to label systems within our continuously infinite ensemble,
namely by using the physical properties (the value of the variables qi). In the presence
of nodes, T is not simply connected.
The view taken is therefore the following. The physical world in its entirety con-
sists of an infinite collection of similar systems (described by the same set of variables,
that is, corresponding to points in the same configuration space) whose properties are
specified in the form of n variables qi. These variables determine the continuity proper-
ties of the collection, thereby forming an n-dimensional manifold T . Since the number
density of systems is not uniform across the qi, this manifold, in general, has non-zero
curvature. The manifold T may be embedded in a configuration space C of the same
dimension via a Weyl geometry, on which points are labelled by the qi. Continuous
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subsets of C with a dimension smaller than n might not have an inverse image (are not
mapped to in the embedding) and form nodes, illustrating that the original manifold
might not be simply connected. In practice, we work in C, labelling systems by qi and
tracking their local number density via the function µ : C → R≥0.
The function S introduced in the action as an arbitrary function is defined on T , not
C. Following the embedding in C it is therefore natural that S is not defined at nodes,
since these are exactly those points that are not in the image of T . Of course, by itself
this does not answer Wallstrom’s criticism. While the presence of nodes is necessary for
a mismatch between naı¨ve TWT and quantum mechanics to occur, it is not sufficient.
In quantum mechanics S is multi-valued and the presence of nodes merely allows one
to find closed paths changing S continuously from one value at a point to another at the
same point.
Before coming to the second part of our solution to Wallstrom’s problem, return
briefly to the question of the existence of trajectories at nodes. In TWT, unlike in
‘many-de Broglie-Bohm worlds’ theory, the manifold of system particles is considered
fundamental. This manifold may or may not have a non-trivial topology, and what func-
tions S (or ‘U +W ’ as introduced in the next section) are possible is contingent on that
topology. One result of this is that a scenario in which there is a node in the wave func-
tion (as described by the standard theory) through which S can be analytically extended
may or may not correspond to a simply connected topology for T . But whether or not
there is a system particle at the node matters—unlike in the case of ‘many-de Broglie-
Bohm worlds’—since it changes the topology of the manifold and therefore the global
properties of functions definable on it.
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11.5.4 The most general time derivative dS/dt
We now discuss a possible solution to Wallstrom’s problem. We consider the most
general total time-derivative dS/dt that can be added to the Lagrangian. This is, in fact,
the sum of two time derivatives, one of which takes values on R as usual, the other one
is a derivative of a function that takes values from the closed one-dimensional manifold
S1, not R.
In order to see this, let us take a step back and consider how S was introduced.
We added an arbitrary total derivative dS
dt
to the action. The only requirement was that
dS
dt
∈ R. This requirement may seem almost not worth stating since it is generally
assumed that terms in the action take values over R or sometimes C. However, the
implication of dS
dt
∈ R is not that S itself must take values on R. Instead we could
define S : T → S1, that is, let S map from T (or equivalently C \ {nodes}) to the
closed one-dimensional manifold, the ‘circle’ S1. The spaces S1 and R share the same
tangent space R. Furthermore, they are the only spaces that do so and our Lagrangian
will therefore indeed be the most general.
It turns out that the resultant function ‘S’ has the required properties to resolve
Wallstrom’s problem. A critic might be inclined to say that we ‘cheated’ by giving S
the required phase-like property by fiat. Yet without wishing to discuss the philosoph-
ical issues too deeply, this is no different than any other introduction of mathematical
objects in quantitative physics. The choice of what particular type of object should
represent some proposed physical entity is founded on the properties that entity is sup-
posed to have, inferred from observed phenomena and, arguably, certain theoretical
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guiding principles (such as generality, simplicity, symmetries, etc.). For example, in
standard quantum mechanics we invent a mathematical object called the ‘wavefunc-
tion’ that takes values from C on configuration space (or, more abstractly, some Hilbert
space whose physical meaning is more obscure). Similarly, we have chosen the correct
mathematical structure to address Wallstrom’s objection and match the predictions of
the theory to empirical facts.
We could justify the step of adding to the action a total time-derivative of a function
S : T → S1 rather than one mapping to R by its ultimate observational success (such as
in measurements of atomic angular momentum). However, since the requirement dS
dt
∈
R gives two options, S : T → R and S : T → S1, and neither changes the equations
of motion, a priori we should add both terms in order to achieve maximal generality.
The added term is therefore not an ad-hoc addition, but a natural generalisation. Let us
therefore introduce a function U : T → R, while the symbol W will be used for the
function W : T → S1. These take the place of the symbol ’S’. Our action becomes
I?TWT =
∫ t1
t0
dt
∫
C
dnx
√
gµ(x)
(
Lclass(q, q˙, t) + γ(n)λ
2R[gij(q, t), φi(q, t)]
− dU
dt
(q, t)− dW
dt
(q, t)
)
.
(11.29)
The equation of motion (11.18) remains unchanged, as does the result for the Weyl
geometry (11.21). The one difference is in the boundary equation, which now reads
pi = ∂iW + ∂iU. (11.30)
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All the previous derivations to recover de Broglie-Bohm trajectories hold provided we
replace S by ‘W+U ’. The expression is in quotation marks since addition is not defined
for two functions taking values in different spaces, even if both are one-dimensional,
and is therefore not to be interpreted as literal addition. However, S = ‘U + W ′ never
occurs itself, only its derivatives do and among them addition is well-defined (since
they all take values in R).
Now since U is a globally defined real field, we have
∮
L
∂iU · dli = 0 (11.31)
for any closed loop, so there is no contribution from U to closed-loop integrals of ∇S.
Meanwhile, ∮
L
∂iW · dli = z · h, z ∈ Z, (11.32)
where h is defined to be the value obtained when the image of the loop L under W
winds around the manifold S1 exactly once. The numerical value of h depends on
how the manifold S1 is parametrised (how it is represented in terms of real numbers,
ultimately a choice of units). The value of h is the same for all nodes in the manifold.
The constant h can be thought of as the ‘circumference’ of S1 if we visualise the
manifold as a circle embedded in R2. It functions as a ‘constant of conversion’ between
lengths on S1 and on R. For dimensional reasons it takes units of angular momentum if
dimensionful variables are used. What is left to be addressed is the relationship between
the associated radius, ~ = h/2pi, and the geometric ‘coupling constant’ λ.
The proportionality of the geometric coupling constant γλ2 follows from dimen-
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sional analysis. The functions U and W must have the same dimension as the action,
length squared over time (L2T−1). The only fundamental scale in the theory is the ‘ra-
dius’ ~, which therefore must also have dimensions L2T−1. But the dimensions of the
curvature R are L−2, so γλ2 must have the dimensions of ~2, allowing us to set λ = ~,
leaving only the numerical constant γ.
The constant ~ is the one fundamental scale provided by the theory. It is remark-
able that this one fundamental scale is, in fact, sufficient to compare all terms in the
Lagrangian (that is, to let them have the same dimensionality). It is even possible to go
one step further and demand that the action be dimensionless. This can be achieved by
rescaling ITWT by a factor ~−1. In this case U and W are dimensionless, too, and the
closed manifold onto which W maps is simply parametrised by angular values.
So only the numerical value of γ is left to be discussed. The value 1
8
n−2
n−1 was, of
course, chosen with the hindsight of experimental outcomes (matching those of quan-
tum mechanics). However, it is itself distinguished: Its n-dependence is the unique
choice such that the resultant equations of motion do not explicitly depend on n. Only
the geometric properties of the manifold do (eq. 11.21). The coupling constant resem-
bles a ‘conformal coupling‘ as familiar from field theory in Riemannian geometries.
11.6 Discussion of trajectory-Weyl quantisation
In this chapter we showed how the phenomenology of non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics may be recovered starting with an ‘ensemble’ of systems continuously distributed
in configuration space. Thus our theory is one of many worlds, though very much dis-
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tinct from the notion of ‘world’ in (Everettian) ‘Many-Worlds’ Theory. By including
a curvature term in the action the trajectories turned out to match those of equilibrium
de Broglie-Bohm theory. Our construction was closely modelled along that of [111],
although our starting point was different. Nor is the idea of recovering quantum dynam-
ics via an infinite ensemble of systems, covering all possible configurations, completely
new, although it is a relatively recent development.
Our purpose here was to show that the two ideas, a dynamical Weyl geometry to-
gether with a ‘many-trajectory’ theory, form a natural union. In order to emphasise this
point we showed how Wallstrom’s objection, a key problem with ‘quantum’ theories
not based on a wavefunction, can be overcome via a generalisation of the total time
derivative in the Lagrangian.
In our procedure we demoted the configuration space to a purely mathematical con-
cept, with the physical reality corresponding to a manifold of configuration-space par-
ticles (or ‘worlds’), or — in a configuration-space-time picture — of trajectories. Other
than the fact that this manifold, unlike the configuration space, has topological proper-
ties that allow the existence of non-contractible loops and thereby forms the first step
in our solution to Wallstrom’s objection, it may also be philosophically preferable: In
standard quantum mechanics the wavefunction is defined on configuration space and it
is unclear what this space is without appeal to some previous classical theory with a
certain set of dynamical variables. In contrast, the present trajectory-Weyl theory has
no such ambiguous ontology. Functions such as S (or U and W ) are defined on the
set of all worlds, each of which is physically concrete. If the manifold allows for non-
contractible loops then the S1-valued function W may yield non-zero quantised values
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for the integral
∮
∂iW ·dli. The appearance ofW in the generalisation of the Lagrangian
thus completes the solution to Wallstrom’s objection.
The development of this wavefunction-free method of arriving at a quantum the-
ory from a classical theory was motivated by the failure of the canonical quantisation
scheme in gravity, and from conceptual issues with interpreting the wavefunction of the
universe, for example. Our motivation has therefore been entirely negative, namely the
failure of another quantisation scheme. There is another positive, philosophical reason
however for this kind of quantisation. In fact, even in the absence of any empirical
evidence for quantum effects a philosopher might propose a scheme similar to ours
because of conceptual trouble with the classical theory.
Consider a philosopher and scientist at the end of the late nineteenth century. Look-
ing at the known laws of physics, he13 realised that two pieces of information are re-
quired for a physical description of the universe: its laws (in the form of equations)
and boundary conditions (selecting the actually instantiated solution). Leaving aside
the possibly deeper questions of why the laws are what they are, he wonders not only
why nature chose some particular boundary conditions rather than another, but also why
one set of boundary conditions must be selected — that is, somehow ontologically pre-
ferred — in the first place. He finds the demand of classical physics to arbitrarily choose
a single solution from the set of all solutions of the laws of nature unacceptable. That
is, he dislikes the categorisation of worlds into impossible worlds (those not satisfying
the laws of nature), possible but non-actual worlds (solutions to the laws of nature that
differ from the actual world), and possible actual worlds (the one world we live in).
13Gender inequality at the time implies that chances are this scholar would likely have been male.
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Suppose, he says, there is no distinction between actual and non-actual possible
worlds. All initial conditions are equally real.14 We would be unable to observe worlds
other than our own (or they would be part of our world by definition), so there is no
empirical reason either for or against their reality. His intellectual adversaries bring
up the principle of parsimony (‘Ockham’s razor’) but he replies confidently that par-
simony was exactly the reason to abandon the superfluous notion of ‘possible but not
actual’ worlds. However, he soon realises that an implication of classical mechanics un-
derstood in this sense is that individual world trajectories cross and that configuration-
space position alone does not uniquely identify a world (one has to include velocities,
or momenta). Dissatisfied by this underdetermination he formalises this problem math-
ematically in the Hamilton-Jacobi description and adds the demand that the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation be C2 (doubly differentiable) everywhere as this would fix the problem.
Imposing this constraint, he arrives at trajectory-based quantisation.
The development from Hamilton-Jacobi theory to quantum trajectories in this man-
ner was, in fact, proposed by Tipler [130], as we discussed. The preceding philosophical
argument has to my knowledge not been made in this exact form, though it is closely
tied to the reasoning of Lewis [76] and others on the reality of all possible worlds (see
footnote 14).
While the reasoning is somewhat tentative and may need to be spelled out more rig-
orously, it does in any case serve as an example of how purely philosophical reasoning
14 The philosophical position proposed here is somewhat similar to modal realism (most prominently
held by David Lewis [76]), which states that all possible worlds are equally real. There ‘possible’ means
not logically inconsistent (while worlds with laws of physics different from ours are considered ‘pos-
sible’). The view of our fictional polymath here is more restricted in that ‘possible’ is understood as
‘possible given that the laws of physics are just as they are in our world.’ We will return to this discussion
briefly in the conclusion (chapter 13).
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— so often dismissed by physicists — can lead to empirically adequate theories. Of
course, if physicists were to adopt this reasoning, it would undoubtedly no longer be
considered ‘philosophical’.15
The scientific test of the theory is, of course, another. Can this quantisation scheme
provide a path toward an adequate theory of quantum gravity?
15Coincidentally, the fact that once a particular line of philosophical reasoning has consequences for
a physical theory it becomes adopted by physicists and loses its status of being ‘philosophical’, and that
as a result philosophers are considered by some to never contribute anything useful to physics, has been
pointed out in a popular article by Hossenfelder [61].
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CHAPTER 12
QUANTUM COSMOLOGY FROM TRAJECTORY-
WEYL QUANTISATION?
In this chapter we sketch the application of the wavefunction-free quantisation scheme
developed in the last chapter to gravity. Detailed technical developments are left for
future work.
12.1 Extension of the trajectory-Weyl approach
The developments of the last chapter have provided us with a fundamentally new method
of arriving at a quantum theory from a classical theory. For a finite-dimensional par-
ticle system with the usual action we have exactly recovered the empirical predictions
of equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm theory and hence standard operational quantum me-
chanics. It is however not guaranteed that this equivalence should hold for any type
of system, in particular, for systems with classical equations that have a fundamentally
different form, such as those resulting from Hamiltonian reduction. In the case of quan-
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tum gravity and cosmology it is not even clear what the ‘standard’ approach is (there is
none). The phenomenological equivalence with canonical quantisation for conventional
actions is, in a sense, coincidental.1
The geometric approach (without a trajectory ontology) has been extended to rel-
ativistic particle quantum mechanics [112, 113] (in the sense of a non-field-theoretic
picture, where the Klein-Gordon equation is considered to hold for a wavefunction,
not for a classical field) and the particle Dirac equation [114, 116], starting from the
configuration space of a classical rigid body (although without attention to Wallstrom’s
criticism). The trajectory ontology could however be incorporated into their method.
Extension to field theory proper is technically more difficult. The primary reason is that
the field-theoretic configuration space (the space of all allowed functions φ(x) in scalar
field theory, for example, or (conformal) superspace in the case of gravity) is infinite-
dimensional. The standard measure on this space is therefore not defined but only
Gaussian measures are available [31, 32]. This complication is likely manageable. An
open question is the proper definition of a geometry (specifically, the curvature term that
enters the action) in the case of an infinite-dimensional space. A rigorously constructed
theory will require considerable technical and formal development, an endeavour left
for future work. In the next section (12.2) we sketch some of the expressions that are
the metric-field counterparts of the equations in chapter 11.
Wallstrom’s problem exists in field theory, too. Recall that the presence of non-
contractible loops requires the existence of nodes of co-dimension two. In field theory
1Of course, without this coincidence we would never have discovered the possibility of trajectory-
Weyl quantisation. More precisely, if the fundamental ontology of the universe is really such an infinite
ensemble of systems individually described by classical language and if the dynamics were not equivalent
with canonical quantisation, then canonical quantisation and standard operational quantum theory would
never have been developed, at least not in the present form.
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this occurs in states corresponding to particular linear combinations of two field modes,
analogous to circular polarisation. For example, if only two such modes k1, k2 in Fourier
space are non-zero, then the infinite-dimensional wave functional can be written in the
form of a two-dimensional wavefunction. For example,
Ψ(k1, k2) = R(|k21 + k22|) [cos k1 + i sin k2], (12.1)
where R(|k21 + k22|) is the ‘radial’ part of Ψ and satisfies R(0) = 0, so that there is a
node on the ‘∞ − 2’ dimensional ‘line’ k1 = 0 = k2. The existence of such states
implies that Wallstrom’s objection also applies to the infinite-dimensional field theory,
not just to simple non-relativistic particle mechanics.
The success of such the trajectory-Weyl approach to quantum field theory is yet
to be determined, although one may be hopeful. Ultimately the goal is, of course, its
application to gravity. Multiple preliminary investigations need to be undertaken here:
the quantisation of time-reparameterisation invariant systems such as those described
in chapter 2, the quantisation of relational theories such as the precursors to Shape
Dynamics as described above, a series of minisuperspace models, which may provide
some insight regarding the scheme’s application to gravity, in particular in the context
of cosmology, the question whether a fully covariant quantisation is possible with this
method or if a particular choice of physical time such as York time has to be made, or
if we should disregard general relativity all together in favour of Shape Dynamics, and
so on. Undoubtedly this work would easily take up another thesis, likely more. Here
we contend with laying the foundation for what may ultimately turn out to be a viable
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contender for a theory of quantum gravity.
12.2 Application to gravity and cosmology
Applying the above quantisation scheme to gravity — presumably to the spatial metric
field for a chosen slicing such as the York-time (constant-mean-curvature) foliation —
introduces a number of technical issues. In addition, it is notationally cumbersome and
some development in this area will be necessary for the theory to be viably analysed. Let
us sketch some of the steps toward this wavefunction-free theory of quantum gravity.
The basic dynamical variables (the ‘qi’ above) in the case of gravity are the possible
configuration of the metric field qab(x). We reserve the symbol gab(x) (or (q0)ab(x)) for
the analogue of the initial variable value or ‘coordinate’ that was called x (or initially
qi0) above, while x in this chapter refers to points of space. The configuration space
is the infinite-dimensional function space of all possible functions qab(x) which are
suitably well behaved, the precise meaning of which will have to be determined but will
presumably involve being symmetric in the indices (ab) and smooth almost everywhere,
and possibly satisfying other properties relating to finiteness and continuity. One way
to ‘translate’ the finite-dimensional quantities from the last chapter to the functional
quantities of the present one is to treat x itself like an additional index, albeit one that
takes values not from a finite subset of N but from R3 in the case of a flat cosmology and
from S3 in a closed one. Sums over indices become integrals over space, in addition
to the finite sums over the two standard indices of the metric. One plausible proposal
for a simplifying notation would be to write qab(x) rather than qab(x) together with an
287
‘Einstein integration convention’, integrating over recurring ‘(x)’. However, we will
not use this here but leave this to be investigated further in future work.
A technical issue that arises in the case of the flat cosmology is that integrals over R3
are, in general, not finite even if the integrand is finite everywhere. One will therefore
require some form of normalisation. This could take the form of a suitably infinitesimal
pre-factor cancelling the infinity or the introduction of a coordinate ‘box’ of space,
giving finite integration limits. The infinite limit of this box could then be taken at the
level of measurable quantities.2
The expression for the classical action analogous to equation 11.1, using York time
T , would read
I1 =
∫
dT L
[
qab(x)(T ), q
′
ab(x)(T ), T
)
, L =
∫
d3x L
(
qab(x)(T ), q
′
ab(x)(T ), T
)
.
(12.2)
Here we used the convention to use square brackets for dependence on functional ar-
guments and mixed brackets ‘[...)’ if both functional as well as conventional arguments
occur. The expression qab(x)(T ) is to be understood as the variable q with finite indices
ab, continuous ‘index’ (x), as a function of time T . We see how the notation quickly be-
comes difficult to read and proposed convention of placing (x) in the super or subscript,
for example, may help with clarity.
The analogue of the action written with the initial ‘coordinate’ gab(x) ≡ (q0)ab(x)
2Alternatively, the theory might be investigated with a suitably chosen box size, such as the size of the
observable universe (of order 10− 100 gigaparsecs today). The latter idea would correspond to choosing
a coordinate limit such that the line integral across the box would give a physical distance of this order,
using a classically plausible choice of metric configuration. However, since here classical notions of
distance are introduced, this method appears less desirable than taking the infinite limit.
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included (equation 11.3) is
I1
[
(q0)ab(x), T0;T1
)
=∫
T1
T0
dT L
[
qab(x)
[
(q0)ab(x);T
)
, q′ab(x)
[
(q0)ab(x)
[
(q0)ab(x);T
)
, T
)
.
(12.3)
The need for more concise yet clear notation is evident. Application of the open-
endpoint principle leads to vanishing of the momenta just as above. Spelled out (analo-
gous to eq. 11.5),
piab(x)
[
qab(x)
(
T1, (q0)ab(x)
]
, q′ab(x)
(
T1, (q0)ab(x)
]
, T
)
≡ δL
δqab(x)
[
qab(x)
(
T1, (q0)ab(x)
]
, q′ab(x)
(
T1, (q0)ab(x)
]
, T
)
= 0. (12.4)
The ensemble minimisation principle above involved an integral of the full con-
figuration space together with a suitable measure µ. The corresponding expression
(analogous to eq. 11.10) is, formally,
IEns =
∫
C
Dgab(x) µ
[
gab(x)
]
I1
[
gab(x), T0;T1
)
. (12.5)
In close analogy with the developments in chapter 11 we have now abandoned the no-
tation (q0)ab(x) in favour of the ‘coordinate’ gab(x). The term Dgab(x) denotes the
coordinate integration measure (itself an issue, to be addressed below), with the physi-
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cal, dynamical measure being given by µ as above.
This raises the second major technical problem. Measures on function spaces are
difficult to define. For example, there is no notion of a basic Lebesque measure. Only
Gaussian measures exist [31, 32]. The way forward here would likely be to first repeat
the finite-dimensional trajectory-Weyl quantisation with such Gaussian measures only
(in standard quantum mechanics a Gaussian rather than Lebesque measure over the con-
figuration/Hilbert space changes the position representation of operators, for example,
but is also possible). Then one could construct a field-theoretic analogy of that. The
issue is, I believe, manageable at least in principle, even if complicated.
Another difficulty is the correct notion of the analogue of a Weyl geometry in a
function space. The naı¨ve expression for length transport3 is
`+ d` = `+ `
∫
d3x φab(x)Dgab(x). (12.6)
This expression alone involves two technical issues: First, the integral is over all space,
which may be infinite. This can be dealt with via a nominal coordinate box. The second
issue is that a small shift Dgab (not to be confused with the functional volume element
Dgab) in the function space requires a metricM on this function space in the first place.4
This problem is exactly that of the coordinate integration measure mentioned earlier.
There is no unique or obvious way to choose this metric. A further complication (though
one that can be dealt with) arises with the need to identify metric configurations that
3The way to define the length of a vector in a function space in the first place is not obviously unique
either.
4The deWitt supermetric Gabcd together with integration over all space (since the deWitt supermetric
is map from two metric values at a point to a number, while M is to be a map from two metric functions)
comes to mind, although this would require some a priori justification.
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correspond to the same geometry (that is, are related via three-diffeomorphisms).
One then has to define a notion akin to curvature for the function space. I am not
currently aware of how far such notions have been developed by mathematicians. A
significant degree of function-space theory will be necessary to make trajectory-Weyl
quantisation rigorous for the metric field. What the resulting dynamics look like will be
seen.
A more basic development is necessary first if the system to be quantised in this
manner was obtained by Hamiltonian reduction, specifically with York time as the phys-
ical time parameter. The developments of chapter 11 were in a Lagrangian style (a term
was added to the action), while the reduced-Hamiltonian theory is by its very nature a
Hamiltonian formalism. Naı¨vely, on might propose deriving a physical (or ‘reduced’)
Lagrangian from the reduced Hamiltonian via a Legendre transform, schematically (for
a finite-dimensional model):
Lphys = q
′apa −Hphys(q, p, T ). (12.7)
This is however problematic since the dynamics in the reduced-Hamiltonian theory is
not determined only by the physical Hamiltonian but also, crucially, by the Poisson
structure. Equations of motion derived via minimisation from a Lagrangian principle
would be incorrect since the non-canonical Poisson structure would be lost.
Instead this requires the development of the proposed quantisation scheme in the
Hamiltonian picture. Another option however could be to quantise in the trajectory-
Weyl style prior to Hamiltonian reduction. In this case the quantisation scheme needs
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to be extended to include time-reparameterisation invariant systems (with general lapse
functions N ) and the procedure of Hamiltonian reduction would need to be extended
to include terms involving the configuration-space curvature. Developments in funda-
mental analytical mechanics appear to form the foundation of this approach to quantum
gravity, no matter which line of inquiry is pursued.
A short-term goal may be the quantisation of cosmological minisuperspace models
(such as those of chapter 5 and section 7.2), which only have a finite number of di-
mensions. In this case the homogeneous gravitational and matter degrees of freedom
would take the role of the variables qi of chapter 11. Even this development however
requires the quantisation scheme to be expressed in a Hamiltonian-compatible form, at
least if connection with a reduced-Hamiltonian picture is to be made. An open question
here is one we already touched upon, then with regards to canonical quantisation. It
equally arises in the case of geometry-trajectory quantisation: is quantising the cosmol-
ogy equivalent to ‘cosmologising’ the quantum theory? That is, is the dynamics one
obtains by quantising a minisuperspace model the same as those obtained by imposing
the selected minisuperspace symmetries onto the full quantum theory?
The goal of this chapter was not to present a full theory of quantum gravity. In-
deed, this would be beyond the scope of any single thesis. Instead the goal was to
lay out as clearly as reasonably possible a research programme based on the quanti-
sation method developed in chapter 11, possibly in conjunction with the physical-time
reduced-Hamiltonian approach that has formed the main part of this work.
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CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSION
An ideal candidate for a fundamental theory of quantum gravity would have the follow-
ing features:
1. It should have a self-consistent mathematical structure and its axioms or princi-
ples should be independent of any non-quantum-gravitational regime, such as a
low-energy or large-scale limit.
2. It should provide a clear ontological picture of what sorts of entities constitute the
world at the fundamental level.
3. In the appropriate respective limits it should recover an empirically adequate clas-
sical theory of gravity (such as general relativity or Shape Dynamics) and the
quantum field theory of the standard model.1
4. It should make clear predictions about in principle empirically accessible quanti-
ties for regimes in which both quantum as well as gravitational effects are impor-
tant (such as the very early universe) and that are outside the scope of our current
1The subject here is a fundamental theory of quantum gravity that includes appropriate matter content,
not a quantum theory of pure gravity (unless is itself purely geometrical, for example, described via a
Kaluza-Klein mechanism).
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best fundamental theories.
I would believe that these criteria are for the most part uncontroversial. That the theory
be consistent is obvious and that it avoid reference to other regimes is a requirement for
the theory to be fundamental and not, for example, to suffer from an analogue of the
measurement problem, which in quantum mechanics arises as the result of the reliance
of the theory on external regimes (such as classical observers) to which the theory does
not apply.
The second point (concerning ontology) might not be considered important by work-
ers without realist sympathies. This is ultimately a question of the philosophy of sci-
ence, the full extent of which we cannot discuss in the confines of this thesis. How-
ever, providing a clear picture of ontology is arguably necessary for the theory to have
explanatory rather than merely predictive value. At least historically this has been a
feature of successful theories in physics, including some formulations of quantum me-
chanics.
The third point is a necessity if the theory is to be empirically adequate. It may be
possible that the limit of the fundamental theory leads to a classical theory of gravity,
for example, that is structurally different from known theories such as general relativity
or Shape Dynamics, but still agrees with observation. In such a case the theory of
quantum gravity would provide a new way ‘for free’ to understand classical gravity.
But even then general relativity and Shape Dynamics would form effective theories in
the low-energy large-scale regime.
The final point is necessary for the theory to be falsifiable independent of the em-
pirical status of its effective form in the low-energy regimes of classical gravity and
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quantum field theory. If the theory has open parameters these should be determinable
by experiment but not in such a way that they can be made to fit any set of observations,
lest the theory lose its scientific value.
A criterion that could be added to the list is that the theory should be derivable from
a small number of well-defined physical principles. Indeed such a property would be
desirable. However, it is not obvious that nature has to behave in a manner that allows
for the reduction of its structure to simple principles or axioms. While many theories
in the past have satisfied this criterion (indeed, a substantial effort is made today to
axiomatise the structure of quantum theory, information-theoretically or otherwise), it
is not a given that there is a fundamental theory of quantum gravity that is reducible in
this manner.
How does the quantisation (canonical or otherwise) of reduced-Hamiltonian theo-
ries of gravity, in particular our theory based on York time fare? The mathematical
structure of our theory is effectively that of quantum mechanics applied to a confor-
mal geometry as its physical degrees of freedom, together with an appropriate matter
content. In the canonical theory one has a wavefunction and (in the de Broglie-Bohm
approach) a trajectory in configuration space (recall that position space is considered
physically preferred not only in de Broglie-Bohm theory, but also by the commutator
structure of the quantised reduced-Hamiltonian theory). The constraints that arise as
part of the reduction fit neatly into this framework (section 10.1 above) and there is no
sign of any internal inconsistency.2 Crucially, the theory is also consistent with time
2Proving that a theory is actually consistent is in general very difficult. It is a lot easier, usually, to
show that an inconsistent theory is just that, while in the case of a consistent theory one must point to the
absence of obvious inconsistencies.
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evolution, which was not the case in the unreduced theory of general relativity in the
ADM description, whose quantisation led to a frozen universe. In the trajectory-Weyl
approach a number of technical questions remain to be explored (see chapter 12), and
only once these are overcome the consistency of the theory can be fully assessed. How-
ever, at least in the finite-dimensional model this method of quantisation did not lead to
any obvious inconsistencies.
The ontology of our theories is also clear. In the canonical theory the universe is
made up of a complex entity mathematically described by a wavefunctional — a com-
plex function over spatial geometries — and possibly (in the de Broglie-Bohm picture)
a concrete ‘world’ represented by a moving point (or ‘particle’) in the configuration
space. Whether or not this is a satisfactory ontological picture is a different question
(mostly independent of gravity and dependent more generally on quantum theory). But
either way, it is a clear proposal for an ontology. In the trajectory-Weyl picture, the
universe instead consists of an infinite continuity of ‘classical-like’ worlds (each rep-
resentable by a single point in configuration space), evolving dynamically in time de-
pendent on one another. There is no wavefunction. In both theories time has a status
analogous to standard classical and quantum mechanics, although it is physically mean-
ingful (since the dynamics is explicitly time dependent). While this does not answer the
question ‘what is time?’ this issue is no more pressing than the same question asked in
the context of classical mechanics.
The limits of the theories are expected to satisfy the third criterion. A classical limit
may be obtained, for example, via Ehrenfest’s theorem or by analysis of the quantum
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trajectories in conditions representing a classical-like regime.3 Quantum field theory is
expected to be recovered in the case where matter fields dominate and the gravitational
field is approximately static flat space. An issue that arises here is that in such a scenario
no York time passes, so quantum field theory can never be obtained exactly but must be
always be understood as a limit (to some extent the situation is analogous to the York-
time description of inflation in section 5.4). In fact, given the intrinsically geometrical
nature of York time, completely new insights into ‘Minkowski’ quantum field theory
may be gained by analysing this limit. A non-trivial amount of work will be necessary
to develop this.
Finally, the description of the early universe in York-time geometrodynamics is
qualitatively no different from later eras: time passes and geometric and matter quan-
tities evolve. In fact, the universe is infinitely old and all time but the very last finite
interval belong to the so-called Planck era. Our theory requires further developments
in order to identify what the measurable remnants of this era are. This may be via the
quantum perturbation theory developed in this thesis, or take the form of non-linear
(that is, non-perturbative) effects. Relating the theory to actual experimental measure-
ments and distinguishing it empirically will require more work. The scientific value of
the theory will rest, at least to a substantial part, on these developments.
Suppose then that quantised York-time geometrodynamics (canonical or trajectory-
Weylian) or perhaps some other still unknown approach to quantum gravity turns out to
3There is no complete consensus, it seems, on what constitutes a rigorous derivation of the classical
limit of a quantum theory. Frequent approaches include considering the limit of the theory as ~ →
0 (which makes no physical sense since ~ is a constant and showing that the theory leads to certain
dynamics in this limit has no bearing on the physical emergence of the macroscopic classical world) or
introducing ‘sufficiently classical states’ (which begs the question how these states arise dynamically in
the case of systems that are expected to behave approximately classical, such as people and planets).
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be an ideal theory in the sense of the criteria above, and further presume that this theory
becomes well corroborated by experiment. That is, the theory of quantum gravity has
been found. What is left for fundamental physics?
The search for quantum gravity is not the only big outstanding question in theoret-
ical physics: What is the cosmological constant and why is it what it is? Did inflation
really occur and what are the actual mechanisms responsible for it if it did? If it did
not, what explains the CMB homogeneity and scale-invariant power spectrum? What
about the flatness problem? What are the details of the reheating mechanism? In what
ways, if any, does the standard model have to be modified? What is the fundamental
(field?) theory describing matter physics at high energies and justifies the renormalisa-
tion of known field theories, which are understood to be only effective at sufficiently
low energies? The list goes on.
One would hope that a full theory of quantum gravity might provide answers to a
number of these questions, for example, explain the apparent value of the cosmological
constant and provide a natural mechanism for inflation. However, even then physics
is left with more fundamental questions: Why are there three spatial and one temporal
dimension (at least at the classical level)? What explains the value of constants in
physics, such as the parameters of the standard model? Why are the symmetries of
space and time — or whatever structure underlies them at the fundamental level —
what they are?
One can ask questions that go even deeper: Is there an underlying reason why the
laws of physics are what they are? That is, why do the equations of quantum gravity
take one form rather than another? Even with the laws in place, how did the uni-
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verse ‘decide’ what the boundary conditions should be? In a very modest sense, the
trajectory-geometry approach to quantisation might be considered to contribute to that
last question. No single trajectory is ontologically preferred and no initial configuration
is selected. However, as the theory stands currently boundary conditions still need to be
applied to the density of trajectories (or the measure on the space).
This line of questioning leads naturally to a desire for a sort of necessitarianism
— the idea that the universe is exactly as it is because it could not possibly have been
otherwise, neither laws nor boundary conditions. That is, there is an underlying reason
why this is the only consistent way for the universe to be. The idea of necessitarianism
has its own history going back at least Anthony Collins in the early eighteenth century
[30], although the subject has been firmly one of philosophy and arguably not physics.4
I do not doubt though that if mathematical or logical reasons are found that explain the
boundary conditions of the universe, for example, the programme would very quickly
be adopted by physicists. The implication of this, the idea that all of physics would
be reducible to pure reason (although its discovery would in practice be guided by
observation) is not new. However, at this point in time it is extraordinarily remote.
Nonetheless, I would argue, it is worth pursuing these questions. Who knows where
they might lead.
4Coincidentally, Collins had an extensive correspondence on a variety of philosophical questions
with the very same Samuel Clarke who famously argued with Leibniz over the nature of space, time and
motion [73].
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